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INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the federal Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) in October of
2002, our nation has been engulfed in a debate over the wisdom of replacing our
existing voting machines with new systems that promise fewer ambiguous votes
(or, in the case of Florida in 2000, “hanging chads”) but also may be vulnerable
to attacks or malfunctions. The quest to provide Americans with voting machines
that properly record their intended selections and protect those selections in the
case of a recount has turned out to be far more difficult than anyone expected.
In 2002, many saw electronic voting systems as a panacea: an alternative to
punchcard and lever machines that would both record voters’ selections more
accurately and provide greater accessibility to voters with disabilities. But by
2004, the vulnerability of electronic systems to attack or malfunction spawned a
national movement for the return to paper-based systems. Often lost in this pub-
lic debate about the security of “electronic” versus “paper” systems have been the
many other values that elections officials must consider when deciding which sys-
tems to purchase and how to best use those systems after they are purchased.
In an effort to address the most serious concerns about new voting technology, the
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law assembled four Task Forces of
the nation’s leading experts in the areas of security, accessibility, usability and
cost, to perform the first ever comprehensive and empirical analysis of electron-
ic voting systems. The analysis focused on the three principal types of voting 
systems being purchased today: Direct Recording Electronic (“DRE”) systems,
DREs with voter-verified auditable paper trails (“DREs w/VVPT”), and
Precinct Count Optical Scan (“PCOS”) systems. To support Task Force analy-
ses, the Center researched state and local election laws, reviewed voting system
contracts, and conducted interviews with hundreds of election officials. The
result of this work is a four-chapter report that offers policy makers, election
administrators, and members of the public a more nuanced and complete under-
standing of new voting systems than ever before.
Two themes emerge from our four-part analysis. First, there has been surprising-
ly little empirical study of voting systems in the areas of security, accessibility,
usability, and cost. The result is that jurisdictions are making purchasing decisions
and adopting laws and procedures that bear little correlation to the goals they
seek to accomplish. Advocates urge security measures that provide questionable
security value, while ignoring steps that provide the best chance of catching the
simplest attacks on the integrity of an election. Jurisdictions purchase accessible
voting machines that do not yet fully address the needs of their disabled commu-
nities and without obtaining contractual guarantees that new accessibility fea-
tures will be added at little or no extra cost as they become available. Counties
make decisions about ballot design and instruction language without performing
usability testing to avoid voter confusion and mistake. And state and local elec-
tion officials often purchase voting machines by looking almost exclusively at ini-
tial costs, with little regard to long-term costs, which will almost always make up
the vast majority of the voting system’s total cost.
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Second, there is not yet any perfect voting system or set of procedures. One sys-
tem might be more affordable than others, but less accessible to the disabled;
some election procedures might make systems easier to use, but less secure.
Communities across the country will have to decide what is most important to
them: how much are they willing to pay for secure, usable, and accessible systems?
Will they sacrifice usability for security? Accessibility for cost? In some cases, the
decisions will be mandated by law. In others, there will be difficult choices to
make. Election officials and the public should be aware of the trade-offs they are
making when choosing one voting system or set of procedures over another, and
they should know how to improve achievement of all four values, irrespective of
which system they choose.
■ VOTING  SYSTEMS DEFINED
Although we have analyzed specific manufacturers’ products to complete our
assessment, our primary objective has not been to rate or rank particular prod-
ucts, but rather to assess the various different types of voting systems. Where pos-
sible, we have analyzed six voting system architectures.
Direct Recording Electronic (“DRE”) voting systems directly record, in electron-
ic form, the voters’ selections in each race or contest on the ballot. Typical DRE
machines have flat panel display screens with touch-screen input, although other
display technologies have been used, including print on paper, and other input
technologies have been used, such as push-button. Such systems can be compared
with mechanical lever voting machines which directly record votes on mechani-
cal counters inside the machine. Neither DREs nor lever voting machines create
a tangible physical record of the voter’s selections on a physical ballot.
The defining characteristic of DRE machines is that votes are captured electron-
ically and stored in that form. Such machines may print a durable paper record
of the votes cast, for example, after the polls are closed or on an internal printer,
but this record is not subject to voter verification. DRE machines also record
Event Logs giving the time of each significant operation on the machine, such as
when it was set up for an election, when the polls were opened, when the polls
were closed, and when a ballot was cast (but not which ballot was cast). At the
close of polls, vote totals, the Event Log, and all votes cast may be printed. In
addition, electronic records of these may be extracted from the machine (for
example, on removable media such as disks or compact electronic memory mod-
ules), or the records may be transmitted electronically to a vote collection center
(for example, by modem).
Procedures for using these alternatives vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Typically, the electronic transmission or the electronic memory module is deliv-
ered to a central vote-counting system (for example, in the county election head-
quarters), where jurisdiction-wide totals are computed.
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There are three subtypes of DRE machines, based on the style of user inter-
faces/interaction:
1. The scrolling DRE uses a touch-screen to collect user input (when not in an
audio ballot mode) and typically allows voters to page through separate
screens for separate offices. Examples include: Sequoia Edge, the ES&S
iVotronic, Diebold AccuVote-TS and -TSX, AVS WinVote, and UniLect
Patriot.
2. The full-face DRE has no paging, and it generally involves an electro-
mechanical human interface, which uses switches providing tactile feedback
to the voter. (The Avante DRE does produce a full-face ballot that uses a
touch-screen)  Examples include: Sequoia Advantage, Nedap ESI1 and
Danaher/Guardian Voting Systems Shouptronic/ELECTronic 1242.
3. DREs with off-screen mechanical control allow the user to view options dis-
played on a screen but provides input via buttons, switches, dials or other
input devices. Examples include: Hart InterCivic’s eSlate.
DREs with Voter-Verifiable Paper Trails (“DRE w/ VVPT”) capture voter choic-
es internally in purely electronic form and contemporaneously on paper in a
record that can be verified by the voter. The paper record is usually not physical-
ly handled by voters, and it remains at the polling place, mechanically stored
within or near the DRE machine used to cast the vote. DREs w/ VVPT include
those that ensure voter privacy by automatically separating and randomizing vote
selections for storage and those with reel-to-reel designs. Proponents of DREs w/
VVPT assume that in the case of a discrepancy between the internally stored
electronic vote and the voter-verified physical ballot securely stored within or
near the machine, the physical ballots would be the votes of record. Examples
include: AccuPoll, Avante Vote-Tracker EVC-308SPR, Sequoia VeriVote with
Printer attachment, TruVote, Diebold AccuView VVPT Printer, Diebold
Election Systems.
Precinct Count Optical Scan (“PCOS”) machines require voters to mark paper
ballots, typically with pencils, independent of any machine, and carry their
sleeved ballots to un-sleeve and insert into scanners that optically sense their
votes. Initial tabulation is generally done at the polling place after the polls close.
In most PCOS systems, voters are warned of overvotes and undervotes and are
given a chance to correct mistaken ballots. Examples include: Avante Optical
Vote Tracker, ES&S Model 100, Sequoia-branded and ES&S-branded Optech
III-P Eagle, and Diebold AccuVote-OS.
Ballot Marking Device (“BMD”) systems produce a marked ballot (usually paper)
that is the result of voter interaction with visual or audio prompts provided by a
computerized interface. The result is a voter-verifiable ballot that may or may not
be accessibly verified. Some BMDs count votes internally (as do DRE systems)
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and may save voter selection information. For any BMD that does count, save, or
use cryptography or other techniques to make it difficult to insert fraudulent bal-
lots prepared on other devices (before, during or after actual voting), any dis-
crepancy between records stored within a BMD and physical ballots produced
would provide clear evidence of malfunction or fraud and initiate an investiga-
tion to determine the source of the discrepancy and the invalid ballots, whether
electronic or physical. Examples include: AutoMark and Populex.
Vote-by-Mail systems dispense ballots by mail for voters to mark and mail back
to a central location for counting by hand or by machine. Examples include: Hart
InterCivic's BallotNow.
Vote-by-Phone systems permit a voter to call a special number, identify herself,
and cast a ballot via audio prompts.
Because of a lack of information about the performance of BMD, Vote-by-Mail,
and Vote-by-Phone systems, we did not include an assessment of those systems in
the chapter on security. Because Vote-by-Mail and Vote-by-Phone are not wide-
ly available commercially, we did not include either of these systems in our analy-
sis of the cost of voting systems.
■ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have included key findings and recommendations in each chapter. These
findings and recommendations may be used by state and local governments
around the country to make purchasing decisions and to enact laws and proce-
dures that comport with their priorities. Furthermore, policy makers can use
these findings and recommendations to ensure that no matter what their priori-
ties are, their voting systems will be as secure, accessible, usable, and affordable as
possible. The recommendations from each chapter are listed in brief below.
■■ CHAPTER ONE: VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY
Three fundamental points emerge from our security analysis: (1) All of the most
commonly purchased electronic voting systems – DREs, DREs w/ VVPT, and
PCOS – have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities, which pose a real
danger to the integrity of national, state, and local elections. (2) The most trou-
bling vulnerabilities of each system can be substantially remedied if proper coun-
termeasures are implemented at the state and local level. (3) Few jurisdictions
have implemented any of the key countermeasures that could make the least dif-
ficult attacks against voting systems much more difficult to execute successfully.
The Brennan Center’s Task Force on Voting System Security reviewed more than
120 potential threats to voting systems. Among its key conclusions was the find-
ing that attacks involving the insertion of software attack programs or other cor-
rupt software are the least difficult attacks against all electronic systems currently
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being purchased, when the goal is to change the outcome of a close statewide
election. In addition, voting machines that have wireless components are signifi-
cantly more vulnerable to a wide array of attacks. Currently, only two states, New
York and Minnesota, ban wireless components on all voting machines.
There are a number of steps that jurisdictions can take to address the vulnera-
bilities identified in the analysis and make their voting systems significantly more
secure. The Task Force recommends adoption of the following security measures:
■ Conduct automatic routine audits comparing voter-verified paper records to
the electronic record following every election. A voter-verified paper record
accompanied by a solid automatic routine audit of those records can go a
long way toward making the least difficult attacks much more difficult.
■ Perform “parallel testing” (selection of voting machines at random and test-
ing them as realistically as possible) on Election Day. For paperless DREs, in
particular, parallel testing will help jurisdictions detect software-based attacks
as well as subtle software bugs that may not be discovered during inspection
and other testing.
■ Ban use of voting machines with wireless components. All three voting sys-
tems are more vulnerable to attack if they have wireless components.
■ Use a transparent and random selection process for all auditing procedures.
For any auditing to be effective (and to ensure that the public is confident in
such procedures), jurisdictions must develop and implement transparent and
random selection procedures.
■ Ensure decentralized programming and voting system administration.
Where a single entity, such as a vendor or state or national consultant, per-
forms key tasks for multiple jurisdictions, attacks against statewide elections
become easier.
■ Institute clear and effective procedures for addressing evidence of fraud or
error. Both Automatic Routine Audits and Parallel Testing are of question-
able security value without effective procedures for action where evidence of
machine malfunction and/or fraud is discovered. Detection of fraud without
an appropriate response will not prevent attacks from succeeding.
Fortunately, these steps are not particularly complicated or cumbersome. For the
most part, they do not involve significant changes in system architecture.
Unfortunately, very few jurisdictions have implemented any of the security measures that the
Task Force’s analysis shows are necessary to make voting systems substantially more secure.
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■■ CHAPTER TWO: VOTING SYSTEM ACCESSIBILITY
There are many reasons for election officials and the general public to be con-
cerned with ensuring that we have created fully accessible voting systems. Not
least of these is that the creation of such systems is long overdue: even today, mil-
lions of Americans cannot vote independently and secretly on the voting
machines in their precincts. For this reason, many of these citizens have found
voting to be a difficult and demeaning experience. It should surprise no one that
the majority of such citizens do not vote.
In addition to reasons of fundamental fairness, there are practical reasons for
election officials to ensure that their systems are accessible. First, it is legally
required. Second, disabled voters represent a very large and growing segment of
the population. Put plainly, no matter where their jurisdictions are located, elec-
tion officials are likely to find that a significant percentage of the citizens they
work for are disabled and that the numbers of such citizens will continue to grow
for the foreseeable future.
To ensure that voting systems are as accessible as possible, the Brennan Center’s
Task Force on Voting System Accessibility makes the following recommendations:
■ Accessibility assessments must take into account the specific needs of citizens
with multiple disabilities. For example, solutions that solve barriers faced by
voters with visual impairments by providing an audio ballot do not help a
voter who is both blind and deaf.
■ To determine accessibility, officials and advocates should examine each step
a voting system requires a voter to perform, starting with ballot marking and
ending with ballot submission. Systems that may provide enhanced accessi-
bility features at one stage of the voting process may be inaccessible to the
same voters at another stage in that process.
■ Accessibility tests must take into account a full range of disabilities. When
selecting participants for system tests, officials and advocates should include
people with sensory disabilities (e.g., vision and hearing impairments), people
with physical disabilities (e.g., spinal cord injuries and coordination difficul-
ties), and people with cognitive disabilities (e.g., learning disabilities and devel-
opmental disabilities). Given the rising number of older voters, officials
should take pains to include older voters in their participant sample.
■ All accessibility tests should be carried out with full ballots that reflect the
complexity of ballots used in elections. A simplified ballot with only a few
races or candidates may produce misleading results.
■ Many features that ensure accessible voting are new to the market or still in
development. As election officials purchase systems today, they should obtain
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contractual guarantees from vendors that vendors will retrofit their systems
with new accessibility features as such technology becomes available, and that
these adjustments will be made at little or no extra cost.
■■ CHAPTER THREE: VOTING SYSTEM USABILITY
The performance of a voting system is measured in part by its success in allow-
ing a voter to cast a valid ballot that reflects her intended selections without
undue delays or burdens. This system quality is known as “usability.” Following
several high-profile controversies in the last few elections – including, most noto-
riously, the 2000 controversy over the “butterfly ballot” in Palm Beach – voting
system usability is a subject of utmost concern to both voters and election offi-
cials. After careful study of published research and new studies conducted for this
report on the voter confidence in and effectiveness and efficiency of various elec-
tronic voting systems, the Brennan Center’s Task Force on Voting System
Usability makes the following recommendations:
■ Do not assume familiarity with technology. Where feasible, elections officials
should address this concern in usability testing among likely voters to deter-
mine the precise effects of different design elements upon voters with limited
familiarity with the technology in question. The results of such testing should
also inform the design of voter education and outreach and poll worker train-
ing prior to the election.
■ Conduct usability testing on proposed ballots before finalizing their design.
Usability testing of specific models within a type of voting system is critical if
election officials are to reduce unnecessary voter errors.
■ Create plain language instructions and messages in both English and other
languages commonly used in the jurisdiction. Use of plain language that is
easy to understand quickly is critical to avoiding voter error. Plain language
instructions in both English and other prevalent languages are critical to
reduce voter errors, even where multiple language ballots are not required
under the Voting Rights Act.
■ Locate instructions so they are not confusing or ignored. Instructions should
be placed in the top left of the frame, where possible. In addition, informa-
tion should be presented in a single-column format rather than a multi-col-
umn format to improve readability.
■ For both ballots and instructions, incorporate standard conventions used in
product interfaces to communicate a particular type of information or mes-
sage. Consistent use of generic conventions (e.g., red = warning or error)
throughout the voting process allows the voter to rely on her existing experi-
ence to streamline the process and clarify otherwise ambiguous instructions.
INTRODUCTION 7
■ Do not create ballots where candidates for the same office appear in multiple
columns or on multiple pages. Listing candidates for the same office in mul-
tiple columns or on multiple pages (as in the infamous “butterfly ballot” used
in Palm Beach County, Florida in 2000, or in optical scan ballots that allow
a contest to continue from one column to another) produces higher rates of
residual votes (both overvotes and undervotes).
■ Use fill-in-the-oval ballots, not connect-the-arrow ballots, for optical scan sys-
tems. In optical scan systems, residual votes (and especially overvotes) are less
common on fill-in-the-oval ballots than on connect-the-arrow ballots. The
latter design should not be used.
■ Eliminate extraneous information on ballots. Ballot design should eliminate
all extraneous information from the voter’s field of vision and minimize visu-
al or audio distractions from the task at hand. Voters may become over-
whelmed or confused by unnecessary material.
■ Ensure that ballot instructions make clear that voters should not cast both a
write-in and normal vote. Write-in lines are a source of many overvotes, as
many voters select a candidate whose name is printed on the ballot and then
write the same name on the write-in line. Election officials should make sure
that instructions clearly state voters should not cast votes in both areas of the
ballot. At the same time, state laws should be amended to require that such
ballots be counted rather than set aside as spoiled, as long as both the write-
in vote and the normal vote are clearly cast for the same candidate.
■ Provide mechanisms for recording and reviewing votes. Voting systems
should provide ongoing feedback to the voter to ensure that she knows which
selections she has already made, and which remain. This information helps
to prevent voter confusion, which may otherwise result in lost votes.
■ Make clear when the voter has completed each step or task in the voting
process. Whether through clear organization of the ballot or through express
messages on a screen, the system should reduce the likelihood of confusion
or error by instructing voters how to complete each task and then making
clear when each task has been successfully completed.
■ Minimize the memory load on the voter by allowing her to review, rather
than remember, each of her choices during the voting process. Undue mem-
ory burdens reduce accuracy and may confuse voters and lead to errors or
delays.
■ Ensure that the voting system plainly notifies the voter of her errors. In par-
ticular, a voter should be informed of any over- or undervote prior to casting
her vote. In paper-based systems such as optical scan systems, this require-
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ment means that the scanner must be programmed so that the ballot is imme-
diately returned to the voter for correction of either of these kinds of error.
■ Make it easy for voters to correct their errors. If voters find it difficult to cor-
rect their own errors during the voting process, then the number of voters
who choose not to make corrections increases, leading to higher residual vote
rates. Accordingly, the mechanism for correcting errors must be easy both to
understand and to execute, without any unnecessary, extra steps to complete.
■■ CHAPTER FOUR: VOTING SYSTEM COST
In interviews with the Brennan Center, election officials frequently cited cost as
the determinative factor when choosing among systems. All too often, however,
they did not have sufficient information to understand the full cost implications
of purchasing any particular system.
The Brennan Center surveyed hundreds of election officials, interviewed dozens
more, and reviewed over 35 recently completed contracts and bids for voting
machines. Based on the results of our surveys, interviews and review of contracts
and bids, we reached the following conclusions about voting system cost:
■ The total costs of voting systems will vary greatly from jurisdiction to juris-
diction depending on at least seven different factors. These factors, and their
likely effects on cost, are detailed in this report.
■ The initial costs of a voting system are likely to be a small percentage of the
system over its total life-span. Voting systems that initially cost a jurisdiction
less money may end up being more expensive than other systems after a few
years.
■ DRE systems without VVPT are less expensive than similar DREs w/ VVPT
under all circumstances, for both initial and ongoing costs.
■ PCOS systems (with accessible DREs) are less expensive than similar PCOS
systems with BMDs under all circumstances, for both initial and ongoing
costs.
■ Vendors offer significant volume discounts. To the extent that counties and
states can pool their purchases, they are likely to save considerably in the pur-




ABOUT THE TASK FORCE
In 2005, the Brennan Center convened a Task Force of internationally renowned
government, academic, and private-sector scientists, voting machine experts and
security professionals to conduct the nation's first systematic analysis of security
vulnerabilities in the three most commonly purchased electronic voting systems.
The Task Force spent more than a year conducting its analysis and drafting this
report. During this time, the methodology, analysis, and text were extensively
peer reviewed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”).
The members of the Task Force are:
Chair
Lawrence D. Norden, Brennan Center for Justice
Principal Investigator
Eric L. Lazarus, DecisionSmith
Experts
Georgette Asherman, independent statistical consultant,
founder of Direct Effects
Professor Matt Bishop, University of California at Davis
Lillie Coney, Electronic Privacy Information Center
Professor David Dill, Stanford University 
Jeremy Epstein, PhD, Cyber Defense Agency LLC
Harri Hursti, independent consultant, former CEO of F-Secure PLC
Dr. David Jefferson, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and 
Chair of the California Secretary of State’s Voting Systems 
Technology Assessment and Advisory Board
Professor Douglas W. Jones, University of Iowa
John Kelsey, PhD, NIST
Rene Peralta, PhD, NIST
Professor Ronald Rivest, MIT
Howard A. Schmidt, Former Chief Security Officer, Microsoft and eBay
Dr. Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Internet Security
Joshua Tauber, PhD, formerly of the Computer Science and 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at MIT
Professor David Wagner, University of California at Berkeley
Professor Dan Wallach, Rice University
Matthew Zimmerman, Electronic Frontier Foundation
ABOUT THE TASK FORCE CHAIR
Lawrence Norden is an Associate Counsel with the Brennan Center, working in
the areas of voting technology, voting rights, and government accountability. For
the past year, Mr. Norden has led the Brennan Center’s voting technology assess-
ment project, including the production and creation of this report. He is a con-
tributor to Routledge's forthcoming Encyclopedia of American Civil Liberties. Mr.
Norden edits and writes for the Brennan Center’s blog on New York State,
www.ReformNY.blogspot.com. He is a graduate of the University of Chicago
and the NYU School of Law. Mr. Norden serves as an adjunct faculty member
in the Lawyering Program at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. He may
be reached at lawrence.norden@nyu.edu.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Most importantly, the Brennan Center thanks NIST and its many scientists for
devoting so many hours to its extensive and thorough peer review of the analysis
and report. The report, in its current form, would not exist without NIST’s many
important comments and contributions.
In particular, we thank John Kelsey of NIST for the substantial material and
ideas he provided, which have been incorporated into the report and the report’s
attack catalogs. We also specially thank Rene Peralta for his original contributions
and analysis. Finally, we are enormously grateful to Barbara Guttman, John
Wack and other scientists at NIST, who provided material for the attack catalogs,
helped to develop the structure of the report, and edited many drafts.
We are also extremely appreciative of Principal Investigator Eric Lazarus’s enor-
mous efforts on behalf of this report. His vision, tenacity, and infectious enthusi-
asm carried the team through a lengthy process of analysis and drafting.
A special debt of gratitude is also owed to election officials throughout the coun-
try, who spent many hours responding to surveys and interview questions related
to this report. In addition to team members Professor Ronald Rivest and Dr.
David Jefferson, we particularly thank Patrick Gill, Woodbury County Auditor
and Recorder and Past President of the Iowa State Association of County
Auditors; Elaine Johnston, County Auditor, Asotin County, Washington; Harvard
L. Lomax, Registrar of Voters for Clark County, Nevada; Debbie Smith,
Elections Coordinator, Caleveras County, California; Jocelyn Whitney, Developer
and Project Manager for parallel testing activities in the State of California;
Robert Williams, Chief Information Officer for Monmouth County, New Jersey;
and Pam Woodside, former Chief Information Officer for the Maryland State
Board of Elections. We would also like to acknowledge the National Committee
for Voting Integrity for their cooperation and assistance in this effort.
Jeremy Creelan, Associate Attorney at Jenner & Block LLP, deserves credit for
conceiving, launching. and supervising the Brennan Center’s voting technology
assessment project, including development of this report, as Deputy Director of
the Center’s Democracy Program through February 2005. The Program misses
him greatly and wishes him well in private practice, where he continues to pro-
vide invaluable pro bono assistance.
The Brennan Center is grateful to Task Force member Lillie Coney, Associate
Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Among many other con-
tributions, she provided invaluable assistance in assembling the Task Force, and
frequently offered the Brennan Center sage strategic advice.
This report also benefited greatly from the insightful and thorough editorial 
assistance of Deborah Goldberg, Director of the Brennan Center’s Democracy
Program. We are extremely grateful to Professor Henry Brady of the University
of California at Berkeley and Professor Benjamin Highton of the University of
California at Davis for their insights into the possible effects of denial of service
attacks on voting systems. The Brennan Center also thanks Bonnie Blader, inde-
pendent consultant, who provided the Task Force with crucial research, David M.
Siegel, independent technology consultant, for his original contributions on the
subject of software code inspections, and Tracey Lall, PhD candidate in
Computer Science at Rutgers University, who contributed many hours of critical
security analysis. Douglas E. Dormer, CPA, CTP provided invaluable assistance
in developing the analysis methodology and in keeping the task force focused.
Joseph Lorenzo Hall also must be thanked for helping the Task Force members
understand the diversity and commonality in voting system architectures. Much
of the legal research was conducted by Gloria Garcia and Juan Martinez, J.D.
candidates at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and Annie Lai and S.
Michael Oliver, JD candidates at NYU School of Law. Lowell Bruce McCulley,
CSSP, was exceptionally helpful in creating the attack catalogs. Finally, we thank
Brennan Center Research Associates Annie Chen, Lauren Jones, Ana Muñoz,
and Neema Trivedi for their many hours of dedicated assistance.
Generous grants from an anonymous donor, the Carnegie Corporation of New
York, the Ford Foundation, the HKH Foundation, the Knight Foundation, the
Open Society Institute, and the Rockefeller Family Fund supported the develop-
ment and publication of this report. The statements made and views expressed
in this report are the responsibility solely of the Brennan Center.
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Core Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Voting System Vulnerabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Security Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Voting System Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
What is a Threat Analysis and Why is it Necessary?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Systematic Threat Analyses of Voting Systems Are Long Overdue . . 20
Solid Threat Analyses Should Help Make Systems More Reliable . . 21
What Methodology Was Used for the Threat Analysis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
What Were the Greatest Risks Revealed by the Threat Analysis?. . . . . . . 23
The Least Difficult Attacks Use Software Attack Programs . . . . . . . . 23
Wireless Components Create Unnecessary Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Systems With Paper Records Are Still Subject to Attack . . . . . . . . . . 26
Attacks on DRE w/ VVPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Attacks on PCOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Security Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Recommendation #1:
Conduct Automatic Routine Audit of Paper Records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Recommendation #2:
Conduct Parallel Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Recommendation #3:
Ban Wireless Components on All Voting Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Recommendation #4:
Mandate Transparent and Random Selection Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Recommendation #5:
Ensure Decentralized Programming and Voting System Administration. . 32
Recommendation #6:
Implement Effective Procedures for Addressing Evidence
of Fraud or Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Tables and Figures
Figure S1. Voting Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure S2. Election for Governor, State of Pennasota, 2007. . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure S3. Software Attack Program: Points of Entry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Figure S4. Possible Attack On DRE w/ VVPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

INTRODUCTION
In these pages, the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law (the
“Brennan Center”) summarizes the nation’s first systematic analysis of security
vulnerabilities in the three most commonly purchased electronic voting systems.
To develop the analysis, the Brennan Center convened a Task Force of interna-
tionally renowned government, academic, and private-sector scientists, voting
machine experts, and security professionals.
The Task Force examined  security threats to the technologies used in Direct
Recording Electronic voting systems (“DREs”), DREs with a voter-verified
auditable paper trail (“DREs w/ VVPT”) and Precinct Count Optical Scan
(“PCOS”) systems. The analysis assumes that appropriate physical security and












A DRE machine directly records the voter’s 
selections in each contest, using a ballot that
appears on a display screen. Typical DRE
machines have flat panel display screens with
touch-screen input, although other display 
technologies have been used. The defining
characteristic of these machines is that votes 
are captured and stored electronically.
A DRE w/ VVPT captures a voter’s choice 
both internally in electronic form, and 
contemporaneously on paper. A DRE w/ VVPT
allows the voter to confirm the accuracy of 
the paper record to provide voter-verification. 
PCOS voting machines allows voters to mark
paper ballots, typically with pencils or pens,
independent of any machine. Voters then carry
their sleeved ballots to a scanner. At the scan-
ner, they un-sleeve the ballot and insert into 
the scanner, which optically records the vote.
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The full report (the “Security Report”), which has been extensively peer reviewed
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), may be found
at www.brennancenter.org. Following the analysis outlined here, the Brennan
Center and Task Force members recommend countermeasures that should be
taken to reduce the technological vulnerability of each voting system.1
CORE FINDINGS
Three fundamental points emerge from the threat analysis in the Security Report:
■ All three voting systems have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities,
which pose a real danger to the integrity of national, state, and local elections.
■ The most troubling vulnerabilities of each system can be substantially reme-
died if proper countermeasures are implemented at the state and local level.
■ Few jurisdictions have implemented any of the key countermeasures that
could make the least difficult attacks against voting systems much more diffi-
cult to execute successfully.
VOTING SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES
After a review of more than 120 potential threats to voting systems, the Task
Force reached the following crucial conclusions:
For all three types of voting systems:
■ When the goal is to change the outcome of a close statewide election, attacks
that involve the insertion of software attack programs or other corrupt soft-
ware are the least difficult attacks.
■ Voting machines that have wireless components are significantly more vul-
nerable to a wide array of attacks. Currently, only two states, New York and
Minnesota, ban wireless components on all voting machines.
For DREs without voter-verified paper trails:
■ DREs without voter-verified paper trails do not have available to them a
powerful countermeasure to software attacks: post-election automatic routine
audits that compare paper records to electronic records.
For DREs w/ VVPT and PCOS:
■ The voter-verified paper record, by itself, is of questionable security value.
The paper record has significant value only if an automatic routine audit is
performed (and well designed chain of custody and physical security proce-
dures are followed). Of the 26 states that mandate voter-verified paper
records, only 12 require regular audits.
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■ Even if jurisdictions routinely conduct audits of voter-verified paper records,
DREs w/ VVPT and PCOS are vulnerable to certain software attacks or
errors. Jurisdictions that conduct audits of paper records should be aware of
these potential problems.
SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
There are a number of steps that jurisdictions can take to address the vulnera-
bilities identified in the Security Report and make their voting systems signifi-
cantly more secure. We recommend adoption of the following security measures:
1. Conduct automatic routine audits comparing voter-verified paper records to
the electronic record following every election. A voter-verified paper record
accompanied by a solid automatic routine audit of those records can go a
long way toward making the least difficult attacks much more difficult.
2. Perform “parallel testing” (selection of voting machines at random and test-
ing them as realistically as possible on Election Day.) For paperless DREs, in
particular, parallel testing will help jurisdictions detect software-based attacks,
as well as subtle software bugs that may not be discovered during inspection
and other testing.
3. Ban use of voting machines with wireless components. All three voting sys-
tems are more vulnerable to attack if they have wireless components.
4. Use a transparent and random selection process for all auditing procedures.
For any auditing to be effective (and to ensure that the public is confident in
such procedures), jurisdictions must develop and implement transparent and
random selection procedures.
5. Ensure decentralized programming and voting system administration.
Where a single entity, such as a vendor or state or national consultant, per-
forms key tasks for multiple jurisdictions, attacks against statewide elections
become easier.
6. Institute clear and effective procedures for addressing evidence of fraud or
error. Both Automatic Routine Audits and Parallel Testing are of question-
able security value without effective procedures for action where evidence of
machine malfunction and/or fraud is discovered. Detection of fraud without
an appropriate response will not prevent attacks from succeeding.
Fortunately, these steps are not particularly complicated or cumbersome. For the
most part, they do not involve significant changes in system architecture.
Unfortunately, few jurisdictions have implemented any of these security recommendations.
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VOTING SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES
■ WHAT IS A THREAT ANALYSIS 
AND WHY IS IT NECESSARY?
In the last several years, few issues in the world of voting systems have garnered
as much public attention as voting system security. This attention to voting sys-
tem security has the potential to be a positive force. Unfortunately, too much of
the public discussion surrounding security has been marred by claims and count-
er-claims that are based on little more than speculation or anecdote.
In response to this uninformed discussion, and with the intention of assisting elec-
tion officials and the public as they make decisions about their voting machines,
the Task Force undertook a methodical analysis of potential threats to voting sys-
tems. The threat analysis provides election officials and concerned citizens with
quantifiable criteria for measuring the level of security offered by voting systems
and potential safety measures. It should assist jurisdictions in deciding (a) which
voting systems to certify or purchase, and (b) how to protect those systems from
security threats after they have been purchased. The Security Report sets forth
the detailed results of that analysis, which are summarized here.
■■ SYSTEMATIC THREAT ANALYSES OF VOTING SYSTEMS 
ARE LONG OVERDUE.
Most Americans would agree that the integrity of our elections is fundamental to
our democracy. We want citizens to have full confidence that their votes will be
accurately recorded. Given the current tenor of debate over voting system secu-
rity, this is reason enough to conduct regular systematic threat analyses of voting
systems.
Just as importantly, such analyses, if utilized in developing voting system stan-
dards and procedures, should reduce the risk of attacks on voting systems. As a
nation, we have not always successfully avoided such attacks – in fact, various
types of attacks on voting systems and elections have a “long tradition” in
American history.2 The suspicion or discovery of such attacks has generally pro-
voked momentary outrage, followed by periods of historical amnesia.3
All technology, no matter how advanced, is going to be vulnerable to attack to
some degree. The history of attacks on voting systems teaches us how foolish it
would be to assume that there will not be attacks on voting systems in the future.
But we can educate ourselves about the vulnerabilities and take the proper pre-
cautions to ensure that the easiest attacks, with the potential to affect the most
votes, are made as difficult as possible. Good threat analyses allow us to identify
and implement the best security precautions.
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■■ SOLID THREAT ANALYSES SHOULD HELP MAKE SYSTEMS 
MORE RELIABLE. 
There is an additional benefit to this kind of analysis: it should help make our vot-
ing systems more reliable, regardless of whether they are ever attacked. Computerized
voting systems – like all previous voting systems – have shown themselves vulner-
able to error. As detailed in the Security Report, votes have been miscounted or
lost as a result of defective firmware (coded instructions in a computer system’s
hardware), faulty machine software, defective tally server software, election 
programming errors, machine breakdowns, malfunctioning input devices, and
pollworker error.
“An old maxim in the area of computer security is clearly applicable here: Almost
everything that a malicious attacker could attempt could also happen by accident;
for every malicious attacker, there may be thousands of people making ordinary
careless errors.”4 Solid threat analyses should help to expose and to address vul-
nerabilities in voting systems, including not only security breaches but also simple
malfunctions.
■ WHAT METHODOLOGY WAS USED 
FOR THE THREAT ANALYSIS?
In developing the study of voting system security vulnerabilities, the Brennan
Center brought together some of the nation’s leading election officials, as well as
a Task Force of internationally recognized experts in the fields of computer sci-
ence, election policy, security, voting systems, and statistics. After considering sev-
eral approaches to measuring the strength of election security, this group unani-
mously selected a model that: (a) identified and categorized the potential threats
against voting systems, (b) prioritized these threats based upon an agreed-upon
metric (which would identify how “difficult” each threat is to accomplish from the
attacker’s point of view), and (c) determined (utilizing the same metric employed
to prioritize threats) how much more difficult each of the catalogued attacks
would become after various sets of countermeasures were implemented.
After several months of work, including a public threat analysis workshop hosted
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Task Force identified
and categorized more than 120 threats to the three voting systems. The threats
generally fell into one or more of nine broad categories: (1) the insertion of cor-
rupt software into machines prior to Election Day; (2) wireless and other remote
attacks on voting machines on Election Day; (3) attacks on tally servers; (4) mis-
calibration of voting machines; (5) shut-off of voting machine features intended
to assist voters; (6) denial of service attacks; (7) actions by corrupt poll workers or
others at the polling place to affect votes cast; (8) vote buying schemes; and (9)
attacks on ballots or voter-verified paper trails.
The Task Force determined that the best single metric for determining the “dif-
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by accident.
ficulty” of each of these attacks was the number of informed participants neces-
sary to execute the attack successfully. An “informed participant” is someone
whose participation is needed to make the attack work, and who knows enough
about the attack to foil or expose it.
For each attack, Task Force members looked at how many informed participants
would be necessary to change the outcome of a reasonably close statewide elec-
tion in which all votes were cast on one of the three voting systems analyzed. The
statewide election we looked at was a fictional gubernatorial race between Tom
Jefferson and Johnny Adams in a composite jurisdiction, Pennasota. Pennasota
was created by aggregating the results of the 2004 presidential election in 10
“battleground” states, as determined by Zogby International polls in the spring,
summer, and fall of 2004.
FIGURE S2
ELECTION FOR GOVERNOR, STATE OF PENNASOTA, 2007
Candidate Party Total Votes Percentage of Votes
Tom Jefferson Dem-Rep 1,769,818 51.1
Johnny Adams Federalists 1,689,650 48.8
To figure out how many informed participants would be needed to change the
outcome of this election, and make Johnny Adams the next Governor of
Pennasota, the experts broke down each attack into its necessary parts, assigned
a value representing the minimum number of persons they believed would be
necessary to accomplish each part, and then determined how many times the
attack would need to be repeated to reverse the election results.
At the conclusion of this process, election officials were interviewed to determine
whether they agreed with the assigned steps and values. When necessary, the steps
and values were modified to reflect feedback from the officials.
After the attacks were prioritized by level of difficulty, Task Force members
reviewed how much more difficult each attack would become if various sets of
countermeasures were implemented. The process for determining the difficulty
of overcoming countermeasures was exactly the same as the process for deter-
mining attack difficulty: each step necessary to overcome the countermeasure was
identified and given a value equal to the number of persons necessary to accom-
plish that step. Election officials were again consulted to confirm that the steps
and values assigned were reasonable.
To ensure that the results of our analysis were robust and not limited to the com-
posite jurisdiction of Pennasota, we ran our threat analysis against the actual
results of the 2004 presidential election in Florida, New Mexico, and
Pennsylvania. All of the results and findings discussed in this summary applied to
our analyses of these three states.
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The full work of the Task Force, including the choice of methodology, analysis
and report, were extensively peer reviewed by NIST.
■ WHAT WERE THE GREATEST RISKS REVEALED 
BY THE THREAT ANALYSIS?
Below is a discussion of the most troubling threats identified in the Security
Report.
■■ THE LEAST DIFFICULT ATTACKS USE 
SOFTWARE ATTACK PROGRAMS.
The “least difficult” attacks against all three systems (as measured by the metric
of number of informed participants necessary to change the outcome of a
statewide election) involve the insertion of corrupt software or other software
attack programs in order to take over a voting machine. Significantly, the threat
analysis suggests that all three voting systems are equally vulnerable to software
attacks.
The most basic type of software attack program would target voting machines
and switch a certain number of votes from one candidate to another. This alter-
ation of votes could occur at any time on Election Day, as long as it was com-
pleted before poll workers printed a paper record of the vote total and extracted
the electronic record of votes from the machines.
Inserting a software attack program into a voting system for the purpose of affect-
ing an election’s outcome is likely to be technically and financially challenging,
particularly if the attacker wants to avoid detection. However, a substantial his-
torical record of this type of attack against non-voting systems suggests that it can
be successfully executed. The Security Report details several ways that an attack-
er could insert a software attack program without detection.
Specifically, there are several points in the development and use of voting
machine software where software attack programs could be inserted without
detection. Among these points, software attack programs could be inserted
through the “firmware” that is hard-wired into voting machines, during the gen-
eration of “commercial off-the-shelf ” (“COTS”) or vendor software used on vot-
ing machines, through software patches and updates meant to improve the per-
formance and capabilities of voting machines, during the creation of configura-
tion files and election definitions used to interpret voter choice and totals on vot-
ing machines, through network communications between voting machines and
outside sources, as well as through “input/output” devices such as memory cards
and printers.
There are many hurdles an attacker would have to overcome to ensure that the
insertion of such an attack program changed enough votes to affect the outcome
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of a statewide election and escaped detection. After careful analysis, the Task
Force determined that none of these hurdles is insurmountable. The full Security
Report discusses in detail how an attacker could prevail over the following chal-
lenges: efforts of vendors to prevent such an attack from occurring (pp. 32–33);
gaining sufficient technical knowledge about the way a voting machine and its
software works (pp. 36–37); gaining sufficient knowledge about the targeted elec-
tion (pp. 37–38); creating an attack program that has the ability to change, add,
or subtract votes (pp. 39–40); eluding independent testing authority (“ITA”)
inspections (pp. 42–45); avoiding detection during machine testing (pp. 44–45);
and avoiding detection through records kept on event and audit logs (pp. 45–46).
■■ WIRELESS COMPONENTS CREATE UNNECESSARY RISKS.
The threat analysis shows that machines with wireless components are particu-
larly vulnerable to software attack programs and other attacks. The Security
Report concludes that this danger applies to all three voting systems examined.
Vendors continue to manufacture and sell machines with wireless components.
Among the many types of attacks made possible by wireless components are
attacks that exploit an unplanned vulnerability in the software or hardware to get
a Trojan horse into the machine. For this type of attack, a Trojan horse would
not have to be inserted in advance of Election Day. Instead, an attacker aware of
a vulnerability in the voting system’s software or firmware could simply show up
at the polling station and beam her Trojan horse into the machine using a wire-
less enabled personal digital assistant.
Thus, virtually any member of the public with some knowledge of software and
a personal digital assistant could perform this attack. This is particularly troubling
when one considers that most voting machines run on COTS software and/or
operating systems; the vulnerabilities of such software and systems are frequent-
ly well known.5 Against all three systems, attackers could use wireless components
to subvert all testing. Specifically, an attack program could be written to remain
dormant until it received particular commands via a wireless communication.
This would allow attackers to wait until a machine was being used to record votes
on Election Day before turning on the software attack.
Attackers could also use wireless communications to gain fine-grained control
over an attack program already inserted into a particular set of machines (i.e.,
switch three votes in the second race on the third machine), or obtain informa-
tion as to how individuals had voted by communicating with a machine while it
was being used.
Finally, wireless networking presents additional security vulnerabilities for juris-
dictions using DREs w/ VVPT and PCOS. A major logistical problem for an
attacker changing both electronic and paper records is how to get the new paper
records printed in time to substitute them for the old record in transit. With wire-
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A “Trojan horse” is a type of 
software attack program 
that “impersonates” 
a benign program. 
Personal digital assistants (“PDAs”
or palmtops) are handheld 
devices that were originally
designed as personal organizers. 
PDAs can synchronize data 
with a personal computer. 
less networking, the DRE or PCOS can transmit specific information out to the
attacker about what should appear on those printed records. In short, permitting
wireless components on DRE w/ VVPT or PCOS machines makes the attack-
er’s job much simpler in practice.
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A cryptic knock is an action taken 
by a user of the machine that will
trigger (or silence) the attack 
behavior. The cryptic knock could
come in many forms, depending
upon the attack program: voting 
for a write-in candidate, tapping a
specific spot on the machine’s
screen, a communication via 
wireless network, etc.
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■■ SYSTEMS WITH PAPER RECORDS ARE STILL SUBJECT TO ATTACK.
Voting systems with some kind of voter-verified paper record (i.e., DRE w/VVPT
or PCOS) offer an important security advantage against software attack pro-
grams not offered by voting systems without voter-verified paper records (i.e.,
DREs without VVPT): jurisdictions can conduct an audit of the voter-verified
paper record and compare that record to the electronic vote totals.
Unfortunately, most states that require voter-verified paper records do not require
automatic audits of paper records after each election. Our analysis shows that sys-
tems with voter-verified paper records provide little, if any, security benefit over systems without
such records, unless there are regular audits and/or recounts of the paper records.
Even assuming that such regular audits and/or recounts are conducted, jurisdic-
tions that use, or are considering purchasing DREs w/ VVPT or PCOS should
be aware of threats that are unique to these systems.
■■■ ATTACKS ON DRE w/VVPT
At least one study has suggested that an extremely low percentage of voters who
use DREs w/ VVPT review the paper trail.6
If those findings are correct, an attacker could subvert a recount or audit by cre-
ating an attack program that directs the machine to record the wrong vote on both
the electronic and paper records. If both records are similarly inaccurate, check-
ing one against the other in an audit or recount will not expose an attack.
In practice, this is how it would work in the Governor’s race in Pennasota:
■ When a targeted voter chooses Tom Jefferson, the screen would indicate that
she has voted for Tom Jefferson.
■ After she has completed voting in all other races, the DRE would print a
paper record that lists her choices for every race, except for governor. Under
the governor’s race, it would state that she has selected Johnny Adams.
■ When the DRE screen asks the voter to confirm that the paper has recorded
her vote correctly, one of two things would happen:
■ the voter would fail to notice that the paper has misrecorded the vote and 
accept the paper recording; or
■ the voter would reject the paper record and opt to vote again.
■ If the voter rejects the paper record, the second time around it would show
that she voted for Tom Jefferson. This might lead her to believe she had acci-
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dentally pressed the wrong candidate the first time. In any event, it would
render her less likely to tell anyone that the machine made a mistake.
We can imagine the attack visually this way:
This attack would not require any additional participants in the conspiracy. Nor,
as demonstrated in the Security Report, is it entirely clear that enough voters
would notice the misrecorded votes to prevent the attack from working.
The Security Report details countermeasures that should allow jurisdictions to
catch this attack. Specifically, even if only a small percentage of voters notice that
a machine has misrecorded their vote, there should be an unusually large num-
ber of “cancellations” on the paper trail. A jurisdiction that recorded and then
reviewed the number of cancellations during a 2% audit would find enough 
evidence of problems to identify a problem and understand that further investi-
gation was warranted.
Of course, encouraging voters to review the paper records could also substan-
tially reduce the risk of a successful attack on the paper trail.
■ ATTACKS ON PCOS
One of the benefits of PCOS machines over Central Count Optical Scanners
(which are very often used in tallying absentee ballots) is that they have an
“over/undervote protection.” The over/undervote protection on PCOS scan-
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ners works as follows: when a voter fills out his ballot, but accidentally fills in two
candidates for the same race (overvotes) or accidentally skips a race (undervotes),
the scanner would refuse to record the vote and send it back to the voter for
examination. The voter then has the opportunity to review the ballot and correct
it before resubmitting.
Central Count Optical Scanners have been shown to lose far more votes than
PCOS. In precincts with over 30% African American voters, for example, the lost
or “residual” vote rate for Central Count Optical Scanners has been shown to be
as high as 4.1% as compared with 0.9% for PCOS.7
The lack of over/undervote protection on Central Count Optical Scanners may
be the reason for this difference.
Our attacker in Pennasota would probably not be able to swing the gubernatori-
al race from Jefferson to Adams merely by inserting an attack program that would
turn off the over/undervote protection on PCOS scanners. Even if we assume
that the result of turning off the protection were a loss of 4% of the votes on
every scanner, and that all of those votes would have gone to Tom Jefferson, this
would result in the loss of only about 20,000 votes. This would still leave Jefferson
(who won by about 80,000 votes) with a comfortable (though slimmer) margin of
victory.
Nevertheless, this attack could cause the loss of thousands of votes. There are at
least three possible ways to catch this attack:
■ Parallel Testing (assuming that the attack program has not also figured out a
way to shut off when it is being tested);
■ Periodic testing of the over/undervote protection on Election Day;
■ Counting over/undervotes during an audit of the voter-verified paper record
to determine whether there is a disproportionate number of such lost votes.
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SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
There is a substantial likelihood that the election procedures and countermea-
sures currently in place in the vast majority of states would not detect a cleverly
designed software attack program. The regimens for parallel testing and auto-
matic routine audits proposed in the Security Report are important tools for
defending voting systems from many types of attack, including software attack
programs.
Most jurisdictions have not implemented these security measures. Of the 26
states that require a voter-verified paper record, only 12 states require automatic
audits of those records after every election, and only two of these states –
California and Washington – conduct parallel testing.8
Moreover, even those states that have implemented these countermeasures have
not developed the best practices and protocols that are necessary to ensure their
effectiveness in preventing or revealing attacks or failures in the voting systems.
RECOMMENDATION #1:
■ CONDUCT AUTOMATIC ROUTINE AUDIT 
OF PAPER RECORDS.
Advocates for voter-verified paper records have been extremely successful in
state legislatures across the country. Currently, 26 states require their voting sys-
tems to produce a voter-verified record, but 14 of these states do not require
automatic routine audits.9  The Task force has concluded that an independent
voter-verified paper trail without an automatic routine audit is of questionable
security value.10
By contrast, a voter-verified paper record accompanied by a solid automatic rou-
tine audit  can go a long way toward making the least difficult attacks much more
difficult. Specifically, the measures recommended below should force an attacker
to involve hundreds of more informed participants in her attack.
■ A small percentage of all voting machines and their voter-verified paper
records should be audited.
■ Machines to be audited should be selected in a random and transparent way.
■ The assignment of auditors to voting machines should occur immediately
before the audits. The audits should take place by 9 a.m., the day after polls
close.
■ The audit should include a tally of spoiled ballots (in the case of VVPT 
cancellations), overvotes, and undervotes.
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■ A statistical examination of anomalies, such as higher than expected cancel-
lations or undervotes and overvotes, should be conducted.
■ Solid practices with respect to chain of custody and physical security of
paper records prior to the automatic routine audit should be followed.
RECOMMENDATION #2:
■ CONDUCT PARALLEL TESTING.
It is not possible to conduct an audit of paper records of DREs without VVPT,
because no voter-verified paper record exists on such machines. This means that
jurisdictions that use DREs without VVPT do not have access to an important
and powerful countermeasure.
For paperless DRE voting machines, parallel testing is probably the best way to
detect most software-based attacks, as well as subtle software bugs that may not
be discovered during inspection and other testing. For DREs w/ VVPT and bal-
lot-marking devices, parallel testing provides the opportunity to discover a specif-
ic kind of attack (for instance, printing the wrong choice on the voter-verified
paper record) that may not be detected by simply reviewing the paper record after
the election is over. However, even under the best of circumstances, parallel test-
ing is an imperfect security measure. The testing creates an “arms-race” between
the testers and the attacker, but the race is one in which the testers can never be
certain that they have prevailed.
We have concluded that the following steps will lead to more effective parallel
testing:
■ The precise techniques used for parallel testing (e.g., exactly how and when
the machine is activated, how activation codes/smart cards/etc. are produced
to allow voting, etc.) should not be fully determined or revealed until right
before the election. Details of how parallel testing is done should change
from election to election.
■ At least two of each type of DRE (meaning both vendor and model) should
be selected for parallel testing.
■ At least two DREs from each of the three largest counties should be parallel
tested.
■ Localities should be notified as late as possible that machines from their
precincts will be selected for parallel testing.
■ Wireless channels for voting machines should be closed off, to ensure they
cannot receive commands.
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■ Voting machines should never be connected to one another during voting.
Some DREs and DREs w/VVPT may be designed so that they cannot 
function unless they are connected to one another. Election officials should
discuss this question with voting system vendors.
■ Voting machines should be completely isolated during the election, and print
out or otherwise display their totals before being connected to any central
server to send in its tallies.
■ Parallel testing scripts should include details, such as how quickly or slowly to
vote, when to make “errors,” and perhaps even when to cast each vote.
■ Parallel testing should be videotaped to ensure that a contradiction between
paper and electronic records when parallel testing is complete is not the result
of tester error.
While a few local jurisdictions have taken it upon themselves to conduct limited
parallel testing, we are aware of only three states, California, Maryland and
Washington, that have regularly performed parallel testing on a statewide basis.
It is worth noting that two of these states, California and Washington, employ
automatic routine audits and parallel testing as statewide countermeasures against
potential attack.
RECOMMENDATION #3:
■ BAN WIRELESS COMPONENTS 
ON ALL VOTING MACHINES.
Our analysis shows that machines with wireless components are particularly 
vulnerable to attack. We conclude that this vulnerability applies to all three 
voting systems. Only two states, New York and Minnesota, ban wireless compo-
nents on all machines.11 California also bans wireless components, but only for
DRE machines. Wireless components should not be permitted on any voting
machine.
RECOMMENDATION #4: 
■ MANDATE TRANSPARENT AND RANDOM 
SELECTION PROCEDURES.
The development of transparently random selection procedures for all auditing
procedures is key to audit effectiveness. This includes the selection of machines
to be parallel tested or audited, as well as the assignment of auditors themselves.
The use of a transparent and random selection process allows the public to know
that the auditing method was fair and substantially likely to catch fraud or mis-
takes in the vote totals. In our interviews with election officials we found that, all
too often, the process for picking machines and auditors was neither transparent
nor random.
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In a transparent random selection process:
■ The whole process is publicly observable or videotaped.
■ The random selection is be publicly verifiable, i.e., anyone observing is able
to verify that the sample was chosen randomly (or at least that the number
selected is not under the control of any small number of people).
■ The process is simple and practical within the context of current election
practice so as to avoid imposing unnecessary burden on election officials.
RECOMMENDATION #5:
■ ENSURE DECENTRALIZED PROGRAMMING 
AND VOTING SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION.
Where a single entity, such as a vendor or state or national consultant, runs 
elections or performs key tasks (such as producing ballot definition files) for mul-
tiple jurisdictions, attacks against statewide elections become easier. Unnecessary
centralized control provides many opportunities to implement attacks at multiple
locations.
RECOMMENDATION #6: 
■ IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES 
FOR ADDRESSING EVIDENCE OF FRAUD OR ERROR.
Both automatic routine audits and parallel testing are of questionable security
value without effective procedures for action where evidence of machine mal-
function and/or fraud is uncovered. Detection of fraud without an appropriate
response will not prevent attacks from succeeding. In the Brennan Center’s exten-
sive review of state election laws and practices, and in its interviews with election
officials for the threat analysis, we did not find any jurisdiction with publicly
detailed, adequate, and practical procedures for dealing with evidence of fraud
or error discovered during an audit, recount, or parallel testing.
The following are examples of procedures that would allow jurisdictions to
respond effectively to detection of bugs or software attack programs in parallel
testing:
■ Impound and conduct a transparent forensic examination of all machines
showing unexplained discrepancies during parallel testing.
■ Where evidence of a software bug or attack program is subsequently found
(or no credible explanation for the discrepancy is discovered), conduct a
forensic examination of all DREs used in the state during the election.12
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Where a single entity, such as 
a vendor or state or national
consultant, runs elections or
performs key tasks for multiple
jurisdictions, attacks against
statewide elections become 
easier.
■ Identify the machines that show evidence of tampering or a software flaw
that could have affected the electronic tally of votes.
■ Review the reported margin of victory in each potentially affected race.
Based upon the (a) margin of victory, (b) number of machines affected, and
(c) nature and scope of the tampering or flaw, determine whether there is a
substantial likelihood that the tampering or flaw changed the outcome of a
particular race.
■ Where there is a substantial likelihood that tampering changed the outcome
of a particular race, hold a new election for the office.
The following is an illustrative set of procedures that would allow jurisdictions to
respond effectively to discrepancies between paper and electronic records during
an automatic routine audit:
■ Conduct a transparent investigation of all machines where the paper and
electronic records do not match to determine whether there is any evidence
that tampering with the paper records has occurred.
■ To the extent that there is no record that the paper records have been tam-
pered with, certify the paper records.
■ If there is evidence that the paper records have been tampered with, give a
presumption of authority to the electronic records.
■ After giving a presumption of authority to the electronic records, conduct a
forensic investigation on all machines where the paper and electronic records
do not match, to determine whether there has been any tampering with the
electronic records.
■ If tampering with the electronic records can be ruled out, certify the elec-
tronic records.13
■ Where there is evidence that both sets of records have been tampered with,
conduct a full recount to determine whether and to what extent paper and
electronic records cannot be reconciled.
■ At the conclusion of the full recount, determine the total number of
machines that report different electronic and paper records.
■ After quantifying the number of machines that have been tampered with,
determine the margin of victory in each potentially affected race.
■ Based upon (a) the margin of victory, (b) the number of machines affected,
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and (c) the nature and scope of the tampering, determine whether there is a
substantial likelihood that tampering changed the outcome of a particular
race.
■ In the event that a determination is made that there is a substantial likelihood
that tampering changed the outcome of a particular race, hold a new elec-
tion for the office.
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CONCLUSION
The Task Force has found that the three voting systems most commonly pur-
chased today are vulnerable to attacks and errors that could change the outcome
of statewide elections. This finding should surprise no one. A review of the his-
tory of both election fraud and voting systems literature in the United States
shows that voting systems have always been vulnerable to attack. Indeed, it is
impossible to imagine a voting system that could be impervious to attack.
But there are straightforward countermeasures that that will substantially reduce
the most serious security risks presented by the three systems.
The Task Force’s recommendations point the way for jurisdictions with the polit-
ical will to protect their voting systems from attack. None of the measures iden-
tified here –  auditing voter-verified paper records, banning wireless components,
using transparent and random selection processes for auditing, adopting effective
policies for addressing evidence of fraud or error in vote totals, conducting par-
allel testing – are particularly difficult or expensive to implement.14  The Brennan
Center urges election officials and policy makers to adopt the recommended
security measures as soon as possible.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, many voters with disabilities have been unable to cast their ballots
without assistance from personal aides or poll workers. Those voters do not pos-
sess the range of visual, motor, and cognitive facilities typically required to oper-
ate common voting systems. For example, some are not be able to hold a pen or
stylus to mark a ballot that they must see and read. Thus, the voting experience
for citizens who cannot perform certain tasks – reading a ballot, holding a point-
er or pencil – has not been equal to that of their peers without disabilities.
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 took a step forward in addressing this long-
standing inequity. According to HAVA, new voting systems must allow voters with
disabilities to complete and cast their ballots “in a manner that provides the same
opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as
for other voters.”1 In other words, as jurisdictions purchase new technologies
designed to facilitate voting in a range of areas, they must ensure that new sys-
tems provide people with disabilities with an experience that mirrors the experi-
ence of other voters.
This report is designed to help state and local jurisdictions improve the accessi-
bility of their voting systems. We have not conducted any direct accessibility test-
ing of existent technologies. Rather, we set forth a set of critical questions for
election officials and voters to use when assessing available voting systems, indi-
cate whether vendors have provided any standard or custom features designed to
answer these accessibility concerns, and offer an evaluation of each architecture’s
limitations in providing an accessible voting experience to all voters.
The report thus provides a foundation of knowledge from which election officials
can begin to assess a voting system’s accessibility. The conclusions of this report
are not presented as a substitute for the evaluation and testing of a specific man-
ufacturer’s voting system to determine how accessible a system is in conjunction
with a particular jurisdiction’s election procedures and system configuration. We





There are many reasons for election officials to be concerned about creating fully
accessible voting systems. Not least of these is that such systems are long overdue:
even today, millions of Americans cannot vote independently on secret ballots
using the voting machines in their precincts.2 For this reason, many of these citi-
zens have found voting to be an “embarrassing, demeaning and time consuming”
experience.3 It should surprise no one that the majority of such citizens do not
vote.4
In addition to reasons of fundamental fairness, there are practical reasons for
election officials to ensure that their systems are accessible. First, it is legally
required. Second, disabled voters represent a very large and growing segment of
the population. Put plainly, no matter where their jurisdictions are located, elec-
tion officials are likely to find that a significant percentage of the citizens they
serve are disabled, and the numbers of such citizens will continue to grow for the
foreseeable future.
■ LEGAL ACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
FOR VOTING SYSTEMS
Current accessibility standards reflect evolving standards in federal legislation
and an essentially private certification regime formerly led by the National
Association of State Election Directors (“NASED”) and now overseen by the
Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”).5 This section summarizes those
requirements and their role in state selection decisions.
■■ The Help America Vote Act
Congress has only recently passed an explicit law requiring a private and inde-
pendent voting experience for people with disabilities. Under the federal Help
America Vote Act (“HAVA”), at least one voting system “equipped for individuals
with disabilities” must be used at each polling place for federal elections held on
or after January 1, 2006.6 HAVA requires that such voting systems:
be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including non-visual accessibility for the
blind and visually-impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for
access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters.7
Specifically, every polling place shall have “at least one direct recording electron-
ic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabili-
ties.”8 In addition, all voting systems “purchased with funds made available under
[HAVA] on or after January 1, 2007” must meet the statute’s standard for dis-
ability access.9 HAVA also requires that the voting system provide alternative lan-
guage accessibility as already required by section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.10
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■■ The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act
While HAVA is the first Congressional statute explicitly to require a private and
independent voting experience for people with disabilities, earlier statutes
cemented a strong foundation for equal access to the polls for voters with disabil-
ities. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 prohibit exclusion of the disabled from government services, pro-
grams, or activities, including voting and elections. Title II of the ADA provides
that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.”11 Similarly, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability … shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance….”12
Under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, Congress mandated promulga-
tion of implementing regulations. Federal regulations provide:
■ Design and construction. Each facility or part of a facility constructed by, on
behalf of, or for the use of a public entity shall be designed and constructed
in such manner that the facility or part of the facility is readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the construction was com-
menced after January 26, 1992.
■ Alteration. Each facility or part of a facility altered by, on behalf of, or for the
use of a public entity in a manner that affects or could affect the usability of
the facility or part of the facility shall, to the maximum extent feasible, be
altered in such manner that the altered portion of the facility is readily acces-
sible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the alteration was com-
menced after January 26, 1992.13
Voting equipment has been found to fall within the expansive definition of “facil-
ity” contained in the regulations.14 Accordingly, election officials must employ
means that make voting equipment “readily accessible to and usable by individ-
uals with disabilities.”15 However, existing precedents do not require election offi-
cials to provide voting equipment “that would enable disabled persons to vote in
a manner that is comparable in every way with the voting rights enjoyed by per-
sons without disabilities.”16 The next few years will likely clarify the precise
requirements of both HAVA and these earlier statutes with respect to the acces-
sibility of voting systems, as courts hear challenges to the various choices made
by elections officials across the country.
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■■ The “Voluntary Guidelines”
In the meantime, federal agencies have issued two sets of voluntary guidelines for
voting system design. In 2002, the Federal Elections Commission (“FEC”) in con-
junction with the United States Access Board issued a set of technical standards
and recommendations called the 2002 Voluntary System Standards (“VSS”).17
The “Accessibility” provisions (Section 2.2.7) of the VSS were divided into two
categories: those that apply to all voting systems and those that apply only to
direct recording electronic (“DRE”) voting systems. The “Common Standards”
section (2.2.7.1) includes six requirements that address the appropriate height of
the voting system, the maximum distance the voter should have to reach to be
able to use the system, and the accessibility of the controls to the voter.18
The “DRE Standards” section (2.2.7.219 ) includes requirements for accessible
voting systems that can be summarized as follows:
■ The voter shall not have to bring in his or her own assistive technology in
order to vote privately and effectively using the DRE system.
■ The system shall provide an audio output that accurately communicates the
complete content of the ballot and instructions; supports write-in voting;
enables the voter to edit, review, and confirm his or her selections; allows the
voter to request repetition of information; supports the use of external head-
phones; and provides adjustable volume controls.
■ When a system uses a telephone-style handset to provide audio information,
it should provide a wireless coupling for assistive devices used by people who
are hard of hearing.
■ The system should avoid electromagnetic interference with assistive hearing
devices.
■ The system should allow for adjustments to be made to the display image,
specifically the image’s contrast ratio, colors, and size of text.
■ If the system uses a touch-screen, it should also provide an alternative tactile
input option that will be easy to operate for individuals with limited motor
skills (i.e., lightweight, tactilely discernible, requiring little force and dexterity,
operable with one hand).
■ If the system requires a response from the voter within a set period of time,
it must alert the voter before time is up and allow the voter to have addition-
al time if necessary.
■ If the system uses an audio cue to alert the voter of an error or confirmation,
it must also provide a visual cue for voters to accommodate voters with hear-
ing impairments.
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The Access Board is a federal agency
committed to promulgating accessi-
ble design.
■ If the system’s primary means of voter authentication uses biometric tech-
nology that requires the voter to have certain biological characteristics, a sec-
ondary means of voter authentication must be made available.
In December 2005, the EAC issued a new set of standards for voting systems, the
2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (“VVSG”). These guidelines reaffirm
criteria set forth in the 2002 VSS and push certain standards a step further by
insisting that a standard “shall,” rather than “should,” be followed. In addition,
the VVSG’s requirements apply to all voting systems, not just DREs, and estab-
lish detailed parameters for each recommended accessibility feature. The most
important new specifications can be summarized as follows:
■ Machines shall be capable of displaying text in at least two font sizes, (a) 3-4
millimeters, and (b) 6.3-9.0 millimeters.20 Sans-serif fonts are preferable to
stylized fonts.21
■ All machines must be capable of displaying information using a high-contrast
display with a ratio of at least 6:1.22
■ Any buttons and controls on a voting system must be discernible by both
shape and color.23
■ Machines must provide an audio-tactile interface that replicates a standard
visual ballot and allows voters to access the full range of features and capa-
bilities in a standard visual ballot. In addition, systems must allow a voter to
pause and resume an audio presentation and to rewind the presentation to a
previous contest.24
■ Default volume level for machines should be set between 40 and 50 dB.
Voters should be able to adjust volume up to a maximum level of 100 dB in
increments no greater than 10 dB.25 In addition, machines must be pro-
grammed to allow voters to vary the speed of an audio presentation.26
■ Voters should be able to watch and listen to a ballot at the same time.27
■ For optical scan systems, “if voters normally feed their own optical scan bal-
lots into a reader, blind voters should also be able to do so.”28
■ DISABILITY DEMOGRAPHICS
A large proportion of the voting-age population would benefit from a voting sys-
tem accessible to people with disabilities. According to the 2000 Census, at least
44.5 million adult residents of the United States (ages 21 and above) have some
form of disability.29 Moreover, because many disabilities are associated with
advanced age, a rapidly aging population stands to produce dramatic increases
in the number of voters with disabilities.30 The statistics in Table A1 confirm the
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magnitude of the voting-age population with disabilities and/or special lan-
guage needs.
TABLE A1
U.S. VOTING-AGE POPULATION WITH DISABILITIES AND LANGUAGE NEEDS
People over 18 who: Millions of people
Have trouble seeing31 19.1
Have trouble hearing 32 30.8
Experience physical difficulty, including trouble
grasping or handling small objects33 28.3
Speak English less than “very well”34 17.8
Live in “linguistically isolated households”35 9.2
In addition, the accessibility of voting systems affects not only those with perma-
nent disabilities, but also the millions of voters with temporary disabilities or con-
ditions that would not formally be considered disabilities. For example, a voter
with a broken arm who has limited use of her hand, or who has forgotten her
reading glasses and cannot read small text, or who has minimal reading skills can
vote more easily and effectively as a result of more accessible voting systems. With
this impact in mind, the VVSG include many requirements for all voting systems
(not just those considered “accessible”) that increase ease of access for people who
are already fully able to vote without assistance.
At the same time, a voting system may provide accessibility to voters with various
disabilities, yet still not be easy to use. For instance, an audio system may provide
accessibility to voters with vision impairments, but if the system’s audio jack is
hidden on the back of the machine, the system cannot be considered very usable.
Similarly, when creating voting systems for individuals with vision impairments,
considerations of accessibility alone are not enough. As Mary Theofanos and
Janice Redish have described with respect to website accessibility, “the diversity of
vision needs and the resulting adaptations that low-vision users require mean that
there are no simple solutions to making web sites work for everyone.”36 For the
same reasons, it is difficult to make voting systems that work for all voters with
vision impairments. Voting machines must enable voters with vision impairments
to easily adjust the system to their particular needs to take full advantage of acces-
sibility features.37
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METHODOLOGY
To assess the various voting system architectures, the Brennan Center’s team of
consulting experts created a set of accessibility criteria drawn from existing acces-
sibility guidelines (including both those specific to voting systems and general
information technology guidelines), such as the VSS 2002,38 Section 508 of the
Rehabilitation Act,39 and the VVSG (2005),40 as well as additional considerations
developed through team discussions. These criteria are posed as questions that
can help election officials and advocates compare specific systems for use on
Election Day.
Next, through a combination of group discussions and one-on-one interviews
with the authors, the team of consulting experts provided their impressions of
systems’ accessibility, which are reflected in this report. Experts considered not
only how an individual feature might affect accessibility, but also how a system
works as a whole. Many voting systems are only accessible if jurisdictions imple-
ment certain procedures or modify systems in specific ways. In evaluating sys-
tems, the team considered whether certain modifications or procedures are need-
ed to render an otherwise inaccessible system accessible.
In addition, each system was first considered as a self-contained product that did
not require the voter to bring her own special adaptive technology. If headsets are
needed to hear an audio version of the ballot, for example, those headsets would
need to be provided at the polling place in order for that voting system to be con-
sidered accessible without effort on the part of the voters. This assumption mir-
rors the Access Board’s definition of a “self-contained product” from 1194.25(a)
of the Section 508 Standard:
Self-contained products shall be usable by people with disabilities without requiring
an end-user to attach assistive technology to the product. Personal headsets for pri-
vate listening are not assistive technology.41
Beyond the most basic accessibility features of a system, however, some observers
believe that a voting system should allow a voter to use her own assistive technol-
ogy, if desired (e.g., by supplying standard ports to connect this equipment to the
voting system). Others have raised three arguments against such an approach.
First, some experts argue that voting systems are intended to be self-contained, and
voters should not be required to bring any special equipment to the polling place.
Second, very few industry standards presently govern the design of connections
for assistive technology. At this time, the only standard jacks included in federal
standards (either the VSS or VVSG) are audio jacks for personal headsets. Third,
security concerns exist about including ports to connect uncertified equipment to
a voting system, and the risks involved in installing the drivers or other software
usually needed to allow assistive technology to operate. Without attempting to
resolve this debate, we assessed the extent to which each system allows a voter to
make use of personal assistive technology to reduce barriers to access.
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Last, we offer an introductory sketch of accessibility features currently provided
by vendors and an analysis of how those features might help ensure compliance
with our accessibility criteria. To obtain this information, we first culled infor-
mation from any available product information published by vendors. We then
conducted initial telephone interviews with vendors and usability experts on the
status and utility of available features. Next, we sent each vendor a written sum-
mary of all compiled research on their machines. Vendors commented upon
those reports, and their changes or comments are reflected here.
52 THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, ACCESSIBILITY,  USABILITY,  AND COST
VOTING ARCHITECTURE ANALYZED
This chapter analyzes the following six voting system architectures:
■ Direct Recording Electronic (“DRE”)
■ Precinct Count Optical Scan (“PCOS”)
■ Ballot Marking Device (“BMD”)
■ DRE with Voter-Verified Paper Trail (“DRE w/ VVPT”)
■ Vote-by-Mail
■ Vote-by-Phone
The specific design of these systems varies greatly with each manufacturer’s mod-
els. With respect to the voter’s experience, however, the systems can be catego-
rized based upon the primary medium through which the voter interacts with the
system to mark and cast the ballot. We consider the features of each type of sys-















With certain exceptions, computer-based voting systems provide greater accessi-
bility to all disabled voters than do paper-based systems. As discussed in greater
detail below, the flexibility inherent in computer-based systems allows voters to
choose and mix features, a capacity that dynamically increases accessibility for
voters with disabilities. In particular, computer-based systems facilitate voting for
people with visual impairments: The size of text can, for example, be electroni-
cally enlarged. Display screens can be set at a high contrast that clarifies and
emboldens words and images. Computer-based systems can provide audio ver-
sions of instructions for voting and of the ballot itself. Other voters can also reap
the benefits of computer-based systems. Voters who are not comfortable reading
English can choose to read or hear their ballots instantly in a different language.
Voters with limited motor capacity need not handle paper or pencil. Often, vot-
ers with disabilities can access these features and vote on their own without the
assistance of a poll worker or personal aide.
Computer-based systems permit voters to use a range of visual, auditory, and tac-
tile options simultaneously. For example, a voter who cannot read well may
choose to hear instructions read out loud, but can retain the ability to select a can-
didate visually from the screen based on her recognition of a candidate’s name.
Drafters of the VVSG have recognized the potential of mixing modes in this
fashion and include a requirement that accessible systems allow visual and audio
streams to be used simultaneously.42 If designed to do so, computer-based systems
can fulfill this requirement with relative ease.
Despite these considerable advantages, computer-based systems can present cer-
tain barriers for people with disabilities. Navigation of computer screens often
requires that voters use controls that require hand-eye coordination – a touch-
screen or a mouse – to select their choices. To operate these controls successfully,
voters must have the visual facility to see a cursor move across a screen or to dis-
tinguish between virtual buttons on a display and the complementary motor-con-
trol necessary to move a mouse or press distant areas on a touch-screen.
The most popular computer-based DRE systems already provide an auxiliary
control pad for voters with visual or mobility and coordination impairments. In
theory, voters can discern each part of these auxiliary controls using only their
sense of touch. The controls’ utility varies from machine to machine. Designers
can vary the shape of each control mechanism to allow voters to discriminate
between controls without looking at them. Voters can activate such controls with
minimal force and without fine motor control. Moreover, a button similar to a
computer tab key can allow voters to click their cursor between one selection and
another without having to move a mouse or touch a screen.
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The following questions should be considered in assessing the accessibility of
computer-based voting systems:
1. Can the system be physically adjusted 
to meet a voter’s access needs?
The answers to this question depend on the ease with which a voter or poll work-
er can: (a) adjust the height of the computer screen, (b) tilt or rotate the screen, or
(c) remove the screen and input controls from a tabletop surface so that a voter can
hold the system in her lap and even vote outside the polling place, i.e., “curbside.”
DREs fall into two categories: Certain systems, including Avante’s Vote Trakker,43
Sequoia’s AVC Edge,44 and Accupoll’s Voting System 1000,45 sit stationary on a
table or stand. Voters cannot readily adjust a stand’s or table’s height, and such
machines are only accessible to voters in wheelchairs if precincts set some sur-
faces at lower heights before polls open. Some of these systems, including
Sequoia’s AVC Edge,46 also address height concerns by allowing their screens to
tilt upward and downward. With the exception of Avante’s47 machines and the
systems once manufactured by Accupoll,48 such systems are sufficiently portable
for a poll worker to set them up curbside if necessary.49
Other systems, such as Hart Intercivic’s eSlate,50 ES&S, Inc.’s iVotronic,51 and
Diebold’s AccuVote-TSX unit,52 do not need to rest on a table. These systems can
be set up to provide a lightweight tablet (ranging from roughly 10–15 lbs.) that the
voter can place on her lap or other suitable surface. This portable module
includes the screen and all of the necessary input controls. These systems are also
sufficiently portable to allow for curbside voting.
2. Does the system allow voters to adjust the visual presentation 
of information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
Although all computer-based systems could offer a range of malleable viewing
options, each DRE model differs in the alternatives it provides for users with
vision impairments. The VVSG require that certified systems comply with cer-
tain requirements concerning the presentation and adjustability of visual outputs.
In particular, the VVSG require that certified systems provide an enhanced visu-
al display that includes a high-contrast presentation, a black-and-white display
option, and at least two font size options of a minimum size.53
Many models have already met the requirements prescribed in the VVSG. DREs
produced by Sequoia,54 Diebold,55 Hart Intercivic,56 ES&S, and Accupoll,57 have
high-contrast electronic image displays with a contrast ratio of 6:1 or greater.
DREs manufactured by Accupoll,58 Avante,59 Sequoia,60 and ES&S61 have elec-
tronic display options that allow for either a black-and-white-only display or a
color display that provides the voter with a means to adjust colors. These features
can be made available to voters using machines made by Diebold62 and Hart
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Intercivic63 but elections officials must ensure that they are incorporated in the
ballot’s design when it is initially developed.
DREs made by Accupoll64 and Avante65 provide at least two font sizes – one with
capital letters of at least 6.3 mm and one with capital letters of between 3.0 and
4.0 mm – using a sans-serif or similar font. Models produced by Diebold,66
Sequoia,67 Hart Intercivic68 and ES&S69 can also vary font size, but officials must
request that this feature be implemented during initial ballot design.
3. Does the system allow voters to adjust the audio presentation 
of information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
Audio outputs can be adjusted in four ways. First, systems can allow voters to
adjust the volume of the audio playback. Indeed, the VVSG requires systems to
do so.70 DREs produced by Sequoia,71 Diebold,72 Hart Intercivic,73 ES&S,74
Avante75 and Accupoll76 provide volume adjustability as a standard feature: vol-
ume can be amplified up to a maximum of 105 dB SPL and automatically resets
to a default level after each voter completes her ballot.
Second, auditory outputs can be recorded in either digitized or computer-syn-
thesized speech. Digitized speech is produced by recording one or more human
voices and then playing such recordings back through the computer’s digital sys-
tem. This type of speech is reportedly easier to understand than synthesized
speech, a rendering that can sound flat and unfamiliar.77 Digitized speech is
already available on DRE systems manufactured by Sequoia,78 Diebold,79
Accupoll,80 Hart Intercivic81 and ES&S.82
Third, certain systems allow the voter to control the rate of speech in the audio
output, as recommended in the VVSG.83 People who are accustomed to inter-
acting with technology through an audio interface can “listen faster” and thus
expedite the otherwise potentially lengthy voting process. This feature is available
on Avante’s,84 Sequoia’s85 and Diebold’s86 DRE systems. According to experts,
speech control has until now been associated with systems that use synthesized
speech. However technologies are now available to allow digitally recorded
human speech to be played at different speeds without changing the tone or cre-
ating a high-pitched, chipmunk effect.87
Finally, the use of different voices for instructions and for ballot selections – for
example, a candidate’s name – allows some voters to expedite the voting process.
Voters accustomed to using audio interfaces can speed up audio recordings so
that they can skim text for breaks or keywords that indicate a new contest. In this
way, voters “scan with their ears” in the same manner that readers quickly scan
and review a page of text.
This feature can be made available on systems manufactured by Avante,88
Sequoia,89 Diebold,90 Accupoll,91 Hart Intercivic92 and ES&S,93 but must be
requested by election officials during ballot design.
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4. Does the system provide an audio output/tactile input alterna-
tive access option to meet the needs of individuals with visual
impairments or other difficulties reading?
Voters who cannot see or read information presented on a visual display need an
alternate, non-visual way both to receive and to input information into DREs. All
major manufacturers of DREs (Avante,94 Sequoia,95 Diebold,96 Accupoll,97 Hart
Intercivic98 and ES&S99) address this issue by providing a version of their ballots
through an Audio Tactile Interface (“ATI”). ATIs allow voters to hear candidate
choices via an audio ballot, rather than seeing them on a display screen, and to
make their choices without any cursor or touch-screen by using separate, tactile-
ly discernible controls.
The 2002 VSS contained detailed criteria for audio ballots, all of which have
been reiterated in the VVSG. The audio ballots were required to communicate
the complete contents of the ballot via a device affixed to an industry standard
connector of a 1/8 inch jack, provide instructions to the voter, enable the voter to
review and edit her input, pause and resume the playback, confirm that the edits
reflect her intent, and allow the voter to request repetition of any information
provided by the system.100 Still, those systems manufactured under the VSS have
produced complaints of badly worded prompts, poorly recorded or poorly digi-
tized speech, and poor navigation options, any of which can make an audio bal-
lot difficult to understand or follow.101 Where possible, election officials should
conduct testing with voters with visual disabilities to assess the audio ballots avail-
able on different machines prior to purchase.
5. Does the system provide controls suitable for voters with limit-
ed fine motor skills?
The touch-screen navigation that is required by most DRE systems poses signifi-
cant barriers to access for persons with limited fine motor skills. Because the
boundaries of selections on the screen are not tactilely discernible, and it is rela-
tively easy to make an erroneous selection by touching the screen outside the
boundaries of the intended “button,” voters who can use their hands but have
limited fine motor control face significant difficulties in voting successfully and
independently. For example, individuals with tremors or other movement disor-
ders that require them to brace their hand when pointing or pressing a button
may encounter difficulties with touch-screens because they cannot rest their hand
on the screen to make selections. If a touch-screen requires direct touch from the
human body rather than a push from any object made of any material, then indi-
viduals who use head sticks or mouth sticks would be unable to use the touch-
screen. Thus, for voters without the use of their hands, the touch-screen cannot
be used to make selections at all. In all these cases, there must be an alternative
input control available.
Manufacturers solve this problem by allowing voters to input selections using the
auxiliary control panel originally designed for ATIs. Voters can use the alternate
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controls on this device to indicate their choices and, in certain machines, retain
the ability either to see their ballot on a display screen or to hear their ballot
through earphones. Hart Intercivic’s eSlate goes a step beyond and makes its
standard control panel accessible to voters with limited fine motor skills: Voters
move between selections on an electronic screen by turning a dial; separate but-
tons exist for selecting a certain candidate or response and for casting a complet-
ed ballot.102
Certain voters cannot input selections with their hands at all, however, and must
use a separate device to input information. Some machines, including those man-
ufactured by Accupoll,103 Sequoia,104 Hart Intercivic105 and Avante,106 include a
“dual switch input option,” a jack for a voter to insert such a device. Voters can,
for example, attach a sip-and-puff device, which allows them to indicate choices
by applying varying amounts of pressure to a straw inserted in the mouth. Other
users may use a blink switch that allows them to operate one or two switches by
blinking their eyes. In both cases the switches can be used to control the voting
machine if it is set up to be controlled with one or two switches.
Switch input devices can present their own usability concerns for certain voters.
Such devices require voters to use a control that can communicate a limited num-
ber of messages for two types of actions, ballot navigation and selection. A voter
using a single, rather than dual, switch input device may not have the ability to
scroll backward and forward to revisit earlier answers and might have to restart the
ballot completely to change a choice. For this reason, voters benefit from voting
systems that can interpret switches that transmit at least two discrete messages: for-
ward/select and backward/select. This flexibility can increase the speed and
usability of the voting system for voters using auxiliary devices. Election officials
should ensure that dual switch input devices can be used on the system chosen.
6. Does the system allow simultaneous use of audio and visual 
outputs, in other words, can a voter to see and hear a ballot at 
the same time?
Many voters, particularly those with low literacy levels, limited English skills, or
mild vision impairments, can benefit from both hearing and seeing a ballot. For
that reason, the VVSG has required that all audio ballots and ATIs be synchro-
nized with a standard visual output.107 This feature is presently available on sys-
tems manufactured by Accupoll,108 ES&S,109 Diebold110 and Hart Intercivic.111
According to its representatives, Sequoia plans to implement this feature some-
time in 2006.112
7. Does the system allow voters to input information using a 
tactile control device while still receiving visual, rather than 
audio, output?
Voters with limited fine motor control may not need to listen to an audio ballot
and may prefer to enter their selections using an auxiliary tactile control device,
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while still receiving their ballot through a standard visual display. This feature
currently exists on the DRE systems manufactured by Hart Intercivic,113
Diebold114 and Accupoll.115 According to its representatives, Sequoia plans to
implement this feature sometime in 2006.116
8. Can a voter choose and change accessibility and language 
options without the assistance of a poll worker?
One of the advantages of a computer-based interface is that it can provide a
range of options and can allow those options to be selected by the voter private-
ly and independently. Similarly, the voter should be able to correct her unintend-
ed selection of a feature independently. For example, if a voter who has already
made some but not all of her selections decides that she would prefer a larger text
size, but must return to a preliminary screen to alter the size of the text to con-
tinue voting successfully, such a transition may be prohibitively confusing, require
assistance from a poll worker, or lead to failure.
Some vendors have anticipated the need for flexibility and have designed systems
that allow voters to choose and switch between features with ease. Accupoll allows
voters to switch languages, adjust volume, and magnify or shrink text size at any
time.117 Avante users can change visual and audio settings at any time.118 Diebold
users can select and change visual features at any time, but cannot change audio
features without poll worker assistance.119 ES&S’s and Hart Intercivic’s systems
ask voters to select their preferred features at the beginning of the ballot, but do
not allow voters to change features later in the voting process.120 According to
Sequoia’s representatives, the updated version of the AVC Edge will allow voters
to choose and manipulate all features at all times.121 With the exception of Hart
Intercivic’s eSlate and ES&S’s iVotronic, computer-based systems require that
ATIs be initialized by a poll worker each time a voter requests a change in the set-
tings in use.122
9. Is the system’s audit function accessible to all voters?
All DREs allow voters to review an electronic record of their cast ballots. Those
records can also be read back via audio inputs to blind voters and can be pre-
sented in an enhanced visual display to voters with vision impairments.
■ PAPER-BASED SYSTEMS
Paper-based systems, which include systems that use optical scan ballots and
Vote-by-Mail ballots, create barriers to voters with disabilities that are not as eas-
ily remedied as those presented by computer-based systems. The barriers
imposed by these systems result principally from four features of the voting expe-
rience. First, with both optical scan and Vote-by-Mail systems, the paper ballot
itself must be printed prior to Election Day and cannot be adjusted to address the
needs of a particular voter. For voters with visual impairments, requesting and
using large-print paper ballots may sacrifice a measure of their privacy: officials
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know who request large-print ballots, and if only a small number of individuals
do so, officials can discern voters’ personal selections after polls have closed. Like
voters with vision impairments, voters who require alternate languages may need
to request a different ballot pre-printed in their language and may encounter a
similar privacy concern. In sum, despite the use of large-print ballots and assis-
tive devices like magnifying glasses, many voters with vision impairments may still
have greater difficulties reading the paper ballot than they would reading an
enhanced electronic visual display.123
Second, paper-based systems require voters to read the ballot. Some jurisdictions
provide recordings of the ballot to facilitate voting for those with visual impair-
ments.124 Even when made available, auditory instructions for paper-based sys-
tems are presently produced by a cassette machine rather than by a computer-
based audio system, and voters cannot change the speed of the audio recording
nor skip forward or backward with ease. More importantly, voters with visual
impairments cannot review their ballots for accuracy once they have been
marked without another person reading the contents to them because no paper-
based systems allow an auditory review of voters’ input. For some voters with
visual impairments this barrier can mean an absolute loss of privacy and inde-
pendence.
Third, paper-based systems require voters to mark the ballot manually. Voters
with coordination or vision problems may require significant assistance to com-
plete this task. In addition, voters with cognitive disabilities have an especially dif-
ficult time marking ballots that ask voters to follow an arrow across a page and
select a candidate. Many voters with learning disabilities may struggle to perform
this kind of visual tracking successfully.
Finally, many paper-based systems require voters to feed their marked ballots into
a scanner, and voters with impairments relating to vision, mobility, or coordina-
tion will experience difficulties in completing these tasks. To initiate and complete
scanning, voters must have the visual and physical facility to grasp a ballot, walk
across a polling station, and insert their ballot into a scanner. Many voters will
find their privacy and independence threatened as they seek the assistance of
another person in order to complete the scanning process.
The following questions should be considered in assessing the accessibility of
paper-based voting systems:
1. Can the system be physically adjusted to meet 
a voter’s access needs?
For those voters with disabilities that do not preclude them from handling or see-
ing paper, paper ballots are easy to position so that they can be seen and marked.
The polling place need only include a selection of writing surfaces set at varying
heights.
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However, systems that require a voter to physically handle paper are fully inac-
cessible to those voters who have such profound motor coordination disabilities
that they are unable to grasp or otherwise manipulate a paper ballot. Such voters
cannot clutch a ballot handed to them by a poll worker or operate a pen or mark-
ing device. Nor can these voters transport a ballot across a polling station and
feed the ballot into a tabulator. Because they are unable to execute the basic
mechanics of paper ballot voting without considerable assistance, voters with sig-
nificant motor control impairments are unable to vote in a private and inde-
pendent manner.
Voters with significant visual disabilities have equally prohibitive difficulties with
paper ballots. Without assistance, such voters are unable to read instructions and
candidate choices or to mark their selections. No currently available physical
adjustment to the paper ballot sufficiently lowers these barriers.
In addition, paper-based systems may pose specific barriers to certain voters who
use wheelchairs. Most optical scan systems include a precinct-based scanner into
which the voter must insert her ballot to be counted, and these scanners can be
inaccessible to voters with high spinal cord injuries. Scanners, including those
manufactured by Avante,125 Diebold,126 Sequoia,127 and ES&S,128 often sit atop a
solid ballot box that stands at waist height. The scanner’s feeder is situated at the
front of the box, and no ballot box provides space under this feeder for a wheel-
chair. Thus, voters in wheelchairs cannot roll up to a scanner and face it. Instead,
voters in wheelchairs must roll up beside a scanner, rotate their torsos, and place
the ballot into the feeder slot. Many voters with high spinal cord injuries cannot
move in this fashion and thus cannot vote without third-party assistance.
Though they present many of the accessibility concerns inherent in any paper-
based system, Vote-by-Mail systems provide unique, physical benefits for voters
with certain disabilities, particularly mobility impairments. These are the only
systems that do not require travel to a polling place. The voter completes the vot-
ing process in her own physical environment with more accessible writing sur-
faces or assistive devices tailored to that voter’s specific needs.
2. Does the system allow voters to adjust the visual presentation 
of information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
Once the paper ballot is printed, the size and contrast of the text can no longer
be adjusted. To circumvent this limitation, jurisdictions can print ballots with a
range of visual presentations, as any vote tallying system can be programmed to
count ballots with enlarged print, different colors and contrast ratios, multiple
languages, or other special options. Scanners must be programmed to read such
ballots, and the jurisdiction must print any special ballots in advance and make
them available upon request. In addition, though Vote-by-Mail systems provide
certain advantages for voters with physical limitations, voters with visual impair-
ments may struggle to complete the voting process without assistance. These 
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voters may not be able to read ballot instructions and candidate choices, or know
what they have marked, and may need to sacrifice their privacy and independ-
ence to cast their ballots in a Vote-by-Mail system.129
3. Does the system allow voters to adjust the audio presentation of
information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
The advent of BMDs – which allow voters with vision disabilities and voters with
limited motor skills to mark a ballot using an auxiliary tactile control – has effec-
tively superseded most efforts to make paper ballots more accessible through
audio recordings.130 Without the kind of interface provided by a BMD, many vot-
ers with severe visual or motor coordination impairments cannot mark a paper
ballot without assistance from another person. The use of “tactile ballots” with
PCOS systems seeks to address this barrier as discussed below, but such devices
do not allow voters to review their marked ballots.
4. Does the system provide an audio output/tactile input 
alternative access option to meet the needs of individuals with 
visual impairments or other difficulties reading?
Paper-based systems do not have audio output or tactile input, and without some
additional component added to the system, cannot provide it. This is true for all
of the systems – PCOS and Vote-by-Mail – that require the voter to mark a paper
ballot. However, certain small-scale innovations have been developed to help peo-
ple with visual disabilities to mark paper ballots, including “tactile ballots.” In
such systems, a paper ballot is accompanied by an overlay with tactile markings
and an audiotape with a description of the ballot to guide the voter in marking
her ballot. The advantage of using such add-ons is that the marked ballot is indis-
tinguishable from all of the others and, once cast, can be counted in the same
manner.
The International Foundation for Election Systems has developed a tactile ballot
template that can be used to accommodate voters with visual impairments.131
These templates are currently in use in Rhode Island, which uses optical scan sys-
tems, for blind and visually-impaired voters.132 When used with a Braille instruc-
tion sheet, tactile ballots allow some voters who are both blind and deaf to mark
their ballots without third-party assistance.
There are, however, several disadvantages. The sequential audiotapes force vot-
ers to proceed through the ballot at the rate of the recorded playback, rendering
the voting process slower for voters using these systems than for voters using a dig-
ital audio playback. More importantly, blind and certain low-vision voters cannot
review the marked ballot, and must trust that it is marked correctly or obtain the
assistance of another person to do so, with a consequent loss of independence
and privacy.
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Because Vote-by-Mail ballots are marked in the voter’s home, she must have any
special assistive systems already available if she wishes to vote without assistance.
For example, a voter might have a system to scan a paper form and have it read
back to them. But, as with tactile ballots, voters with severe visual impairments
may not be able to review their marked ballots. For voters without any assistive
devices, moreover, it may be impossible to vote without assistance.
5. Does the system provide controls suitable for voters 
with limited fine motor skills?
Paper-based systems do not have controls to mark the ballot and instead require
the voter to use a pen or pencil to mark it. Such systems are thus inaccessible to
many voters with limited fine motor skills. In addition, all of these systems
(including BMD systems) require the voter to place the marked ballot into an
optical scanner. Voting systems that require a ballot to be grasped, transported
across a polling place, and fed into a scanner create obvious difficulties for voters
without fine motor skills.
6. Does the system allow simultaneous use of audio and visual 
outputs, in other words, for a voter to see and hear a ballot 
at the same time?
Theoretically, election administrators could provide voters with a scanner of
some kind that could convert ballot text into audible speech. No such scanner is
currently on the market, however, perhaps because BMDs serve the same essen-
tial purpose at a lower cost.
7. Does the system allow voters to input information using a 
tactile control device while still receiving visual, rather than 
audio, output?
Unless a voter can use a tactile paper ballot, this feature is essentially inapplica-
ble to paper-based systems, which are not amenable to fully tactile controls.
8. Can a voter choose and change accessibility and language 
options without the assistance of a poll worker?
Unlike a computer display, paper ballots cannot be dynamically altered to change
the size, color, or language of the text at the time when a vote is cast.
With respect to language options, however, if all of the languages used in the
precinct are printed on each ballot, the voter can make use of any of these
options in a PCOS or Vote-by-Mail system. If not, she must request her desired
language either at the polling place (PCOS or BMD) or in advance (Vote-by-
Mail). Large text or other special versions must also be requested in the same
manner.
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Similarly, if a voter needs to change the format of the paper ballot he is using
during the voting process, in most cases he must request a new, blank ballot. For
example, a voter who discovers that she is having trouble reading the ballot might
request a large-print version, if one is available. Similarly, if the voter has already
marked the ballot erroneously, she must ask for a new ballot. Unlike most com-
puter-based systems, paper-based systems require a voter to seek and obtain such
assistance and to discard all work on the original ballot.
In a Vote-by-Mail system, requesting a new or different ballot can involve a trip
to the elections office, requiring significant effort on the part of the voter. In
Oregon, however, the only state that currently uses such a system, replacement
ballots can be requested by calling a toll-free hotline or a County Board of
Elections Office.133 If a voter calls more than five days before an election, her bal-
lot will be sent to her in the mail. If a voter calls within five days of an election,
she must travel to a County Board of Elections Office to pick up her ballot. Such
a trip could prove prohibitive for some disabled voters without transportation.
9. Is the system’s audit function accessible to all voters?
Any voter who can see and read a paper ballot can audit the ballot simply by
looking at it. Voters with vision disabilities or trouble reading may need a
machine to translate markings on a paper ballot into an enhanced visual display
or audible reading of those markings. No such scanner, other than the BMD sys-
tems described below, currently exists.
■ HYBRID SYSTEMS
To determine the accessibility of both hybrid systems analyzed in this section –
BMD and DRE w/ VVPT – it is best to think of each hybrid system in terms of
the system architectures they combine. BMD systems integrate a computer-based
system with a defining feature of paper-based systems: namely, voters use a com-
puter to mark a paper ballot they feed into a scanner to be processed and count-
ed. Similarly, DREs w/ VVPT make use of both computer- and paper-based 
systems. DREs w/ VVPT incorporate a paper-based system as a means by which
a voter can verify her selections prior to casting her vote.
■■ OVERVIEW OF BMD
Like a DRE, BMD systems allow a voter to make her selections on a computer.
BMD systems print the marked ballot for the voter, who must then feed it into a
scanner to be counted. BMDs thus provide the significant accessibility features of
a DRE, but still require that voters overcome the barriers inherent in scanning
paper ballots. Indeed, if the marking process were the end of the voting process,
the use of paper ballots coupled with BMDs would present no greater barriers to
voters with disabilities than DREs.
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■■ ANALYSIS OF BMD
1. Can the system be physically adjusted to meet 
a voter’s access needs?
Once a BMD prints a marked ballot, the system poses unavoidable challenges to
voters who cannot transport a ballot across a polling station. Prior to that point
in the voting process, however, voters interact with a BMD exactly as they would
with a computer-based DRE system. The voter has the same opportunities to (a)
adjust the height of the computer screen, (b) tilt or rotate the screen, or (c) remove
the screen and input controls from a tabletop surface to hold the system in her
lap. ES&S’s Automark includes a screen that can be tilted upward and down-
ward,134 and Populex’s BMD system, at 15 lbs., can rest in a voter’s lap or be eas-
ily transported to allow for curbside voting.135
2. Does the system allow voters to adjust the visual presentation 
of information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
BMDs present all ballot information in an electronic format. In theory, voters can
adjust this electronic ballot in all the ways one can adjust a DRE’s presentation
to allow greater access. Both the Automark and Populex BMDs have high-con-
trast electronic image displays with a contrast ratio of 6:1 or greater.136 In addi-
tion, both machines allow for either a black-and-white display or a color display
that provides the voter with a means to adjust colors.137 Populex provides two font
sizes, one with capital letters of at least 6.3 mm and one with capital letters of
between 3.0 and 4.0 mm, both in a sans-serif or similar font.138 The Automark’s
screen supports large-font displays and font sizes can be varied by the voter if
elections officials request that this feature be implemented during initial ballot
design.139 Populex and Automark users can also magnify any part of their ballots
by pressing a zoom button at any time.140
3. Does the system allow voters to adjust the audio presentation of
information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
Users can adjust the volume of the Automark and Populex BMDs to a maximum
of 105 dB SPL.141 Volume is automatically reset to a default level after each voter
completes her ballot.142 Both BMDs also allow voters to accelerate its audio
recording in order to expedite the voting process.143
4. Does the system provide an audio output/tactile input 
alternative access option to meet the needs of individuals with 
visual impairments or other difficulties reading?
Both the Automark and the Populex BMDs come with ATIs and have dual switch
input capabilities.144 On the Automark’s ATI, four blue arrow keys are used to
move between choices and surround a blue square button that is used to make
selections. All buttons are also labeled in Braille.145 Populex provides a modified
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calculator keypad as its ATI.146 For voters who cannot use a standard ATI, the
Automark also provides dual switch input capacity.147
5. Does the system provide controls suitable for voters 
with limited fine motor skills?
BMDs allow voters with limited motor skills to mark their ballots without the
assistance of an aide or poll worker. Still, voters who need BMDs to mark their
ballots often lack the dexterity necessary to complete the voting process inde-
pendently once the ballot has been marked. Voters must retrieve their ballots
from a BMD, travel to a scanning station, and feed their ballots into a scanner.
Thus, many voters with limited motor skills may require a poll worker or aide to
handle these tasks, and this assistance could diminish their privacy and inde-
pendence.
BMD manufacturers have attempted to address the privacy concern by providing
a cover sleeve that is placed over the ballot.148 If a voter cannot clutch a ballot
well enough to place it in a plastic sleeve, another person can insert the blank bal-
lot into a privacy sleeve for the voter at the start of the voting process. The top
two inches of the ballot protrude from the cover. The person who provides such
assistance can then proceed with the voter to the BMD, insert the two-inch over-
hang into the feeder slot, and allow the machine to draw in the unmarked ballot.
The privacy sleeve is left hanging off the lip of the feeder slot and, once a voter
has finished marking the ballot, the BMD automatically inserts the marked bal-
lot back into the privacy sleeve.
At that point, the person who is assisting the voter can transport the covered bal-
lot across the polling place to a scanner, insert the front two inches of the ballot
into the scanner, and allow the scanner to draw in and count the voter’s ballot.
According to ES&S and Vogue’s representatives, at no point will that person see
any of the markings on the voter’s ballot.149 Although cover sleeves may safeguard
a voter’s privacy, such protection could come at a stiff price for jurisdictions.
Managing the use of privacy sleeves places a high burden on poll workers. Not
only must workers manage the distribution of sleeves, but they must also shadow
any voter who needs a sleeve through every step of the voting process. Nor does
the privacy sleeve restore the independence lost by the voter who cannot com-
plete the voting process without assistance.
6. Does the system allow simultaneous use of audio and visual 
outputs, in other words, for a voter to see and hear a ballot at 
the same time?
This feature is available on the Automark and Populex BMD systems.150
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7. Does the system allow voters to input information 
using a tactile control device while still receiving visual,
rather than audio, output?
This feature is available on the Automark.151
8. Can a voter choose and change accessibility and language 
options independently without the assistance of a poll worker?
The Populex system allows the voter to magnify text and adjust the audio 
presentation at any time.152 The Automark allows voters to adjust the audio pres-
entation at any time, and a button on its touch-screen allows voters to switch
between two font sizes or magnify text.153
9. Is the system’s audit function accessible to all voters?
Both the Automark and Populex BMDs allow voters to review the marks on their
ballots. According to Vogue and ES&S representatives, the Automark BMD is
sold with a standard scanner that reviews the darkened bubbles on the ballot’s
face and translates those marks into an enhanced visual display or an audio ren-
dering of a voter’s choices.154 A voter need only reinsert her ballot to activate this
feature.155 The Populex BMD prints its marked ballots with a barcode that reflects
a voter’s selections.156 Voters can swipe this barcode under a scanner that converts
its contents into an audio output that can be reviewed with headphones or on an
enhanced visual display. To activate these features, a voter needs only the visual
and physical dexterity to swipe her marked ballot under Populex’s scanner. For
voters with limited vision or limited fine motor control this final step may prove
difficult and require assistance to accomplish when either system is used.
■■ OVERVIEW OF DRE w/ VVPT
While DREs w/ VVPT provide the accessibility benefits of a computer-based
system, the voter must be able to read (or hear) the contents of the VVPT to ver-
ify her selections prior to casting her vote. For a voter with limited vision, the
VVPT cannot be easily printed in a large-font for two principle reasons. First, in
certain models, a VVPT prints into a hard case of a fixed size that may not
accommodate a VVPT made larger by a larger font size. Second, ballots printed
in a large-font by machines like the ones once manufactured by Accupoll, which
printed out the VVPT on loose paper from an inkjet printer are, by definition,
longer than other ballots. This may sacrifice the privacy of the voter’s ballot selec-
tions because the large-font ballot’s length would render it immediately distin-
guishable from other ballots.157 For these reasons, voters with visual impairments
may benefit from reviewing the VVPT via audio or on an enhanced electronic
visual display so as to avoid the pitfalls of a large-print ballot.
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As discussed below, technologies are just now being made available to allow blind
voters to read such VVPTs by translating their text into audio. In the spring of
2005, Accupoll released its version of a barcode scanner that was mounted beside
the DRE, read the VVPT barcode produced by the printer attached to the
Accupoll DRE, and translated it into audio.158 According to its representatives,
Sequoia plans to release a similar mechanism early in 2006.159 Scanning technol-
ogy for VVPTs is still in its nascent development phase; it will be several years
before thorough usability testing determines the efficacy of these scanners and
their technology is fine-tuned.
■■ ANALYSIS OF DRE w/ VVPT
1. Can the system be physically adjusted to meet 
a voter’s access needs?
To voters with disabilities that do not relate to their vision, DREs w/ VVPT pro-
vide essentially the same physical adjustability as DREs, discussed already. It is
important to note, however, that if the paper record (i.e., the VVPT) must be read
behind a transparent cover as in most models, the position of that paper often
cannot be changed. A voter with a narrow field of vision may need to reposition
herself to see the paper record, placing the computer screen and possibly the con-
trols out of reach for a time.
2. Does the system allow voters to adjust the visual presentation 
of information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
As with physical adjustments, DREs w/ VVPT systems can be adjusted just as
DRE systems, except in that portion of the voting process that involves verifica-
tion by the voter of her ballot. In all models, the print on the VVPT record is of
a fixed size and appearance and is not subject to modification by the voter at any
time. One system, Accupoll’s AVS 1000, used to print the voter’s selections on a
full-sized sheet of paper (rather than a small strip) that a voter could handle and
bring closer to her face.160
VVPT systems manufactured by Diebold, and ones once manufactured by
Accupoll, offer an additional display option that may be helpful to voters with
cognitive or learning disabilities. In those systems, the ballot screen and the
VVPT are displayed simultaneously on a DRE’s screen to allow for a side-by-side
visual comparison of the two images, thereby simplifying verification for voters
who have difficulties reading rows of information on a printed page.
3. Does the system allow voters to adjust the audio presentation of
information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
Last spring, Accupoll introduced an electronic scanner that, according to com-
pany representatives, could read back the text of a VVPT to a voter.161 Voters
could adjust the speed and volume of the Accupoll scanner’s playback. The elec-
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tronic scanner rested next to a DRE. Each VVPT printed by the Accupoll DRE
contained a barcode of the voter’s selections, as well as a text version of those
selections. A voter thus had to grasp the VVPT and swipe it under the scanner to
verify her vote. Accupoll asserted that given the proximity of the scanner to the
voting machine, blind voters should have had no trouble detecting the existence
of a scanner with their hands and successfully completing the swipe. In theory,
the only voters who would not have been able to verify their votes without assis-
tance would have been voters with both physical and visual impairments. As of
now, the barcode scanners once offered by Accupoll and promised by Sequoia are
the only means for a voter to hear, rather than see, the contents of their VVPTs.
Of course, only rigorous usability testing will be able to verify these predictions.
4. Does the system provide an audio output/tactile input 
alternative access option to meet the needs of individuals with 
visual impairments or other difficulties reading?
Every DRE w/ VVPT can be outfitted with an ATI. If a voter must take action
in response to reviewing a VVPT, she can do so by using such an ATI.
5. Does the system provide controls suitable for voters 
with limited fine motor skills?
As long as voters have the visual facility to see a ballot and are provided with an
ATI, DREs w/ VVPTs are fully accessible to such voters.
6. Does the system allow simultaneous use of audio and visual 
outputs, in other words, for a voter to see and hear a ballot at 
the same time?
DREs w/ VVPT allow the voter to see and hear the selections simultaneously
during the initial phase of the voting process. Once the voter reaches the point at
which she must verify her vote by reviewing the VVPT, however, the audio
options are limited. As noted already, Accupoll offers audio rendering of VVPTs,
and Sequoia might soon follow suit.
7. Does the system allow simultaneous use of visual displays and 
tactile input controls?
As long as a DRE w/ VVPT includes a set of auxiliary tactile controls, and the
controls are programmed to input responses during the VVPT review process,
VVPT systems can facilitate the simultaneous use of visual displays and tactile
input controls.
8. Can a voter choose and change accessibility and language 
options independently without the assistance of a poll worker?
For DREs w/ VVPT, features selected for the initial computer-based portion of
the voting process (e.g., large-print or language options as well as audio options)
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are not carried over into the voter’s verification of the paper record. In the latter
stage of the process, as discussed already, the only accessibility feature that has
been on the market and may be in the future is a barcode reader that translates
the paper record’s contents into audio speech for verification.
VVPT could also encroach on the privacy of those voters who choose a language
other than English to vote. In order for a voter to verify her ballot, the paper trail
may need to be produced in her language of choice. This would reveal a special
language choice on the printout – names of races would not be printed in English
– and if the selection of a language other than English is rare in a particular
precinct, a voter’s privacy could be compromised should officials review ballots
during a recount. Election officials could request that machines be configured to
print every VVPT with labels written in both English and all other available lan-
guages, but this could require a sharp increase in paper use and cost and may be
infeasible for other reasons. To date, no company has pre-programmed a
machine to do so.
9. Is the system’s audit function accessible to all voters?
Any voter that can read a VVPT is likely able to verify the accuracy of its text.
As noted above, voters with visual impairments may require an enhanced visual
display or audio rendering of their VVPTs in order to verify them. Ideally,
enhanced visual and audio renderings of VVPTs would be derived from the same
written text available to sighted voters. The only audio scanner once available for
VVPTs, Accupoll’s, read a barcode, not printed text.162 It is possible that the bar-
code, rather than the text, could be counted as the official ballot in the event of
a recount. In states where this proves true, voters with visual impairments who
use a scanner like Accupoll’s will avoid verifying selections that do not reflect the
ballot of record in an election.
Accessibility experts have suggested two alternatives to Accupoll’s barcode scan-
ner. First, certain scanners can read text printed in OCR fonts, and these scan-
ners could prove helpful in reading VVPTs to voters. Scanners understand each
letter, convert letters into words, and create a spoken version of a written word.
VVPT printers could be programmed to use OCR fonts – indeed Accupoll’s
printers once did – and OCR scanners could be provided.163 Second, some print-
ers can read the words they produce, and VVPTs could be outfitted with such
printers. Printers take note of each character they write and can sound out those
characters into words. The accuracy of these audio renderings improves when
there are limited options for what a word could be, such as a when a printer is
choosing between two candidates in a race.164
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OCR fonts are standard 
monospaced fonts designed for 




In telephone-based voting systems, voters use a touchtone phone to dial a phone
number that connects voters to an audio ballot. Voters press specific telephone
keys to indicate their selections, and the system’s software interprets the tones of
those keys to record choices.165 Telephone-based systems can be designed in two
ways. In one scenario, states can configure their Vote-by-Phone lines to accept
calls from any phone so that voters can cast ballots from home using their own
equipment. Alternatively, states can limit incoming calls to a discrete set of
phones housed at polling places. In this case, voters must travel to the polls to vote
and use phones provided by the state. Unless carefully designed, these telephones
can be largely inaccessible to voters with disabilities.
The only existent Vote-by-Phone systems, New Hampshire’s and Vermont’s, fol-
low the latter model.166 The great accessibility promise of Vote-by-Phone systems,
however, lies in the possibility of allowing voters to vote from home on Election
Day. At home, voters could use customized phones already configured with any
special keypads or other features they might need. Perhaps most importantly, vot-
ing from home would save voters from traveling to a polling place. Many disabled
voters cannot drive and could escape the cumbersome task of arranging for
transportation on Election Day if they could vote from home. In addition, if all
voters voted by telephone, states would not need to invest in rendering old polling
places accessible to voters in wheelchairs. Thus, when combined with a Vote-by-
Mail system for voters with hearing impairments, Vote-by-Phone systems could
level the playing field by giving all voters the same remote voting experience.
Unfortunately, all telephone-based systems present significant barriers to voters
with hearing impairments. First, the voter’s ability to vote by phone depends
upon the quality and nature of their adaptive equipment that facilitates full use
of the telephone. Although many voters with hearing impairments possess such
technology, many voters do not. In theory, jurisdictions using Vote-by-Phone sys-
tems that require voters to vote from home could obtain Text Telephones
(“TTYs” or “TDDs”) to connect with voters that have TTYs in their homes.167
Only a small proportion of voters who have trouble hearing have access to TTYs,
however, and Vote-by-Phone systems would need to be used in conjunction with
Vote-by-Mail systems to accommodate many of these voters.
At present, Vote-by-Phone systems do not offer TTY-capabilities as an option on
their voting systems.168 For now, Inspire’s Vote-by-Phone system thus comes with
“a full-featured Election Management System (EMS) which enables the jurisdic-
tion to configure and print blank paper ballots. These blank ballots could be
mailed to, or made available at the polling sites for, those who are deaf and can-
not use the telephone.”169 This option may not, however, aid those voters with
sight and hearing difficulties.
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Second, while Vote-by-Phone systems may provide significant accessibility bene-
fits to blind voters accustomed to responding to audio output using a standard
phone keypad, this mechanism may prove cumbersome and unfamiliar for other
voters with other accessibility needs: older voters who have vision impairments
and are also hard of hearing may not be able to navigate a phone system with
ease. Voters with limited mobility may not be able to use the telephone keypad
unless it is specially designed for such voters.
■■ ANALYSIS OF TELEPHONE-BASED SYSTEMS
1. Can the system be physically adjusted to meet 
a voter’s access needs?
Standard telephones have a fixed cord length or range of operation, fixed keypad
configuration, and fixed keypad size. If states insist that voters use telephones pro-
vided at a polling place, they may not be physically adjustable unless auxiliary
features are provided. If voters cast ballots from their homes, however, they can
use their personal phones. In all likelihood, these telephones will already be con-
figured to accommodate the voter’s needs and would not require physical adjust-
ments.
2. Does the system allow voters to adjust the visual presentation 
of information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
All telephone-based systems use an audio, not a visual, ballot.
3. Does the system allow voters to adjust the audio presentation of
information contained in the ballot or in voting instructions?
Although existent Vote-by-Phone systems in Vermont and New Hampshire do
not allow voters to adjust the ballot’s volume and speed, designers could program
audio ballots to do so. In addition, many phones allow users to adjust a receiver’s
volume levels.
4. Does the system provide an audio output/tactile input 
alternative access option to meet the needs of individuals with 
visual impairments or other difficulties reading?
All Vote-by-Phone systems transmit information in audio form and ask voters to
input information using tactilely discernible controls. However, Vote-by-Phone
systems allow voters to access and enter information in only one way. Voters must
enter their selections using a standard telephone keypad.170 According to repre-
sentatives of IVS, makers of Vermont’s Vote-by-Phone system, if a voter cannot
use a standard telephone for some reason, no alternative system exists for
inputting ballot information using telephones.171
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5. Does the system provide controls suitable for voters 
with limited fine motor skills?
A Vote-by-Phone system could be designed in two ways. In one scenario, a voter
casts her ballots from home using her personal phone. In this case, the interface
for a phone system is, by definition, the voter’s own equipment and should be
accessible to her.
In a second scenario, currently in practice in Vermont, the voter uses a phone to
cast the ballot at a polling station where phones have been provided. Many vot-
ers with limited motor skills need a specially designed phone with an interface
that is more accessible than a standard 12-key keypad. Indeed, these voters may
need telephones to have an alternative switch input available or telephone end
units adapted to their particular needs. As long a voter can access the unit, any
adaptive technology which is able to replicate the tones of a keypad should be
able to operate the Vote-by-Phone system. According to IVS, some of these adap-
tive technologies cannot meet this requirement, however, because they do not
replicate the “distinct sounds generated by the telephone when its buttons are
pressed.”172
6. Does the system allow simultaneous use of audio and visual 
outputs, in other words, for a voter to see and hear a ballot at 
the same time?
Telephone-based systems cannot currently provide such a feature.
7. Does the system allow simultaneous use of visual displays 
and tactile input controls?
Telephone-based systems cannot currently provide such a feature.
8. Can a voter choose accessibility and language options 
independently without the assistance of a poll worker?
Vote-by-Phone systems have a limited range of accessibility options because they
do not have a visual display and are only as accessible as the telephone system
used by the voter. As discussed already, this can be prohibitive for voters with
hearing impairments who must, in many cases, vote by mail. Nevertheless, these
systems do protect the privacy and independence of those voters who can use the
telephone through assistive devices or other means.
Like a computer interface, language options can be made a part of the initial
steps of the voting process in telephone-based systems, allowing independent and
private selection. Election officials should ask that this flexibility be implemented
during initial ballot design.
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9. Is the system’s audit function accessible to all voters?
Vote-by-Phone systems produce a paper ballot, and auditing this ballot presents
many of the same accessibility concerns as VVPTs. Once a voter has finished
entering her choices, the system prints a marked paper ballot either to a central
location, such as the Secretary of State’s office, or at the precinct itself. This paper
ballot is treated as the ballot of record.173
In the central location scenario, the voter cannot see her marked ballot. However,
ballots are printed with a barcode that contains a voter’s selections. This barcode
can be scanned as it prints at the central office, translated into an audio ballot,
and read back to the voter over the telephone. The voter can either reject or
accept her ballot after hearing the barcode’s contents. In jurisdictions where
paper ballots, not barcodes, are the ballot of record, voters would review a proxy
for a ballot, rather than the physical text that would be counted in an election.
By contrast, when ballots are printed at precincts, sighted voters can read the text
printed on their ballots and verify its accuracy. Like with barcode scanners used
with VVPTs, voters with vision impairments must have the visual and motor
facility to use a barcode scanner to translate their ballots into an audio recording.
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KEY FINDINGS
Our report reached several conclusions about the accessibility of each system:
■ COMPUTER-BASED SYSTEMS: DRES AND BMDS
■ Accessibility of Computer-Based Systems: Because computer-based inter-
faces allow voters to tailor a range of features to their individual needs
instantly and without assistance from another person, DREs and BMDs offer
the greatest accessibility to voters with disabilities, particularly those with
visual impairments.
■ Audio and Enhanced Visual Display Capabilities for Voters with Visual
Impairments: Unlike paper-based voting systems that do not provide any
means for voters to hear rather than see instructions or ballot information,
most DREs and BMDs allow voters to hear such information through head-
phones and to adjust the volume and rate of the audio output. In addition,
several systems provide digitized (i.e., real recorded human voice), rather than
computer-synthesized, speech, and use different voices for instructions and
ballot selections to expedite comprehension and thus the voting process itself.
For voters with mild vision impairments who might not need an audio ballot,
computer interfaces provide an enhanced visual display that uses bigger and
bolder text.
■ Alternative Input Devices for Voters with Motor/Coordination Impairments:
Navigation of computer screens often requires that voters use controls that
require hand-eye-coordination – a touch-screen or a mouse – to select their
choices. For voters without the use of their hands or with severe motor
impediments, a touch-screen cannot be used to make selections at all. In both
cases, there must be an alternative input control available. The most popular
computer-based systems already provide tactilely discernable input controls,
often as part of the Audio Tactile Interface designed for voters who cannot
see. Frequently these tactile controls can be used by individuals with mobili-
ty and coordination disabilities so long as the visual display remains active
when those controls are engaged. For those voters who cannot use their hands
at all to input selections, certain machines include a “dual switch input
option,” a jack for a voter to insert their own dual switch input device. Voters
can, for example, attach a sip-and-puff device, which allows the voter to indi-
cate choices by applying pressure to a straw or any other dual switch com-




■ Limited Flexibility to Meet Special Needs: First, with PCOS and Vote-by-
Mail systems, the paper ballot itself must be printed prior to Election Day
and thus cannot be adjusted to address the needs of a particular voter. In
addition, despite magnifying lenses and other assistive devices provided by
elections officials, voters with vision impairments still may have greater diffi-
culties reading the paper ballot than they would reading a computer screen
that allows fine contrast and size adjustments to be made. Paper-based sys-
tems do not have audio output or tactile input, and without some additional
component added to the system, cannot provide it.
■ Tactile Ballots for Voters with Visual Impairments: Certain small-scale inno-
vations have been developed to help people with visual disabilities to mark
paper ballots, including “tactile ballots.” However, many voters with visual
impairments still cannot review the marked ballot and must trust that it is
marked correctly or obtain the assistance of another person to do so, with a
consequent loss of independence and privacy.
■ Inaccessible Auditory Instructions: If made available at all, auditory instruc-
tions for paper-based systems are presently produced by a cassette machine,
rather than by a computer-based audio system. In practice, voters with visu-
al impairments can neither change the speed of the audio nor skip forward
or backward during the voting process. More importantly, such voters cannot
review their ballots once they have been marked without another person
reading the contents to them.
■ Paper Ballots Inaccessible to Voters with Motor Coordination Impairments:
Paper-based systems that require voters to mark the ballot manually present
significant challenges to voters with either or both coordination and vision
problems. Paper-based systems do not have “controls” to mark the ballot and
instead require the voter to use a pen or pencil to mark it. Such systems are
thus inaccessible to many voters with limited fine motor skills.
■ Scanners Inaccessible to Many Voters with Visual, Mobility, or Motor
Coordination Impairments: Systems that require voters to feed their marked
ballots into a scanner present barriers not only for voters with impairments
relating to vision, mobility, or coordination, but even to non-disabled voters
who have coordination difficulties.
■■ Vote-by-Mail Systems
Vote-by-Mail systems provide unique benefits for voters with mobility impair-
ments. These are the only systems that do not require travel to a polling place;
the voter completes the voting process in her own physical environment with
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more accessible writing surfaces or assistive devices tailored to that voter’s specif-
ic needs. Nevertheless, voters with visual or motor coordination impairments still
may be unable to vote independently using a paper ballot of any kind, including
a mail-in ballot.
■ HYBRID SYSTEMS
■■ DREs w/ VVPT
While DREs w/ VVPT provide the accessibility benefits of a computer-based
system, voters with visual impairments are presently unable to review and verify
the contents of the VVPT prior to casting their votes. Voting system manufac-
turers have just started to release scanners that read back the text of a VVPT to
a voter, and those technologies are as yet unproven. In addition, despite assur-
ances from the manufacturer that visually-impaired voters should have no trou-
ble detecting the existence of a scanner with their hands and successfully scan-
ning their VVPTs, voters who have both visual and motor impairments are like-
ly to need assistance in using such technology to read their marked ballots. Of
course, only rigorous usability testing will be able to verify these predictions.
■■ BMDs
BMDs greatly augment the accessibility of paper-based systems. Indeed, if the
marking process were the end of the voting process, the use of paper ballots cou-
pled with BMDs would present no greater barriers to voters with disabilities than
DREs. Moreover, both the Automark and Populex BMDs allow visually-impaired
voters to review the marks on their ballots on an enhanced visual display or in
audio format. To activate these features, a voter needs only the visual and physi-
cal dexterity to use the scanner. For voters with limited vision or limited fine
motor control, this may prove difficult and require assistance to accomplish.
■ TELEPHONE-BASED SYSTEMS
Precinct-based Vote-by-Phone systems provide no greater accessibility than
DREs or BMDs, and such systems may remain inaccessible to many voters. In
particular, telephone-based systems may prove cumbersome for people with lim-
ited fine motor control and hearing impairments, especially those who have poor
speech discrimination, or who rely on lip-reading, text, or other visual cues. To
make a telephone voting system accessible for these individuals, audio signal
enhancement and a text alternative would need to be available. Moreover, none
of the currently available Vote-by-Phone systems allows the use of adaptive tech-
nologies to assist hearing-impaired voters, such as TTY phones. Finally, it is
unclear to what extent other adaptive telephone end units could be used with cur-
rent systems.
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The future promise of Vote-by-Phone systems lies in the possibility of allowing
Election Day voting from home, where voters could use customized phones
already configured with any special keypads or other features they might need.
Voting from home would save voters from traveling to a polling place. Thus,
when combined with a Vote-by-Mail system for voters with hearing impairments,
Vote-by-Phone systems could level the playing field by giving all voters the same
remote voting experience. But the only existent Vote-by-Phone systems, New
Hampshire’s and Vermont’s, require voters to vote at a polling place.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
This report provides a template of key questions and preliminary answers to
assess the accessibility of the various types of voting systems. More significant
testing must be performed to provide fuller answers. In such assessments, elec-
tions officials should keep in mind five general points:
■ Assessments must take into account the specific needs of citizens with multi-
ple disabilities. For example, solutions that solve barriers faced by voters with
visual impairments by providing an audio ballot do not help a voter who is
both blind and deaf.
■ To determine accessibility, officials and advocates should examine each step
a voting system requires a voter to perform, starting with ballot marking and
ending with ballot submission. Systems that may provide enhanced accessi-
bility features at one stage of the voting process may be inaccessible to the
same voters at another stage in that process.
■ Accessibility tests must take into account a full range of disabilities. When
selecting participants for system tests, officials and advocates should include
people with sensory disabilities (e.g., vision and hearing impairments), people
with physical disabilities (e.g., spinal cord injuries and coordination difficul-
ties), and people with cognitive disabilities (e.g., learning disabilities and devel-
opmental disabilities). Given the rising number of older voters, officials
should take pains to include older voters in their participant sample.
■ All accessibility tests should be carried out with full ballots that reflect the
complexity of ballots used in elections. A simplified ballot with only a few
races or candidates may produce misleading results.
■ Many features that ensure accessible voting are new to the market or still in
development. As election officials purchase systems today, they should obtain
contractual guarantees from vendors that vendors will retrofit their systems
with new accessibility features as such technology becomes available, and that
these adjustments will be made at little or no extra cost.
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INTRODUCTION
The performance of a voting system is measured in part by its success in allow-
ing a voter to cast a valid ballot that reflects her intended selections without
undue delays or burdens. This system quality is known as “usability.”1 Following
several high-profile controversies in the last few elections – including, most 
notoriously, the 2000 controversy over the “butterfly ballot” in Palm Beach – 
voting system usability is a subject of utmost concern to both voters and election
officials.
Defining Usability. In this chapter, we examine the usability of various voting
systems and discuss several ways that election officials can maximize the usabili-
ty of these systems. By maximizing the usability of a system, we mean ensuring,
to as great a degree as possible, that voting systems: (a) effectively (correctly)
record voters’ intended selections, (b) complete the voting process in an efficient
and timely manner, and (c) provide voters with confidence and satisfaction in the
voting process.
Analysis. Our discussion of voting system usability proceeds in two stages.
■ Effectiveness (or Correctness). We review original research conducted by Dr.
David Kimball, which quantifies the extent to which current voting systems
correctly record voters’ intended selections, i.e., the systems’ “effectiveness.”
Specifically, Dr. Kimball looks at the residual vote rate for each major voting
system in the 2004 presidential election. The “residual vote rate,” the differ-
ence between the number of ballots cast and the number of valid votes cast
in a particular contest, is viewed by many experts as the single best measure
of the effectiveness of a voting system. Based on the research on voting sys-
tem and general usability standards, we extract four key findings about the
effectiveness of various voting systems. The findings may be found on pages
10–11.
■ Efficiency and Voter Confidence. We summarize the limited research avail-
able on the efficiency of and voter confidence in the various systems.
Usability Principles. From this work and other research into usability, we then
identify a series of usability principles applicable to voting systems which elec-
tions officials and advocates should use to assess and improve the usability of vot-
ing systems in their jurisdictions. The principles may be found on pages 108–115.
Usability Recommendations. Finally, we provide recommendations to assist
election officials in maximizing the usability of their voting systems in the areas
of ballot design and system instructions. A full discussion of the recommenda-
tions may be found on pages 116–117. They are summarized below:
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■ Do not assume familiarity with technology.
■ Conduct usability testing on proposed ballots before finalizing their design.
■ Create plain language instructions and messages in both English and other
languages commonly used in the jurisdiction.
■ Locate instructions so they are not confusing or ignored.
■ For both ballots and instructions, incorporate standard conventions used in
product interfaces to communicate a particular type of information or mes-
sage.
■ Do not create ballots where candidates for the same office appear in multiple
columns or on multiple pages.
■ Use fill-in-the-oval ballots, not connect-the-arrow ballots, for optical scan sys-
tems.
■ Ensure that ballot instructions make clear that voters should not cast both a
write-in and normal vote.
■ Provide mechanisms for recording and reviewing votes.
■ Make clear when the voter has completed each step or task in the voting
process.
■ Eliminate extraneous information on ballots.
■ Minimize the memory load on the voter by allowing her to review, rather
than remember, each of her choices during the voting process.
■ Ensure that the voting system plainly notifies the voter of her errors.
■ Make it easy for voters to correct their errors.
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DEFINING USABILITY
In December of 2005 the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) released the
Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (“VVSG 2005”), which include the first set
of usability requirements applicable to voting systems in this country.2 As part of
this work, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) has
undertaken to develop a set of precise performance criteria and test protocols to
measure the usability of specific voting systems.
A consensus among experts as to the definition of usability of voting systems has
developed out of usability research in other areas of technology. The
International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) defines usability as “the
extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals
with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of user.”3
Both the draft voting systems of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (“IEEE”)4 and the VVSG 20055 echo these standards, noting that
usable voting systems will effectively and correctly record voters’ intended choices,
operate efficiently, and instill confidence in the voter that her choice was correctly
recorded and that her privacy was assured.
Before reviewing the performance of the various voting systems under the usabil-
ity guidelines, it should be noted that usability is affected not solely by the type of
voting system at issue, but also by the ballot and instructions designed by the ven-
dors or elections officials for a particular jurisdiction. Indeed, any usability bene-
fits of a particular type of voting system may be eclipsed partially, if not entirely,
by a poor ballot design or confusing instructions. For this reason, the recent pub-
lic debate over the strengths and weaknesses of various voting systems may have
unduly obscured the importance of what should occur to improve the voting
process after elections officials have made their choice of system. Although we do
not yet have sufficient data to prescribe a single “best” or “most usable” ballot
design for each system, there is a substantial body of research on the usability of
forms (both paper and electronic), instructions, and other signage that can be
used as guidance. In addition, given the variations in local laws and practices,
elections officials should conduct their own usability testing where possible on
their chosen system to limit design flaws that lead to voter errors.
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ANALYSIS
■ EFFECTIVENESS (OR CORRECTNESS)
There are few published studies of usability testings that have compared the
effectiveness of different voting systems in accurately recording voter intention in
a controlled environment.
Absent such testing, one of the most revealing available measures of voting sys-
tem effectiveness is what is referred to in the political science literature as the
residual vote rate. The “residual vote rate” is the difference between the number
of ballots cast and the number of valid votes cast in a particular contest. Residual
votes thus occur as the result of undervotes (where voters intentionally or unin-
tentionally record no selection) or overvotes (where voters select too many candi-
dates, thus spoiling the ballot for that contest).6 Exit polls and other election sur-
veys indicate that slightly less than 1% of voters intentionally abstain from mak-
ing a selection in presidential elections.7 Thus, a residual vote rate significantly
higher than 1% in a presidential election indicates the extent to which the voting
system’s design or the ballot’s design has produced unintentional voter errors.
Significantly, several studies indicate that residual vote rates are higher in low-
income and minority communities and, in addition, that improvements in voting
equipment and ballot design produce substantial drops in residual vote rates in
such communities.8 As a result, the failure of a voting system to protect against
residual votes is likely to harm low-income and minority voters and their com-
munities more severely than other communities.
This section reviews research previously published by Dr. Kimball, and research
that he is publishing here for the first time, on the residual vote rates for various
voting systems in the 2004 elections.
■■ METHODOLOGY
For the most part, Dr. Kimball used a cross-sectional analysis to generate the
research findings discussed below. In a cross-sectional analysis, a particular char-
acteristic is compared across jurisdictions. Here, for a given election, residual vote
rates are compared across jurisdictions using a multivariate statistical analysis to
control for factors other than voting system (such as demographics, the level of
competition in the election, and other features of the local electoral context).
Because of the decentralized nature of election administration in the United
States, local elections officials generally make their own decisions about purchas-
ing voting technology, as well as designing and printing ballots. As a result, vot-
ing technology and ballot design vary from one jurisdiction to the next, often even
within the same state. This report also reviews a smaller number of studies 
examining residual votes and voting technology over time to take advantage of
local changes in voting equipment. Examining both types of studies allows a 
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difference-in-difference research design to provide a more rigorous estimate of
the impact of voting technology.9
■■ RESIDUAL VOTE RATES
Table U1 summarizes the rates of residual votes for the relevant voting systems
found by Dr. Kimball in the election results for president (2000 and 2004) and
governor (2002):
TABLE U1
RESIDUAL VOTE RATES BY TYPE OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY
Residual  Vote Rate In:
Technology Description 2000 2002 2004
Full-face DRE Candidates listed on a full-face 1.6% 2.2% 1.2%
computerized screen – voter pushes 
button next to chosen candidate.  
Machine records and counts votes.
Scrolling Candidates listed on a scrolling — 1.2% 1.0%
DRE computer screen – voter touches screen 
next to chosen candidate.  Machine 
records and counts votes.
Central-Count Voter darkens an oval or arrow next to 1.8% 2.0% 1.7%
Optical Scan chosen candidate on paper ballot.  
Ballots counted by computer scanner 
at a central location.
Precinct Count Voter darkens an oval or arrow next to 0.9% 1.3% 0.7%
Optical Scan chosen candidate on paper ballot.  
Ballots scanned at the precinct, allowing 
voter to find and fix errors.
Mixed More than one voting method used. 1.1% 1.5% 1.0%
Nationwide Residual Vote Rate 1.8% 2.0% 1.1%
Based on 1755 counties analyzed in 2000, 
1270 counties analyzed in 2002, and 2215 counties analyzed in 2004
■■■ DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC (“DRE”) SYSTEMS
Full-face DRE systems produce higher residual vote rates (1.2%) than both scroll-
ing DRE systems (1.0%) and precinct count optical scan (“PCOS”) systems
(0.7%). “Full-face” DRE systems employ a ballot that displays all of the offices
and candidates on a single screen, rather than in consecutive, separate screens
that the voter touches to select her preferred candidates. As shown in Table U2,
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however, two scrolling DRE systems produced a residual vote rate of 0.7% – the
same as the nationwide average rate for PCOS systems.
TABLE U2:
RESIDUAL VOTE RATES BY SCROLLING DRE BRAND
2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Brand of Voting Machine Residual Vote Rate
UniLect Patriot (17 counties) 6.8%
VTI VotWare (1 county) 4.1%
Fidlar-Doubleday EV 2000 (8 counties) 2.3%
Hart InterCivic eSlate (8 counties) 1.8%
MicroVote Infinity (20 counties) 1.6%
Advanced Voting Solutions WinVote (10 counties) 1.1%
Diebold AccuVote-TSX (1 county) 0.9%
Sequoia AVC Edge (24 counties) 0.8%
ES&S iVotronic (54 counties) 0.7%
Diebold AccuVote-TS (190 counties) 0.7%
Sequoia DRE with VVPT (17 counties in Nevada) 0.3%
Nationwide Scrolling DRE Residual Vote Rate 1.0%
Based on 353 counties using scrolling DREs in 2004
The performance of full-face and scrolling DRE systems diverges even more as
the income level of the voters declines. Stated differently, relative to scrolling
DRE systems, full-face DRE systems produced particularly high residual vote
rates among voters with incomes of less than $25,000 in 2004. Similarly, full-face
DREs tend to produce higher residual vote rates than scrolling DREs in counties
with large Hispanic or African American populations. Indeed, only punch card
systems produced a higher residual vote rate than full-face DREs in jurisdictions
with a Hispanic population of over 30%. See Table U3.
While the residual vote rates produced by both scrolling and full-face DREs
decrease slightly as the percentage of African American voters increases (1.0% to
0.8%), such rates increase significantly as the percentage of Hispanic voters
increases beyond 30% of the population (0.9% to 1.4% for scrolling DREs). The
reasons for these trends are not clear, but they suggest that additional analysis
should be conducted by elections officials and vendors to determine whether and
how DREs could be programmed to address the language needs of Spanish-
speaking voters more effectively.
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TABLE U3: 
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC DISPARITY IN RESIDUAL VOTES BY VOTING TECHNOLOGY
2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Votomatic Optical Optical Full-
Punch Scan Scan Face Scrolling
Composition of County Cards Central Precinct DRE DRE
Racial/Ethnic
Less than 10% black 1.8% 1.5% 0.8% 1.3% 1.0%
Between 10% and 30% black 1.7% 1.7% 0.5% 1.2% 0.9%
Over 30% black 2.4% 4.1% 0.9% 1.3% 0.8%
Less than 10% Hispanic 1.8% 1.7% 0.6% 1.1% 1.0%
Between 10% and 30% Hispanic 1.8% 1.1% 0.9% 1.1% 0.7%
Over 30% Hispanic 2.4% 1.9% 1.2% 2.0% 1.4%
Median Income
Less than $25,000 4.0% 3.3% 1.4% 2.8% 1.3%
Between $25,000 and $32,499 2.3% 1.7% 0.8% 1.4% 1.1%
Between $32,500 and $40,000 2.0% 1.6% 0.7% 1.3% 1.0%
Over $40,000 1.5% 1.2% 0.7% 0.9% 0.8%
Based on 2402 counties analyzed in 2004
Researchers at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan
have released preliminary findings from usability testing they conducted on sev-
eral DRE systems.10 Their early findings suggest that specific model and ballot
design features may lead to different incidences of voter error produced by dif-
ferent manufacturers’ DREs. In a laboratory comparison between the Hart
InterCivic eSlate and Diebold AccuVote-TS, for example, the authors found that
the two manufacturers’ approaches to providing the voter with an opportunity to
review her selections before casting her vote produce different error rates.
Both machines present the voter with a two-page “review” screen prior to casting
the vote. According to the researchers, the eSlate’s “review” screen appears more
distinct in both color and format from the earlier pages that the voter sees than
does the AccuVote-TS review screen. In addition, if the eSlate voter activates the
control to “cast” the ballot prior to reviewing both screens, that machine then
shows the voter the second review screen rather than casting the ballot immedi-
ately. By contrast, the AccuVote-TS allows the voter to circumvent the review
process midstream by touching the screen to “cast” her ballot.
The researchers who conducted this testing hypothesize that these two design dif-
ferences may be responsible for a greater incidence of unintended voter errors
from the AccuVote-TS DRE, as voters do not devote as much attention to review-
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ing and correcting their selections.11 Although preliminary in nature, such find-
ings demonstrate the critical importance of usability testing of specific models
within a type of voting system to reduce unnecessary voter errors. Although both
of these systems are DREs, such differences in ballot design produce very differ-
ent opportunities for voter error in each of the two machines.
■■■ DRE SYSTEMS WITH VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER TRAILS (“VVPT”)
Only one state, Nevada, used a DRE system w/ VVPT in the 2004 election. In
addition, Nevada is the only state in the country that includes a “none of the
above” option on the ballot for federal and statewide elections. This option
reduces undervotes, regardless of the voting system being used, because it allows
voters who wish to cast a protest vote to do so without registering a “lost” vote.
Because no other states used comparable systems or ballot options, the data are
too limited to draw any conclusions regarding residual vote rates. The 17 Nevada
counties registered a miniscule residual vote rate of 0.3% in the 2004 elections,
but this figure is not directly comparable to that produced by other jurisdictions
with different ballot options.
■■■ PRECINCT COUNT OPTICAL SCAN SYSTEMS
With the exception of Nevada’s DRE system,12 the specific voting systems that
produced the lowest residual vote rate in the country in 2004 – both at 0.6% –
were the AccuVote-OS and ES&S M100 precinct count optical scan systems. See
Table U4. In addition, the nationwide average residual vote rate for PCOS sys-
tems was lower in 2004 than the average rate for either type of DRE system.
TABLE U4:
RESIDUAL VOTE RATES BY PRECINCT COUNT OPTICAL SCAN BRAND
2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Brand of Voting Machine Residual Vote Rate
ES&S Optech 3P Eagle (220 counties) 0.9%
ES&S M100 (102 counties) 0.6%
Diebold AccuVote-OS (264 counties) 0.6%
Nationwide PCOS Residual Vote Rate 0.7%
Based on 630 counties using PCOS in 2004
Unlike for scrolling DREs and central-count optical scan systems, residual vote
rates for PCOS systems do not appear to correlate significantly with the percent-
age of African American voters within the jurisdiction. See Table U3. But resid-
ual vote rates for both PCOS and DRE systems increase significantly with the
percentage of Hispanic voters. This conclusion suggests that neither PCOS nor
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DRE systems succeed in eliminating the impact of voters’ language needs on the
extent of residual votes. When compared with other voting systems, however,
PCOS systems and scrolling DREs appear most successful at minimizing the cor-
relation between residual votes and the racial, ethnic, or economic composition
of a county.
Differences in ballot design for optical scan systems produce significant differ-
ences in residual vote rates. First and foremost, ballots that required voters to
darken an oval produced a residual vote rate of 0.6% in the 2004 election, while
those that required voters to connect an arrow with a line to a candidate pro-
duced a rate of 0.9%. See Table U5. Plainly, the former design is preferable to
avoid spoiled ballots. In addition, other ballot design features have been found to
affect error rates in optical scan systems.
TABLE U5:




Where Ballots Are Counted an Oval an Arrow
Precinct Count (641 counties) 0.6% 0.9%
Central Count (767 counties) 1.4% 2.3%
Nationwide Optical Scan Residual Vote Rate 1.0%
A recent pilot study of ballots from 250 counties in five states identified seven
design recommendations for paper-based optical scan ballots, many of which
could apply to other voting systems as well.13 These recommendations are listed
later in this report along with the usabilty principles they support.
■■■ VOTE-BY-MAIL SYSTEMS
At present, the state of Oregon is the only jurisdiction within the United States
that uses a Vote-by-Mail system (“VBM”) as its principal voting system.
Accordingly, definitive conclusions about the residual vote rates of VBM systems
must await additional studies of that state and of jurisdictions outside the United
States, such as Great Britain. Studies of Oregon’s experience indicate that the
adoption of a statewide VBM system in 2000 had no substantial impact either on
voter participation or residual vote rates in Oregon elections. For example, the
residual vote rate in Oregon in the 1996 presidential election (before adoption of
VBM) was 1.5%, while the residual vote rate in Oregon in 2000 was 1.6%.14
These figures do suggest that VBM systems may produce significantly higher
residual vote rates than either PCOS or scrolling DRE systems.
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Although further research must be conducted to determine precise causes of this
discrepancy, it may stem from the fact mail-in ballots are scanned and counted
using the same technology as the centrally counted optical scan systems used in
other jurisdictions. As shown in Table U1, the residual vote rate for such systems
in the 2004 elections was 1.7%. By definition, such systems do not allow the voter
to be notified of, or to correct, any under- or overvotes she may have uninten-
tionally indicated on her ballot. Therefore, while VBM systems may have other
benefits, these systems are not as effective in minimizing residual votes as DRE or
PCOS systems.
■■■ OTHER SYSTEMS
Unfortunately, no data are yet available concerning the actual residual vote rates
for Ballot Marking Devices (“BMDs”) or Vote-by-Phone systems because few of
these systems have yet been used in elections in this country.
■■ LIMITS OF RESIDUAL VOTE RATE STUDIES
Measuring the residual vote rates of top-of-the-ticket races indicates how often
voters interact with a particular voting system on Election Day in such manner as
to produce an incorrect (or ineffective) vote that does not reflect their intended
selections. But residual vote rates reflect only the frequency of voter errors; they
do not provide any basis to determine the reason for the voter errors on a partic-
ular type of voting system. Moreover, few if any jurisdictions gather data con-
cerning the number or nature of requests for assistance by voters on Election
Day, how long it takes for voters to vote, or any other information that would help
to assess the efficiency or confidence produced by particular voting systems. For
this reason, election officials should consider ways to gather such information on
Election Day in selected precincts in order to facilitate future improvements in
voting system and ballot design. In the meantime, election results provide an
important but limited way to assess the usability of a particular voting system.
■■ KEY FINDINGS
Key findings from the limited available research on the effectiveness of various
voting technologies are as follows:
■ With few exceptions, PCOS systems and scrolling DREs produce lower rates
of residual votes than central-count optical scan, full-face DRE, or mixed
voting systems.
■ Residual vote rates are higher on DREs with a full-face ballot design than on
scrolling DREs with a scrolling or consecutive screen format. The negative
impact of full-face ballot design in terms of lost votes is even greater in low-
income and minority communities than in other communities.
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■ PCOS systems produce significantly lower residual vote rates than central-
count optical scan systems because the former systems allow the voter to cor-
rect certain of her errors prior to casting her ballot.
■ VBM systems produce higher residual vote rates than PCOS or DRE sys-
tems. VBM systems are comparable in this regard to central-count optical
scan systems, which employ the same technology and counting process. Like
central-count optical scan systems, VBM systems provide no opportunity for
the voter to be notified of, or to correct, any under- or overvotes on her bal-
lot prior to its being counted.
■ EFFICIENCY AND VOTER CONFIDENCE
The existing research concerning the time each system requires to complete the
voting process, the burdens imposed upon voters, and the confidence each system
inspires among voters remains extremely limited. We summarize that research
below.
■■ DREs
Several studies of DREs since 2000 have provided an overview of potential
usability concerns based on limited testing and expert reviews, but scholars have
only recently started to conduct fuller usability tests with statistical and analytical
significance.15 In addition, two economists recently analyzed voter turnout in the
State of Georgia in 2002 and found a positive relationship between the propor-
tion of elderly voters and a decrease in voter turnout from 1998 levels; the
authors hypothesize that this evidence suggests that elderly voters were “appre-
hensive” about the statewide change in voting technology to DREs.16
Dr. Frederick G. Conrad of the University of Michigan, and collaborators Paul
Herrnson, Ben Bederson, Dick Niemi and Mike Traugott, have recently com-
pleted one of the first major usability tests on electronic voting systems other than
vendor testing. They analyze the steps required to complete voting in a single
election and suggest that certain DREs require substantially more actions by a
voter – i.e., touches to the screen, turns to a navigation wheel, etc. – to select a can-
didate or ballot measure than other DREs. Not surprisingly, they have found that
more actions mean more time to complete the voting process, as well as lower
voter satisfaction with the DRE in question. In particular, Hart InterCivic’s eSlate
required 3.92 actions per task and 10.56 minutes on average for a voter to com-
plete the voting process while Diebold’s AccuVote-TS required only 1.89 actions
per task and only 4.68 minutes to complete the process. Out of the six systems
analyzed, participants in that study indicated that they were most comfortable
using the AccuVote-TS and least comfortable using the eSlate.17
The same research suggests, however, that design elements that decrease efficien-
cy or voter confidence may actually increase the accuracy of voters’ selections.
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For example, eSlate’s approach to facilitating the voter’s review of her selections
prior to voting both adds time to the voting process and increases the likelihood
that a voter will catch her errors and correct them prior to casting her ballot.
Accordingly, usability testing may be most valuable not in eliminating any one
problematic feature of a system, but instead in evaluating the performance of a
system as a whole and in making clear the tradeoffs election officials must con-
sider in selecting a system and in designing the ballot and instructions.
In a research project sponsored by the Brennan Center for Justice and conduct-
ed by MIT Professor Ted Selker, the authors conducted a one-day simulated 
election test at a YMCA regularly used as a polling place. The test compared the
voting experiences of people with and without reading disabilities on full-faced
voting machines and a standard screen-by-screen voting machine. Three
machines were tested: one DRE with a full-face ballot (ES&S’s V2000 LED); one
DRE with a scrolling ballot design and an LCD display (ES&S’s iVotronic LCD);
and a prototype DRE with a full-face ballot displayed on a lever machine-sized,
high-resolution screen (iVotronic LS Full Faced DRE). 48 of 96 participants had
been previously diagnosed with a reading disability, and researchers attempted to
catch undiagnosed reading disabilities by testing all participants prior to the vot-
ing simulation. The results have implications for all voters. Notably, voters with
undiagnosed reading disabilities and voters with no disabilities had much higher
rates of undervotes on full-faced machines than on scrolling voting machines.
This population also had fewer errors on the commercial DRE than on full-faced
voting machines. People who had been diagnosed with reading disabilities were
able to compensate for their difficulties and had fewer than other participants on
full-faced voting machines. All voters took more than 3 minutes to vote but all
reading disabled people took longer to vote on the scrolling DRE than the full-
faced DRE.18 These conclusions confirm the evidence of higher incidence of
“roll off ” produced by full-face lever and DRE voting systems in real elections.19
■■ DRES w/ VVPT
Professor Selker and his team at MIT’s Media Lab have attempted to assess the
extent to which voters who use such machines actually review the VVPT prior to
casting their votes. In their testing, the authors found that no VVPT users report-
ed any errors during the voting process though two existed for each ballot they
used. At the end of the voting process, testers asked VVPT users whether they
believed any errors existed on their paper record even if they did not report them.
Only 8% answered yes. In contrast, users of an audio-based verification system
reported errors at higher rates. 14% of users reported errors during the voting
process, and 85% of users told testers that they believed errors existed in the
record although they did not all report them.20 Additional research needs to be
conducted to measure the efficiency of and voter confidence in these systems. But
Dr. Selker’s research suggests that VVPTs may present significant usability prob-
lems that can prevent voters from identifying errors readily.
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valuable in evaluating the 
performance of a system as 
a whole and in making clear 
the tradeoffs elections officials
must consider.
■■ PRECINCT COUNT OPTICAL SCAN SYSTEMS
No available research has measured the efficiency of or voter confidence in opti-
cal scan systems. This is a significant gap in the literature that hampers sound
comparisons between DREs and optical scan systems and also limit public scruti-
ny of ballot design in these systems.
■■ OTHER SYSTEMS
Unfortunately, no research is yet available that has measured the efficiency of or
voter confidence in BMDs or Vote-by-Phone systems because few of these sys-
tems have yet been used in elections in this country. In addition, no studies have
measured these variables for VBM systems, as used presently in Oregon.21
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USABILITY PRINCIPLES
As this chapter establishes, the research into the usability of voting systems
described in this chapter demonstrates that scrolling DREs and PCOS systems
protect voters against their own errors more consistently than other types of sys-
tems. Still, only a few studies have compared different ballots directly or defini-
tively determined what makes one form of ballot more usable than another – i.e.,
less prone to producing errors, more efficient, and more confidence-inspiring.22
To be sure, usability experts have provided valuable guidelines for elections offi-
cials and the EAC that promise to improve the basic usability of voting systems.
Still, until new research correlates specific design elements with measurable accu-
racy, efficiency, and voter confidence, such usability guidelines for voting systems
will remain a work in progress. In addition, new research should reflect the per-
formance-based thrust of the EAC’s evolving voting system certification stan-
dards and study the relationships between specific features and the combined
effects of the design choices embodied in a system, rather than just one facet of
a design.
For this project, we have assembled the most significant lessons drawn not only
from our work with voting systems, but also from other areas in which usability
has improved the interaction between humans and technology. We provide the
following discussion of specific areas of concern to assist elections officials in
designing both the ballots for elections and the protocol for usability testing that
should be conducted prior to completing such ballot design.
■ DO NOT ASSUME FAMILIARITY WITH TECHNOLOGY.
Voting systems should rely as little as possible upon a voter’s prior experience or
familiarity with a particular type of technology or interface. Computer-based sys-
tems present the most obvious concerns for elderly or marginalized voters who
may be unfamiliar with ATMs, computers, or other similar technologies. Even
optical scan systems that rely upon the voter’s familiarity with “SAT-style” bub-
bles to fill in present parallel problems. Where feasible, elections officials should
address this concern in usability testing among likely voters to determine the pre-
cise effects of different design elements upon voters with limited familiarity with
the technology in question. The results of such testing may also inform the design
of voter education and outreach and poll worker training prior to the election.
Even without usability testing, elections officials should select their jurisdiction’s
voting systems and design the ballots for those systems with the recognition that
many voters, particularly elderly voters, are not fully familiar with technologies
used in ATMs and computers. The VVSG 2005 echoes this general recommen-
dation in one of its specific requirements: “Voting systems with electronic displays
shall not require page scrolling by the voter [e.g., with a scroll bar as against a clear-
er “next page” button].”23
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■ FOLLOW COMMON DESIGN CONVENTIONS.
Ballots and instructions should incorporate standard conventions used in product
interfaces to communicate a particular type of information or message and to
avoid confusion.24 For example, the color red is typically used to indicate an emer-
gency or error in need of attention, while green indicates a selection to move for-
ward or activate the function in question. Consistent use of such generic conven-
tions throughout the voting process allows the voter to rely upon her existing
experience with those conventions to streamline the process and clarify otherwise
ambiguous instructions, but does so without making her success depend upon any
specific prior knowledge or experience. Elections officials should be aware of
such conventions if they are called upon to select color schemes in designing the
ballot for an election in their jurisdictions. All usability guidelines draw on com-
monly accepted typographic principles. For example, Drs. Kimball and Kropf
suggest using text bolding to highlight certain information on the ballot:
■ Ballots should use boldfaced text to help voters differentiate between office
titles and response options (candidate names).25
The Plain Language Guidelines also include typographic principles, such as:
■ Use – but don’t overuse – highlighting techniques.
■ Use 8 to 10 point type for text (i.e., larger than that used in most government
forms at the time).
■ Avoid lines of type that are too long or too short.
■ Use white space and margins between sections.
■ Use ragged right margins.
■ Avoid using all capitals.
The VVSG 2005 also includes design guidelines that address common design
issues such as color, size and contrast for information:
■ The use of color should agree with common conventions, e.g., red should be
used to indicate errors or problems requiring immediate attention.
■ The minimum font size for text intended for the voter shall be 3.0 mm, and
should be in a sans-serif font.26
■ The minimum “figure-to-ground ambient contrast ratio” for text and graph-
ics shall be 3:1.27
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■ USE PLAIN LANGUAGE IN INSTRUCTIONS 
AND MESSAGES.
In the late 1970s, the American Institutes for Research began a Document
Design Project to promote plain language and simple design in public documents.
That Project, which eventually led to the creation of the Document Design
Center, conducted research into language comprehension, how real people write
and read, and particular aspects of public documents that created usability prob-
lems. From this research came a set of principles called “Guidelines for
Document Designers,” which were intended to apply across many different disci-
plines.28
These guidelines include principles for creating instructional and informational
text, such as:
■ Write short sentences.
■ Use the active voice.
■ Use personal pronouns to address the reader.
■ Avoid phrases that are long strings of nouns.
■ Avoid nouns created from verbs; use action verbs.
■ List conditions separately.
■ Keep equivalent items parallel.
■ Avoid unnecessary and difficult words.
Usability experts who focus on voting systems use these plain language guidelines
in their efforts to ensure that text presented to voters at each stage of the voting
process is as easy to comprehend as possible.29 Although the benefits of most of
these simple principles appear intuitively obvious, further research through
usability testing of voting systems is necessary to determine the relative impacts
of these rules upon the three core elements of usability (accuracy, efficiency, and
voter confidence). Dr. Kimball and Dr. Kropf ’s findings on paper ballots repre-
sent a strong first step in this process. Based on their 2005 study, they recommend:
■ Voting instructions should be short and simple, written at a low reading level
so voters can read and comprehend them quickly.30
The VVSG 2005 echoes this suggestion:
■ Voting systems “shall provide clear instructions and assistance to allow voters
to successfully execute and cast their ballots independently.”31
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■ LOCATE INSTRUCTIONS SO THEY WILL BE CLEAR.
Proper instructions must be presented in a manner that is helpful to voters, rather
than confusing or overwhelming. According to general guidelines, instructions
should be placed near the process they describe. When a procedure requires sev-
eral steps, instructions should be provided at each step, rather than only at the
beginning.32 In addition, research into the impact on usability of different formats
for presenting on-line information has demonstrated that, particularly for users
with limited literacy, information should be presented in a single-column format
rather than a multi-column format to improve readability.33 According to
research conducted by Drs. Kimball and Kropf, voters using optical scan ballots
often ignored text that spanned the top of a multi-column ballot. Accordingly,
they recommend that:
■ Voting instructions should be located in the top left corner of the ballot, just
above the first contest. That is where people in Western cultures begin read-
ing a printed page and where respondents will look for instructions on the
first task.34
Where possible, elections officials should design usability testing that will identify
the best approach to provide clear, readable instructions to voters throughout the
voting process.
■ ELIMINATE EXTRANEOUS INFORMATION.
Ballot design should eliminate all extraneous information from the voter’s field of
vision and minimize visual or audio distractions from the task at hand.35 Voters
may become overwhelmed or confused by such unnecessary material. This phe-
nomenon may explain in part the higher levels of “roll off ” produced by voting
systems that present the voter with all of the races and ballot questions at once
on a single surface.36 Even for paper ballots, Drs. Kimball and Kropf suggest that
designers eliminate information not immediately necessary to vote:
■ Ballots should avoid clutter around candidate names (such as a candidate’s
occupation or hometown).37
■ PROVIDE CLEAR MECHANISMS 
FOR RECORDING AND REVIEWING VOTES.
Voting systems should clearly indicate where a voter should mark her selections,
and provide ongoing feedback to the voter to ensure that she knows which selec-
tions she has already made and which remain. This information orients the voter
to avoid confusion or lost votes due to such confusion. Drs. Kimball and Kropf
suggest a specific guideline to help ensure that a system offers clear and unam-
biguous feedback to the voter as she marks her ballot:
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■ To minimize ambiguity about where voters should mark their votes, ballots
should avoid locating response options on both sides of candidate names (this
is a common problem on optical scan ballots, where two or three columns of
offices and candidate names are listed on a single page).38
The VVSG 2005 also includes requirements that address this issue:
■ “There shall be a consistent relationship between the name of a candidate
and the mechanism used to vote for that candidate,” e.g., the button for select-
ing candidates should always be on the left of the candidates.39
■ Voting systems shall provide unambiguous feedback to indicate the voter’s
selection (e.g., a checkmark beside the chosen candidate).40
■ “Input mechanisms shall be designed so as to minimize accidental activa-
tion.”41
A recent study of ballot design changes implemented in Illinois between 2000
and 2002 underscores this point.42 In Illinois, voters must cast judicial retention
votes in each election, using long lists of sitting judges for which voters must vote
either “yes” or “no.” In 2000, Cook County switched to a butterfly design for
their punch card system, and the percentage of people who cast votes in the judi-
cial retention elections dropped significantly.
In 2002 Marcia Lausen, of Design for Democracy, and the county election
department redesigned the county's ballot. Lausen and her colleagues clarified
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FIGURE U1
PUNCH CARD BALLOT USED IN 2000
where voters should mark their ballots by stacking all of the retention candidates
in single columns on left-hand pages only.
The improvement was dramatic. In the 2002 and 2004 elections, even while
retaining the smaller-hole punch card, judicial retention voting returned to its
pre-2000 levels with no abnormal loss of voters. Figure 3 shows the votes cast in
sequence for Cook County retention judges before, during and after 2000. Note
the peaks and valleys that correspond to page changes on the 2000 ballot. Before
the change, voters would repeatedly begin again after turning the page, and then
give up.
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FIGURE U2
BALLOT DESIGN USED IN 2002
FIGURE U3












































■ CREATE CLEAR CLOSURE.
Where applicable, the ballot presentation should make clear when the voter has
completed each step or task in the voting process. Whether through clear organ-
ization of the ballot or through express messages on a screen, the system should
seek to reduce the likelihood of voter confusion or error by instructing how to
complete each task and then making clear when each task has been successfully
completed. This principle should apply as well to making clear to the voter when
she has completed the voting process by casting her vote. Drs. Kimball and Kropf
suggest that designers use shading to separate sections of the ballot:
■ Ballots should use shading to help voters identify separate voting tasks and
differentiate between offices.43
■ REDUCE MEMORY LOAD.
Voting systems should minimize the memory load on the voter, allowing her to
review, rather than remember, each of her choices during the voting process.
Undue memory burdens may confuse voters and lead to errors or delays. For
example, systems that allow voters to review their choices in a clearly presented
format, rather than simply asking if they are ready to cast their ballots, can
reduce unintentional error. At least one requirement in the VVSG 2005 address-
es the problem of memory load and possible confusion if the voter is required to
track a contest from one part of the ballot to another:
■ Voting systems “should not visually present a single contest spread over two
pages or two columns.”44
Elections officials should consider this principle in selecting a voting system, in
developing usability testing to improve ballot design, and in designing the ballot
and instructions for their jurisdiction.
■ NOTIFY VOTERS OF ERRORS. 
The voting system should plainly notify the voter of her errors and provide a
clear and easy opportunity to correct such errors. In particular, a voter should be
informed of any under- or overvotes prior to casting her vote. In paper-based sys-
tems such as optical scan systems, this requirement means that the scanner must
be programmed to return immediately to the voter for correction any ballot that
includes such an error. In DREs, the system should notify the voter of any such
error and provide an opportunity and instructions to correct it. Drs. Kimball and
Kropf ’s guidelines include:
■ Ballot instructions should warn about the consequences of casting a spoiled
ballot and explain how to correct a spoiled ballot (required by the Help
America Vote Act of 2002).45
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Systems that allow voters to
review their choices in a clearly
presented format, rather than
simply asking if they are ready
to cast their ballots, can reduce
unintentional error.
The VVSG 2005 also requires notification of errors, stressing the importance of
noting any under- or overvotes. The guidelines also recommend that all warnings
function in a similar manner, not only stating the problem, but doing so in a com-
prehensible manner and offering options to address it:
■ Warnings to the voter should clearly state the nature of the problem and the
responses available to the voter.46
■ MAKE IT EASY TO CORRECT ERRORS.
The federal Help America Vote Act requires that voters have an opportunity to
correct errors on their ballots.47 But if correcting errors during the voting process
imposes a significant burden on voters, the number of voters who choose not to
make corrections increases, leading to higher residual vote rates. Accordingly, the
mechanism for correcting errors must be easy both to understand and to execute.
In their laboratory research on DREs, Dr. Conrad et al. found that the Diebold
AccuVote-TS required the voter to de-select an erroneous candidate selection
before touching her preferred candidate on the screen; this extra step caused con-
fusion among participants and led to at least one error.48 By contrast, other DREs
under study did not require that extra step in the error correction process. The
VVSG 2005 includes several requirements to provide opportunities for error cor-
rection and ensure that voters can extend a warning period if they need more
time:
■ DREs “shall allow the voter to change a vote within a contest before advanc-
ing to the next contest.”49
■ Voting systems “shall provide the voter the opportunity to correct the ballot
for either an undervote or overvote before the ballot is cast and counted” and
“shall allow the voter . . . to submit an undervoted or overvoted ballot.”50
■ If the voting system requires a response by the voter within a specified peri-
od of time, it shall issue an alert at least 20 seconds before this period
expires.51
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Our review of usability research on various technologies, including but not limit-
ed to voting systems, points us to several recommendations in the areas of ballot
design and system instructions. These recommendations should assist election
officials in making purchase decisions and in maximizing a voting system’s usabil-
ity once it is purchased and before ballot designs and instructions are finalized:
■ Do not assume familiarity with technology. Where feasible, elections officials
should address this concern in usability testing among likely voters to deter-
mine the precise effects of different design elements upon voters with limited
familiarity with the technology in question. The results of such testing should
also inform the design of voter education and outreach and poll worker train-
ing prior to the election.
■ Conduct usability testing on proposed ballots before finalizing their design.
Usability testing of specific models within a type of voting system is critical if
election officials are to reduce unnecessary voter errors. Election officials
should not assume familiarity with technology or a particular voter interface.
■ Create plain language instructions and messages in both English and other
languages commonly used in the jurisdiction. Use of plain language that is
easy to understand quickly is critical to avoiding voter error. Both DREs and
optical scan systems produce substantially higher residual vote rates in juris-
dictions with a Hispanic population of at least 30%. This suggests that plain
language instructions in both English and Spanish are critical to reduce voter
errors, even where Spanish language ballots are not required under the
Voting Rights Act.
■ Locate instructions so they are not confusing or ignored. Instructions should
be placed in the top left of the frame, where possible. In addition, informa-
tion should be presented in a single-column format rather than a multi-col-
umn format to improve readability.
■ For both ballots and instructions, incorporate standard conventions used in
product interfaces to communicate a particular type of information or mes-
sage Consistent use of generic conventions (e.g., red = warning or error)
throughout the voting process allows the voter to rely on her existing experi-
ence to streamline the process and clarify otherwise ambiguous instructions.
■ Do not create ballots where candidates for the same office appear in multiple
columns or on multiple pages. Listing candidates for the same office in mul-
tiple columns or on multiple pages (as in the infamous “butterfly ballot” used
in Palm Beach County, Florida in 2000, or in optical scan ballots that allow
a contest to continue from one column to another) produces higher rates of
residual votes (both overvotes and undervotes).
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■ Use fill-in-the-oval ballots, not connect-the-arrow ballots, for optical scan sys-
tems. In optical scan systems, residual votes (and especially overvotes) are less
common on fill-in-the-oval ballots than on connect-the-arrow ballots. The
latter design should not be used.
■ Eliminate extraneous information on ballots. Ballot design should eliminate
all extraneous information from the voter’s field of vision and minimize visu-
al or audio distractions from the task at hand. Voters may become over-
whelmed or confused by such unnecessary material.
■ Ensure that ballot instructions make clear that voters should not cast both a
write-in and normal vote. Write-in lines are a source of many overvotes, as
many voters select a candidate whose name is printed on the ballot and then
write the same name on the write-in line. Election officials should make sure
that instructions clearly state voters should not cast votes in both areas of the
ballot. At the same time, state laws should be amended to require that such
ballots be counted rather than set aside as spoiled, as long as both the write-
in vote and the normal vote are clearly cast for the same candidate.52
■ Provide mechanisms for recording and reviewing votes. Voting systems
should provide ongoing feedback to the voter to ensure that she knows which
selections she has already made and which remain. This information orients
the voter to avoid confusion or lost votes due to such confusion.
■ Make clear when the voter has completed each step or task in the voting
process. Whether through clear organization of the ballot or through express
messages on a screen, the system should reduce the likelihood of confusion
or error by instructing voters how to complete each task and then making
clear when each task has been successfully completed.
■ Minimize the memory load on the voter, allowing her to review, rather than
remember, each of her choices during the voting process. Undue memory
burdens reduce accuracy, and may confuse voters and lead to errors or
delays.
■ Ensure the voting system plainly notifies the voter of her errors. In particu-
lar, a voter should be informed of any under- or overvotes prior to casting her
vote. In paper-based systems such as optical scan systems, this requirement
means that the scanner must be programmed so that the ballot is immedi-
ately returned to the voter for correction of either of these kinds of error.
■ Make it easy for voters to correct their errors. If voters find it difficult to cor-
rect their own errors during the voting process, then the number of voters
who choose not to make corrections increases, leading to higher residual vote
rates. Accordingly, the mechanism for correcting errors must be easy both to
understand and to execute without any unnecessary, extra steps to complete.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the currently available voting technologies, which is the least expensive? It’s a
simple question without a simple answer. A host of voting machine cost studies
have produced contradictory results, particularly when it comes to assessing the
two most common technologies: Direct Recording Electronic (“DRE”) and
Precinct Count Optical Scan (“PCOS”) systems.
For instance, on March 12, 2005, TrueVoteCT issued an analysis that purported
to show that PCOS “is a much less expensive voting technology than DRE
machines.”1 In contrast, a New York City Election Voting Systems draft report
released in February 2005 (and later updated on March 11, 2005) tentatively con-
cluded that the initial costs of a DRE-based system would be slightly higher than
the initial costs of a PCOS-based system, but that the ongoing per election costs
of the DRE-based system would be far lower.2 And, splitting the difference, the
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project reported that “over a fifteen-year span,
the combined operating and acquisition costs [of DRE and PCOS] are not sig-
nificantly different.”3
While it may be difficult to determine which voting technology is least expensive,
it is quite easy to understand how seemingly straightforward analyses of voting
technology costs could produce such different results: each system has different
costs and benefits, and the ability to exploit these benefits is contingent upon a
diverse set of jurisdiction-specific conditions. Depending upon the assumptions
one makes about these conditions before crunching the numbers, each of the sys-
tems can be made to look comparatively affordable or expensive.
Of course, most election officials and concerned citizens care little about how dif-
ferent voting systems stack up against each other in the abstract. The real con-
cern is how much a particular voting system will cost them. The purpose of this
report is to assist localities and their citizens in making that determination.
■ VOTING SYSTEMS BACKGROUND 
The Brennan Center has analyzed the relative cost of five voting systems. In all five
cases, the systems are made up of a combination of two machines: the main appa-
ratus (i.e., PCOS, DRE, or DRE with a Voter-Verified Paper Trail (“DRE w/
VVPT”)), plus one accessible apparatus per polling place (i.e., accessible DRE,
accessible DRE w/ VVPT, or Ballot Marking Device (“BMD”)).4 Pursuant to
Section 301(a)(3) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), election juris-
dictions must ensure that every polling place has one voting machine or method
that allows the disabled to vote in privacy. While a DRE can be made accessible to
people with disabilities with a relatively inexpensive peripheral hardware purchase,
the paper ballots employed by PCOS-based systems can only be made “accessi-
ble” (within the meaning of HAVA) through the purchase of a separate BMD or
accessible DRE, which greatly increases the per-polling place hardware cost.5
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The Brennan Center sent surveys to nearly 1700 county election officials around
the country, with questions regarding their current voting machine systems, pur-
chasing plans, and compliance with HAVA.6 Without exception, election officials
who have recently purchased DREs or DREs w/ VVPT have either already pur-
chased, or intend to purchase, accessible DREs to meet HAVA’s accessibility
requirements. Election officials that have recently purchased PCOS have pur-
chased, or intend to purchase, either accessible DREs or BMDs to meet HAVA’s
accessibility requirements.
The following are the five voting systems currently being purchased (the “Five
Voting Systems”), and they will be the subject of this report:
■ The DRE System. This system is comprised of DREs (touch screen
machines) with an “accessible” DRE in each polling place.
■ The DRE System w/ VVPT. This system is comprised of DREs w/ VVPT,
plus an accessible DRE in each polling place.
■ The PCOS System. This system is comprised of PCOS machines with an
accessible DRE in each polling place.
■ The PCOS System with DRE w/ VVPT. This system is comprised of PCOS
machines with an accessible DRE w/ VVPT in each polling place.
■ The PCOS System with BMD. This system is comprised of PCOS machines
with a BMD in each polling place.
■ SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Our conclusions about cost can be broken into two categories. “General
Conclusions” are the few universal rules that govern the cost of voting systems
independent of jurisdictional considerations. “Jurisdiction-Dependent
Conclusions” reflect the effect of localized factors on total system cost. A full
explanation of these conclusions can be found in “Analysis of Total Cost” below.
■■ GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Our study of the cost of voting systems has shown the following conclusions to
be true across jurisdictions:
■ The initial costs of a voting system are likely to be a small percentage of the
cost over its total life-span. Voting systems that initially cost a jurisdiction less
money may end up being more expensive than other systems after a few
years.
■ DRE Systems without VVPT are less expensive than similar DRE Systems 
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w/ VVPT under all circumstances, for both initial and ongoing costs.
■ PCOS Systems (with accessible DREs) are less expensive than similar PCOS
Systems with BMDs under all circumstances, for both initial and ongoing costs.
■ Vendors offer significant volume discounts. To the extent that counties and
states can pool their purchases, they are likely to save considerably in the pur-
chase of their voting systems.
■■ JURISDICTION-DEPENDENT CONCLUSIONS
The relative cost of DRE-based and PCOS-based systems, in particular, will vary
greatly from one jurisdiction to the next. The Brennan Center has identified
seven jurisdiction-dependent factors that appear to be most significant in deter-
mining the initial and/or long term cost of voting systems. Localities should con-
sider each of these factors when attempting to get a complete picture of the long
term cost of a voting system. They can use the Cost Calculator to assist them in
weighing these factors:
1. How many registered voters are there per precinct/polling place?
2. What percentage of votes is cast early? 
3. How much will the jurisdiction need to pay for ballots?
4. How many elections are held per year?
5. How much programming assistance will the jurisdiction need?
6. How much poll worker and other training will the jurisdiction need? 
7. Will the county be forced to incur transportation and storage costs for the vot-
ing machines? 
Each of these factors, by itself, can dramatically alter the long term cost of a vot-
ing system. Below is a chart detailing how the total cost of DRE- and PCOS-
based systems are likely to be affected by each factor.
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TABLE C1
JURISDICTION-DEPENDENT COST FACTORS
Factor PCOS-based Systems DRE-based Systems
1. More voters per precinct/polling place No Effect More Expensive
2. More votes cast early No Effect More Affordable7
3. Higher cost for ballots More Expensive Marginally
More Expensive 
(absentee ballots)
4. More elections per year More Expensive Marginal Effect
5. Using vendor for programming No Uniform Answer No Uniform Answer
6. Additional poll worker More Expensive More Expensive
and other training
7. Additional transportation and storage More Expensive More Expensive
Factors 1 and 2 relate to how many voters a jurisdiction can place on each
machine. As discussed in greater detail infra pp. 140–141, one of the primary ben-
efits of PCOS-based systems is that PCOS machines can handle many more 
voters in a single day than DRE-based systems. This means that jurisdictions with
high numbers of voters in a single precinct or polling place would not incur as
great an increase in hardware costs for a PCOS-based system as for a DRE-based
system. On the other hand, this advantage to PCOS-based systems could be
reduced if a large percentage of votes are cast over several days prior to Election
Day; one DRE can handle many more votes over several days than in a single
day, since the most salient constraint on the number of voters a DRE can process
is the amount of time it takes each user to vote.
Factors 3 and 4 relate to the cost of paper ballots, one of the most expensive
ongoing costs for all Five Voting Systems. PCOS-based systems use many more
paper ballots than DRE-based systems, which will primarily use paper ballots for
absentee voting. DRE machines themselves do not use paper ballots. The more a
jurisdiction has to pay for ballots, and the more ballots it has to print, the more
expensive PCOS-based systems will become.
Factors 5 through 7 will be particularly difficult for jurisdictions to quantify and
will require extensive investigation. As discussed in greater detail infra pp.
146–151, such investigation will have to include the technical sophistication of
county employees and poll workers, whether and to what extent counties can uti-
lize available resources for a new voting system, and what type of voting system
the jurisdiction previously used. We have included two case studies that detail the
experience of purchasing a new voting system to assist jurisdictions in determin-
ing what questions to ask when conducting this investigation.
130 THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, ACCESSIBILITY,  USABILITY,  AND COST
■ METHODOLOGY 
The Brennan Center was faced with two major challenges in developing a
method for comparing the costs of voting systems. They were: (1) finding out
what jurisdictions were actually paying for voting systems, in both the short and
long term; and (2) identifying the key jurisdiction-dependent factors that made
costs of the same system vary so much from one jurisdiction to another.
■■ DATA COLLECTION
The Brennan Center took the following steps in order to collect a comprehensive
dataset representing the actual costs incurred by jurisdictions in purchasing and
implementing new voting systems:
■ Contacted the 324 jurisdictions believed to have purchased one of the Five
Voting Systems since Election Day 20028 and requested copies of their most
recent voting machine contracts or final vendor bids (“Contracts and Bids”).9
■ Sent surveys (the “Follow-Up Surveys”) to, and conducted follow-up inter-
views with, the 35 jurisdictions that provided data in response to our request,
in order to identify costs not enumerated in the Contracts and Bids.10
■ Sent cost surveys to 1,694 counties nationwide (the “Cost Surveys”) to sup-
plement the data acquired in steps 1 and 2, particularly for the purposes of
estimating the costs of ballots and identifying other factors that affected the
short- and long-term costs of purchasing a particular voting system.11
■ Contacted six major vendors regarding costs and policies associated with
their voting systems.12
■■ DATA ANALYSIS 
Using the Contracts and Bids, interviews with vendors and election officials, as
well as the Cost Survey and Follow-up Survey responses, the Brennan Center cal-
culated the initial and ongoing costs of voting machines for various jurisdictions.
From this information, we identified the way in which certain jurisdiction-
dependent factors appeared to affect those costs.
For the purpose of performing this analysis, we were forced to make a number of
assumptions. Where possible, these assumptions are based upon information
gleaned from the Cost Surveys. We summarize them below:
■ Life Span and Repair. In estimating the cost of systems, we have assumed
that the life span of each system will be exactly the same. We assumed that
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jurisdictions will enter into the up-front maintenance agreements, offered by
most vendors, which cover most repair costs.
■ Conglomeration of Machine Type. We have not distinguished between ven-
dors when calculating the cost of the various system types, and our cost esti-
mates are based on the median price charged for hardware, software and
consumable goods for each type of system. Our discussion of the cost of
DRE-based systems is limited to systems that use “scrolling” as opposed to
“full-face” DREs.
■ Inflation, Time Value of Money. In projecting costs over time, we have
assumed there will be no increase in licensing, maintenance fees, or the pur-
chase price for consumables or replacement parts. Furthermore, we have
computed total costs without considering the “time value” of money, i.e., the
balancing of short- and long-term costs in making an initial purchasing deci-
sion.
■ Number of Ballots Purchased. We have assumed that jurisdictions using
PCOS machines will purchase one ballot per registered voter for every elec-
tion.
■ Growth/Changes in Jurisdiction. In estimating and projecting the overall cost
of voting systems, we have not factored in the costs that may be incurred as
a result of population or political changes in the jurisdiction.
■ Other Costs. Our “Analysis of Total Cost” does not take account of all pos-
sible costs associated with voting systems, but rather includes only those fac-
tors found to have the greatest influence on the cost of purchasing, operating,
maintaining, and using the voting systems.
For a more detailed discussion of these assumptions, see Appendix C.
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ANALYSIS OF TOTAL COST
We have detailed the most common initial and ongoing costs for hardware, soft-
ware, and consumables in Appendix D.13 Our analysis of total cost, below, is
meant to assist jurisdictions in understanding how these individual costs, over
time, will affect the overall cost of a voting system.
■ GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions can be made independent of jurisdictional considera-
tions.
■■ OPERATING COSTS ARE LIKELY TO EXCEED 
INITIAL COSTS OF VOTING SYSTEMS.
The Brennan Center has analyzed both initial and ongoing costs of the Five
Voting Systems. Many jurisdictions are most concerned with initial costs at the
time of purchase. In part, this concern is fueled by the need to ensure that feder-
al funds allocated to the states pursuant to HAVA will pay for new machines in
their entirety.
However, initial costs of information technology systems like voting machines are
generally only a small portion of their total, life-span cost. The life-span costs
include the purchase and use of consumables like ballots, paper, and ink, as well
as “costs associated with operations, maintenance, upgrades and training.”14 In
fact, “within a few years of initial purchase, many voting system jurisdictions have
found that other nonprocurement expenditures exceed the initial purchase cost
[of voting systems].”15
As demonstrated in the next section, “Jurisdiction-Dependent Factors,” voting
systems that initially seem least expensive will often become more expensive than
other systems after a few years. Some jurisdictions may decide that, given the con-
straints of current funding for voting systems and the time value of money, they
care most about a voting system’s initial costs. At the very least, they should be
aware that, depending upon facts specific to their locations, the costs of the Five
Voting Systems are likely to change substantially over time.
■■ DRES ARE LESS EXPENSIVE THAN DRES w/ VVPT. 
Among jurisdictions that have decided to purchase a DRE-based system, rather
than a PCOS-based system, there is often significant debate over whether the
DRE-based system should have VVPT. Not surprisingly, DREs without VVPT
are less expensive than similar DREs w/ VVPT under all circumstances. This is
true not only because of the additional hardware and printing costs associated
with DREs w/ VVPT,16 but also because voting on DREs w/ VVPT takes more
time than voting on DREs without VVPT.
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Voters using VVPT systems must wait for the paper record to print, and then they
are asked to review it. Based upon follow-up interviews, we estimate that voting
takes 10% longer on DREs w/ VVPT than on DREs without VVPT.17 As a
result, we have assumed that jurisdictions purchasing large numbers of DREs w/
VVPT will have to purchase a slightly higher number of DREs than they would
if they purchased a system without VVPT.
■■ ACCESSIBLE DRES ARE LESS EXPENSIVE THAN BMDS. 
Purchasers of PCOS-based systems must buy one accessible machine for each
polling place; in general, that accessible machine will either be an accessible DRE
or a BMD. Our statistical sample of BMDs is small, since few jurisdictions have
yet to buy these machines (in fact, the only contracts or bids for BMDs that we
have found are for ES&S’s Automark).
Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that currently, BMDs are significantly
more expensive than accessible DREs. BMDs are still a relatively new technolo-
gy, and there is reason to believe that their cost will decrease over time. Some
jurisdictions have chosen BMDs over accessible DREs because they prefer to
have a single ballot-based system (which, theoretically, could lead to lower costs
for audits and storage; see discussion of storage costs, infra pp. 149–151.
■■ MOST VENDORS OFFER VOLUME DISCOUNTS. 
Regardless of what voting system a jurisdiction purchases, large purchases are
likely to produce significant savings over smaller purchases. Many contracts and
bids that we have reviewed provide purchasers with volume discounts. This
means that a jurisdiction can get better prices if it purchases more machines.
Accordingly, we recommend that states negotiate with vendors directly, rather
than allowing counties to do so individually. Moreover, to the extent it is possible,
counties and states will probably receive significant reductions if they make pur-
chases together to take advantage of volume discounts.
Below are some examples of volume discounts provided by vendors that we dis-
covered after reviewing the Contracts and Bids.
Accupoll
Of all vendors, Accupoll’s volume discounts were the most consistent across bids.
In both Iowa and Texas, Accupoll’s flagship DRE machine, the AVS-1000, began
at $3,688 and was discounted by 10% when more than 500 units were purchased.
When a jurisdiction purchased 5,000 machines, the price of the AVS-1000
decreased by 15%.18
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Diebold
Diebold offered Iowa jurisdictions the AccuVote-OS PCOS scanner at $5,250 for
counties that purchased 100 PCOS machines or fewer. The price was reduced to
$4,995 for purchases of 101–200 machines, and $4,800 for purchases of more
than 200 machines.19
In the final Diebold bid to Texas (the “Texas Bid”),20 Diebold offered Texas coun-
ties the AccuVote-OS scanner for $6,400. One percent was subtracted for pur-
chases of more than 50, 3% for more than 100, 5% for more than 500, and 7%
for more than 1,000.21
A number of Arizona counties purchased the AccuVote-OS together and
received what appears to be a significantly reduced price for the AccuVote-OS:
they paid a flat price of $4,800 for each machine (including necessary accessories,
such as ballot boxes).22
Diebold offered its primary DRE, the AccuVote-TS, to Iowa counties (the “Iowa
Bid”) for $3,150 for the first 125 machines purchased. This was discounted by an
additional $50 per machine at each of the following quantities: 325, 550, 1,000,
2,000, and 3,000.23 In its Texas Bid, Diebold offered the AccuVote-TS to Texas
counties for $3,195. It provided a $50 discount per machine for the same quan-
tities as in the Iowa Bid.24
San Diego County, CA, received an “allowance” or discount of $11 million for
its purchase of voting equipment, including 8,500 AccuVote-TSX machines at
$3,195 per machine.25
ES&S
ES&S did not explicitly offer a volume discount for its main PCOS product, the
Model 100 (“M100”), in any of the Contracts or Bids we reviewed. However,
counties that purchased more machines appeared to receive better prices. For
instance, LaSalle County, Illinois, which purchased 100 M100s, paid $3,752 per
M100 scanner, while Menard County, Illinois, which purchased only 11 paid
$4,400 per M100 scanner.26
The only explicit mention of a volume discount for the ES&S iVotronic DRE
machine in the ES&S contracts and bids we have reviewed was in ES&S’s Texas
bid. For Texas counties, the 15” iVotronic began at $2,496 and was discounted by
an additional $50 at each of the following quantities: 25, 100, 250, 500, 1,000,
2,000, and 10,000.27 Among the other contracts and bids we reviewed, the cost
of the 15” iVotronic was relatively constant at about $3,000 ($3,200–3,500 for the
accessible version).
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■ JURISDICTION-DEPENDENT FACTORS
As already discussed, the Brennan Center has identified seven jurisdiction-
dependent factors that are likely to affect the total cost of purchasing a particu-
lar voting system. They are:
1. How many registered voters are there per precinct/polling place?
2. What percentage of votes is cast early? 
3. How much will the jurisdiction need to pay for ballots?
4. How many elections are held per year?
5. How much programming assistance will the jurisdiction need?
6. How much poll worker and other training will the jurisdiction need? 
7. Will the county be forced to incur transportation and storage costs for the vot-
ing machines? 
We can see how important some of these factors are by examining the likely cost
of purchasing each of the Five Voting Systems28 in three seemingly similar coun-
ties that responded to our Cost Survey: McLeod County, Minnesota; Curry
County, New Mexico; and Lyon County, Kansas.29 All three jurisdictions are
rural counties, with approximately 20,000 registered voters. Our estimates of
their likely costs are based upon the median prices for hardware, software, and
services that have been charged for each system (a) in the Contracts and Bids and
(b) as reported to us in the Cost Survey Responses and Follow-up Interviews.
These estimates are not based upon actual bids received or contracts entered into by any of the
three counties.30
Nor do these estimates take into account jurisdiction-dependent factors 5 through
7. These are factors that are unique to each county, but were not possible for us
to estimate without the counties performing extensive investigations.31
We do not intend the analysis below to serve as recommendations to any of these counties regard-
ing which system they should purchase. Nevertheless, the graphs below starkly demon-
strate how different the costs of the same system can be, even to counties that
appear to have similar needs.
We can see that in Curry County, the initial cost of purchasing any of the Five
Voting Systems seems roughly equal, but that after 20 years, PCOS-based systems
are likely to cost the county much more than DRE-based systems.
By contrast, in Lyon County, PCOS-based systems start out significantly less
expensive than DRE-based systems. After 20 years, the cost of three systems – the
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PCOS System, the PCOS System with accessible DRE w/ VVPT, and the DRE
System – appear roughly equal in total cost. The DRE System w/ VVPT is sig-
nificantly more expensive than these three systems, and the PCOS System with
BMD is most expensive of all.
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FIGURE C1
CURRY COUNTY, NM
41 POLLING PLACES, 37 PRECINCTS, 21,020 REG. VOTERS, 1400 ABSENTEE BALLOTS,
4.5 ELECTIONS PER YEAR, 92 CENT BALLOTS
FIGURE C2
LYON COUNTY, KS
28 POLLING PLACES, 32 PRECINCTS, 20,500 REG. VOTERS, 400 ABSENTEE BALLOTS,
2 ELECTIONS PER YEAR
FIGURE C3
MCLEOD COUNTY, MN
16 POLLING PLACES, 28 PRECINCTS, 19,800 REG. VOTERS, 325 ABSENTEE BALLOTS,
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Finally, in McLeod County the three PCOS-based systems start out the least
expensive. We project that after twenty years, they remain the least expensive.
Some patterns remain constant for all three counties. For instance, DRE Systems
without VVPT are less expensive than DRE Systems w/ VVPT, both initially and
over time, in every county. And PCOS Systems (with accessible DREs) are less
expensive than PCOS Systems with BMDs initially and over time in every county.
But how do we explain the differences? Why are PCOS-based systems initially so
much less expensive in McLeod County, but roughly the same price as DRE-
based systems in Curry County? Why do initial and long-term costs seem to cor-
relate by system in McLeod County, while in Lyon County, some systems (in par-
ticular the PCOS System with BMD) have a low initial price, but are projected to
cost the county much more over twenty years? We can find the answers to these
questions in the information each county gave us.
PCOS-based systems are initially so much less expensive in McLeod County
because McLeod County has more than 1,000 registered voters per polling place
(specifically, 16 polling places, 28 precincts, and 19,800 registered voters).32 If it
so chooses, McLeod County can limit its purchase to just 16 PCOS machines, or
one per polling place. PCOS machines have been shown to handle as many as
3,500 voters in a single Election Day.33 At approximately $5,000 per PCOS scan-
ner, the primary piece of hardware for the PCOS-based systems will cost
McLeod County about $80,000.34 To comply with HAVA’s accessibility require-
ments, McLeod County will also have to purchase 16 BMDs or accessible DREs.
This would cost the County an additional $48,000 to $90,000.
By contrast, our review of the Contracts and Bids show that, on average, coun-
ties will purchase one DRE for every 180 registered voters. This means McLeod
County would have to buy at least 110 DREs if it purchased one of the DRE-
based systems. As the median cost of the DRE unit is around $3,000, McLeod
County would likely be forced to pay approximately $325,000, or about twice as
much on the DRE units as on PCOS scanners and BMDs or accessible DREs.35 
In Curry County, there are 21,020 registered voters, but 41 separate polling places;
this means PCOS-based systems offer less of a savings than in McLeod County.36
Like McLeod County, Curry County would probably have to buy at least 110
DREs, including 41 accessible units (one for each polling place). The number of
PCOS scanners it would have to buy would greatly increase: with 41 separate
polling places, it will need to buy at least 41 PCOS machines and 41 accessible
units (either BMDs or accessible DREs). This is more than triple the number of
PCOS machines and accessible units than McLeod County would have to buy.
And it means that Curry County will probably need approximately $400,000 for
the PCOS scanners and accessible units, an amount substantially similar to what
it would pay for DRE hardware.37
We project the cost to McLeod County of owning a PCOS-based system will not
increase greatly over time. By contrast, it rises steadily in Lyon County, and even
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more significantly in Curry County. One reason is the amount we estimate each
county would pay for ballots, which are used only on optical scan machines.
McLeod County pays just seven cents for each PCOS ballot.38 In contrast, Curry
County pays 92 cents.39 Lyon County does not have a PCOS-based system; we esti-
mated that Lyon County would pay 30 cents a ballot, which is the average price
paid by counties that responded to our Cost Survey and use a PCOS-based system.
The difference in the cost of ballots between McLeod and Curry County is 85
cents per ballot. Both counties are likely to print close to 20,000 ballots for most
elections.40 This means the difference in the cost of printing ballots for each elec-
tion could run as much as $17,000. Over 20 years, this difference becomes quite
substantial.
Another, but related, difference between the counties is the number of elections
held per year. McLeod County holds approximately one election per year, Lyon
County holds two, and Curry County averages 4.5.41 The more elections a coun-
ty holds, the more ballots it will have to consume, and the more expensive a
PCOS-based system is likely to become over several years.
These are some of the explanations for the projected differences in costs. In fact,
as already discussed, there are at least seven factors that could dramatically affect
the initial and long term costs of voting systems. We discuss each of them below.
■■ REPRESENTATIVE MODEL FOR DEMONSTRATING THE IMPACT 
OF THE SEVEN COST FACTORS: AMALGAM COUNTY, USA
To demonstrate the impact of each of these factors, we have created a compos-
ite jurisdiction. “Amalgam County” is a jurisdictional composite that is meant to
represent a typical county in the United States. Using information provided in the
EAC 2004 Election Day Survey, we determined that, as of 2004, the “average”
county in the United States had approximately 39 polling places, 56 precincts,
and 53,946 registered voters.42 Based upon the results of our Follow-Up and Cost
Surveys, we assumed that Amalgam County would pay 30 cents per PCOS bal-
lot (the average price paid by survey respondents) and conduct two elections per
year (the average number conducted by survey respondents). Finally we assumed
that Amalgam County would pay the vendor to program the machines and bal-
lots (in most Contracts, counties opted to have the vendor program the machines,
at least initially).
We made no assumptions about the previous voting system owned by Amalgam
County, or the amount it would pay for training, transportation, or storage for
machines. These factors are so idiosyncratic by county that we did not believe it
made sense to make assumptions about these costs.43 However, using data we col-
lected from jurisdictions in our Cost Surveys, we do show how each of these costs
can dramatically affect the total cost of any of the Five Voting Systems infra pp.
148–151.
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TABLE C2





Price Per Ballot $0.30
Elections Per Year 2
Using the data provided in Table C2, we are able to chart out a 20-year project-
ed cost analysis of the Five Voting Systems for Amalgam County:
FIGURE C4
AMALGAM COUNTY, USA
20 YEAR COST ESTIMATE
For Amalgam County, the PCOS System with accessible DRE is the least expen-
sive voting system, followed by the PCOS System with accessible DRE w/ VVPT,
and then the PCOS System with BMD. The initial costs for all three of these sys-
tems should be somewhere around $500,000. After 20 years, the total cost of the
PCOS System with accessible DRE and PCOS System with accessible DRE w/
VVPT will increase at roughly the same rate, to well over $1 million. The cost of
the PCOS System with BMD increases more sharply over time. This is largely
because ES&S charges higher hardware maintenance fees for BMD machines
than for any other machine.44
More expensive initially, and over time, are the DRE-based systems. These two
systems will start out costing somewhere between $1 million and $1.5 million.
After 20 years, the operating costs of the DRE System should run over $500,000,
for a total cost of more than $1.5 million. The total cost of the DRE System w/
VVPT will likely come to more than $2 million.
Among the DRE-based systems, the DRE System (without VVPT) is less expen-
sive than the DRE System w/ VVPT. This is true both initially and over time. As
already discussed, this result should not be surprising: DREs w/ VVPT have
additional hardware and printing costs. Moreover, DREs w/ VVPT are slower
than DREs, which we have assumed would force Amalgam County to purchase
more of them.
■■■ NUMBER OF POLLING PLACES/PRECINCTS
A primary reason that PCOS-based systems are less expensive in Amalgam
County is that the number of registered voters per precinct and polling place is
relatively high: 963 voters per precinct and 1,383 voters per polling place. This
means that Amalgam County needs to purchase only one PCOS machine for
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every 1,000 or so registered voters. By contrast, it must purchase one DRE for
every 180 registered voters and one DRE w/ VVPT for every 162 voters.
But what happens if the county has more precincts and fewer registered voters
per precinct? For instance, if the county had 120 precincts, there would be
approximately 450 voters per precinct (as opposed to the 963 voters in our origi-
nal analysis). Almost 30% of the counties that responded to our Cost Survey had
precincts with 450 or fewer registered voters per polling place. Assuming that
Amalgam County had 120 precincts rather than 56, and that it purchased one
PCOS machine for each of these 120 precincts, the initial and long-term cost of
all three PCOS systems would greatly increase compared to our earlier analysis.
FIGURE C5
AMALGAM COUNTY, USA
120 PRECINCTS, 1 PCOS PER PRECINCT
We can see in Figure C5 that under these circumstances, the initial costs of all
three PCOS-based systems are much closer to the initial costs of the three DRE-
based systems. Moreover, by about year 14, Amalgam County is projected to have
spent more on the PCOS System with accessible DRE than it would spend on the
DRE System. Similarly, at about year 20, the cost of the PCOS System with
BMD is projected to surpass the DRE System w/ VVPT. This is because, in addi-
tion to the extra cost created by the necessity of purchasing additional PCOS
machines, over time Amalgam County will have to pay more for maintaining and
operating these extra machines.
Does this mean that, all other factors being equal, counties with less than 450 vot-
ers per precinct should assume that PCOS-based systems will eventually become
more expensive than DRE-based systems? Not necessarily.
Some counties, such as Amalgam County, will have multiple precincts per polling
place.
By putting two precincts on a single machine, these jurisdictions can significant-
ly cut the initial and long term costs of purchasing a PCOS-based system.
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In Figure C6 we see that initial costs for the PCOS-based systems start much
lower than if Amalgam County purchased one machine for every precinct.
Moreover, in the long term, the PCOS-based systems appear to remain less
expensive than the DRE-based systems. Again, with few machines, a county is
likely to pay less in maintenance and programming for those machines.
FIGURE C6
AMALGAM COUNTY, USA
120 PRECINCTS, 1 PCOS FOR EVERY 2 PRECINCTS
We make an important caveat to this projection, however: voting results must be
totaled, audited, shipped and stored by precinct. The separation of ballots by
multiple precincts could be a hardship at the close of Election Day. Moreover, the
ballots themselves would become more expensive: to the extent that a polling
place is using only one PCOS machine to count multiple precincts, each
precinct’s ballots must be coded with an extra bar, so that they can be distin-
guished by the machines.45 These facts make using PCOS machines on multiple
precincts more expensive than they appear in the chart above.
Some vendors claim that their PCOS scanners can handle as many as five to
seven ballot types.46 This would theoretically allow urban districts like New York
City or Chicago – which have several precincts per polling place – to place as
many as seven precincts on a single scanner. In practice, however, few, if any,
jurisdictions do this. For instance, in recently deciding to purchase a PCOS-based
system, Cook County, Illinois assumed it would place a maximum of two
precincts on a single PCOS machine. It judged placing more precincts than two
on a single PCOS machine as too complicated.47
■■■ PERCENTAGE OF EARLY VOTING
The analysis above assumes that counties will purchase one DRE for every 180
voters. But what if a large number of voters vote early? Will it be necessary to
buy so many DREs? Maybe not. In such cases, counties may calculate that they
can afford to buy fewer DREs per precinct.48
Going back to our original assumptions about Amalgam County, let’s assume that
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there are 53,946 registered voters. In the 2004 Presidential Election in Arizona,
40.8% of all voters voted early.49 If Amalgam County knew that so many of its
voters were going to vote early, it might not need to buy one DRE for every 180
voters. Instead, it might purchase one DRE per 318 registered voters, as
Chambers County, Texas appears recently to have done.50 This would drastically
reduce the relative cost of DRE-based systems.
FIGURE C7
AMALGAM COUNTY, USA
318 VOTERS PER DRE
On the other hand, some counties have determined that one DRE per 180 reg-
istered voters is too few. Posey County, Indiana, for instance, bought one DRE for
every 76 voters. These jurisdictions may fear that voters will need extra time
because they are unfamiliar with the DRE machines, or they may believe that
their counties are growing quickly enough that it is better to buy additional DREs
as soon as possible. In any case, we can see in Figure C8 that if Amalgam County
followed the conservative path of Posey County, Indiana, DREs would appear to
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■■■ COST OF BALLOTS
Responses to our Cost Surveys and Follow-Up Interviews showed that ballots
often represent the single highest consumable cost for jurisdictions; this is true
across systems. In all systems, some ballots are used; even in jurisdictions that use
only paperless DREs, absentee votes are recorded by ballot.
PCOS-based systems are affected most by the cost of ballots because all votes,
whether cast absentee, early, or on Election Day, are cast on paper ballots. Where
paper ballot costs are high, the PCOS-based systems become much more expen-
sive over time. Our Cost Survey responses showed that jurisdictions can pay any-
where between 7 and 92 cents per paper ballot. The explanation for these vary-
ing costs are many: some jurisdictions have more complex ballots; some want to
spend more on design to ensure that the ballots are not confusing; some must rely
on vendors who charge high prices to supply their ballots; while some print their
own ballots.51
The median price of ballots for jurisdictions that responded to our survey was 30
cents, so this is the amount we have assumed Amalgam County would pay. But
we can see in Figures C9 and C10 how differently the cost of PCOS-based 
systems, in particular, look if we assume a very high or low price per ballot:
FIGURE C9
AMALGAM COUNTY, USA
BALLOT PRICE: 92 CENTS
FIGURE C10
AMALGAM COUNTY, USA
BALLOT PRICE: 7 CENTS
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Where a county pays just seven cents per ballot, as McLeod County, Minnesota
does, the cost of owning a PCOS-based system remains relatively low over time.
The gap between the cost of PCOS-based systems and the cost of DRE-based
systems actually grows over time. This is mostly due to the extra maintenance
costs that will likely be incurred for DRE-based systems because many more
machines would be required than if the county purchased a PCOS-based system.
By contrast, where a county must pay 92 cents per ballot, as in Curry County,
New Mexico, long-term costs of PCOS-based systems balloon. If Amalgam
County was forced to pay 92 cents per ballot, the three PCOS-based systems
would become more expensive than the DRE System (without VVPT) by year 8,
and more than the DRE System w/ VVPT by year 12.
For this reason, when considering which voting system to purchase, counties
should investigate carefully how much ballots are likely going to cost them.
■■■ NUMBER OF ELECTIONS PER YEAR
Just as a high cost of ballots makes the long term cost of PCOS-based systems
greater, so too does a high number of elections per year. In both cases, the con-
sumption of ballots increases the operating costs of PCOS-based systems.
The average number of elections per year varies from state to state and county
to county. Some jurisdictions reported to us that they have as few as one election
every two years.52 Others had as many as 4 or 4.5 per year.53
FIGURE C11
VARYING NUMBER OF ELECTIONS
4 ELECTIONS PER YEAR
Again, going back to our original assumptions about Amalgam County, we can see
in Figure C11 that if Amalgam County had 4 elections per year, PCOS-based sys-
tems become much more expensive over time.54 After 20 years, the amount spent
on PCOS-based systems will equal the amount that would be spent on DRE-based
systems.
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VARYING NUMBER OF ELECTIONS
1 ELECTION EVERY 2 YEARS
By contrast, if Amalgam County held only one election every two years, as in
Sherburne County, Minnesota,55 the long term costs of PCOS-based systems
remain relatively low. In fact, we project that the total operating costs for the
DRE-based systems will be greater over the 20-year period than it will be for the
PCOS-based systems.
■■■ PROGRAMMING
Responses to our Follow-Up Interviews and Cost Surveys show that program-
ming costs are often among the highest annual costs for operating voting
machines. We did not find significant differences across systems for programming costs.
Vendors often charge significant sums to program machines to read new ballots
for each election. For instance, Diebold, in its Iowa Bid, proposed charging coun-
ties with ten or fewer precincts $300 per precinct per election. For programming
for more than 11 precincts, its charge was $250 per precinct, per election.
Amalgam County, with 59 precincts, would pay a substantial amount to Diebold
under this bid. Specifically, it would pay $14,750 per election. With an average of
two elections per year, this would amount to an extra $590,000 in costs over 20
years. This is greater than the amount of money Amalgam County would ini-
tially pay to purchase any of the PCOS-based systems (all of which should cost
less than $500,000 today), and about one-half the initial cost of purchasing a
DRE-based system.
Because vendor programming can be so expensive, many jurisdictions have cho-
sen to do their own programming. Doing so can result in substantial savings for
jurisdictions with access to a well-trained information technology staff. Of course,
the cost of performing programming locally will vary dramatically from county
to county depending on such factors as (a) whether appropriately trained person-
nel are already on staff, (b) the cost of labor in the region, (c) the complexity of
the ballots, and (d) whether the jurisdiction is switching to a new system.
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It should be noted, however, that jurisdictions that choose to perform their own
programming generally pay vendors more for software and maintenance than
jurisdictions that allow the vendors to perform the programming. The reasons for
this are two-fold. First, many vendors require jurisdictions to license additional
software if they are going to perform their own programming. Second, some ven-
dors may charge more for other goods in order to make up for the lost (and
repeatable) revenue that they would have received if the jurisdiction had chosen
to purchase programming services.
We can see the effect of a jurisdiction performing its own programming on total
contract price by looking at side-by-side tables of costs for Amalgam County. In
the first column of each table, we look at the total non-programming costs to
Amalgam County if the county opts to perform its own programming. In the sec-
ond column, we look at the total costs if it opts to allow the vendor to perform its
programming. Neither column accounts for the actual cost of programming; the higher
costs in the first column are attributable to higher software license fees.
TABLE C3
SOFTWARE LICENSING FEES FOR PCOS SYSTEM WITH BMD 
(COST IN $)








SOFTWARE LICENSING FEES FOR PCOS SYSTEM WITH ACCESSIBLE DRE 
(COST IN $)
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TABLE C5
SOFTWARE LICENSING FEES FOR PCOS SYSTEM WITH ACCESSIBLE DRE w/ VVPT 
(COST IN $)








SOFTWARE LICENSING FEES FOR DRE SYSTEM
(COST IN $)







Jurisdictions should consider these extra vendor charges when determining
whether to perform their own programming.
■■■ TRAINING
To the extent that a jurisdiction is purchasing an entirely new system from a new
vendor, it is likely to have substantial initial training and labor costs.56 Four major
vendors sent election staff training bids to Iowa in 2005.57 Prices ranged from
$715 per worker per day to $2,440 per worker for a two-day course.58 These
charges were the same on a per-worker basis, regardless of the voting system pur-
chased. In general, the training costs should decrease over time: trained, experi-
enced workers should be able train new workers without the need to use vendor-
sponsored training. Also, many of the Contracts and Bids included some amount
of initial training from the vendor at no additional cost to the jurisdiction.
The case studies, infra pp. 151–154, detail some of the additional training costs
associated with the purchase of a new system that many election officials cited in
Follow-Up Interviews, including: (a) rewriting instruction and training materials
for poll workers and employees; (b) rewriting and training employees and poll
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workers in new Election Day protocols, (c) teaching employees and poll workers
how to replace machine parts when they break down, and (d) training poll work-
ers how to test machines before and after Election Day.
■■■ TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE
Perhaps more than any other category, transportation and storage costs are going
to vary widely by jurisdiction. Many jurisdictions will be able to obtain storage for
their systems free of charge.59 In some cases, there will be no cost for transporta-
tion of machines because the distance between polling places and off-site storage
is minimal.60
On the other hand, some jurisdictions will incur significant costs for storage and
transportation. Cass County, North Dakota, which uses a PCOS-based system
and owns 56 ES&S M100s reported that in two elections in 2004, it spent
$9,292.05 for transportation of its machines, and that it expected storage of these
machines (plus its BMDs) to cost about $15,000 per year.61
Another western county, which requested anonymity, reported that it used 350
Sequoia AVC Edge DREs in the November 2004 election. This county has
approximately the same number of voters as Cass County, but twice the number
of precincts. It estimates that it spent $4,500 on transportation of its 350 DREs
per election and that it cost $36,000 per year to store them.62 
We can see how much more Amalgam County might have to pay for its voting
systems over time by adding $9,000 per year for transportation and $25,000 per
year for storage.
FIGURE C13
DRE SYSTEM w/ VVPT
TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE COSTS






































PCOS SYSTEM WITH ACCESSIBLE DRE w/ VVPT
TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE COSTS
As already discussed, a jurisdiction with large precincts is going to need to pur-
chase more DREs than PCOS machines. This could result in greater storage and
transportation costs for DRE-based systems than PCOS-based systems.
But there are other, quite significant factors that may play a role in total cost for
transportation and storage. Some of these favor DRE-based systems. Some fac-
tors that jurisdictions should be aware of when considering potential costs of
storing and transporting their voting systems are:63
■ Paper records (including ballots) may have to be stored in fire-resistant con-
tainers.
■ For auditing purposes, memory cards (necessary to all Five Voting Systems)
may have to be stored.
■ DRE-based systems will frequently have Precinct Control Units and
Supervisor Terminals which must be stored and transported.
■ Consumables, including ink cartridges, pens, and thermal paper may have to
be stored.
Some questions that jurisdictions should ask when considering the potential cost
of storing and transporting their machines are:64
■ Do the machines or other system components require storage in climate con-
trol?
■ Do the machines’ batteries require regular recharging?
■ What procedures need to be followed in moving units between their storage
and polling sites?
■ Can damage done to machines during transportation be billed back to com-
panies handling the transportation?




































■ What system was previously owned? How similar are new machines to pre-
vious machines in size, shape, and number?
■ Will warehouses or vans previously used for storage and transportation need
to be retrofitted to hold new machines?
In Appendix E, we look at the height and weight of some of the most popular
DRE, DRE w/ VVPT, and PCOS machines. This information should be useful
in assisting jurisdictions to determine what kind of moving and storage costs will
be associated with each new system.
In “Case Studies: Purchasing a New System” below, we provide case studies that
detail issues jurisdictions have faced when changing voting systems, including
additional unexpected costs associated with storage and transportation.
Jurisdictions have reported significant costs associated with re-wiring warehouses.
(Rewiring has tended to be more of an issue with DREs, which must be periodi-
cally recharged; however, if jurisdictions want to test machines in their ware-
houses, they must have electrical outlets, no matter which system they purchase.)
Moreover, because all Five Voting Systems tend to be more delicate than older
punch-card or lever machines, counties purchasing one of the Five Voting
Systems are often forced to hire and pay for moving companies to ship machines
between off-site warehouses and polling places for the first time.
■■ CASE STUDIES: PURCHASING A NEW SYSTEM
The case studies below65 are representative of discussions we had with dozens of
election officials in our Follow-Up Interviews. Purchasing and converting to a new
voting system is expensive. This expense is often independent of what is charged
by a vendor. Election officials should consider whether they will need to find new
ways of moving their machines, convert current warehouse space, and modify
polling places. These and other cost issues are discussed in the case studies.
■■■ CASE STUDY I: TRANSITION FROM PUNCH CARD TO DRE TO DRE w/ VVPT66 
San Bernardino County, California is home to 750,000 registered voters in 900
precincts. Voting occurs at 410 polling places across the county. The County
replaced its punch card system with 4,000 Sequoia Edge 2 DRE machines in
2003, with HAVA and Proposition 4167 money. The price of the machines was
$13.7 million, which included machines and a support warranty through the end
of 2005.
Fearing that California might some day require machines to have a VVPT, San
Bernardino County negotiated a term that stated Sequoia would add VVPT free
of charge if a VVPT became required under the law. In September of 2004,
California added a law requiring VVPT for all voting systems. In 2005, Sequoia
added the VVPT free of charge, in accordance with the purchase contract. The
County has incurred the following costs in implementing its new voting system:
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■ New Storage Issues. Prior to its purchase of DREs, San Bernardino County
stored its voting machines in a single warehouse. Unlike punch card
machines, DREs need to be charged regularly. Accordingly, San Bernardino
County had to pay to have the warehouse retrofitted to meet the electrical
needs of these machines.
■ Modifying Polling Places. The County employed teams of 6–10 people to
assess whether each of the 410 polling places could accommodate the space
and power requirements of the machines. About 35% of the polling places
had to be converted or relocated altogether. Residences that had previously
served as polling places were especially likely to be inappropriate for DREs
because they could not meet the DRE size and power needs.
■ New Transportation Costs. With the old punch card system, poll workers
would pick up ballots and punch card equipment after training and take
them back to their respective polling places. Now, $100,000 is spent on vehi-
cles and labor in order to transport the machines and ballots to the polling
places because the machines are so much larger.
■ Increased Maintenance. DREs have required more maintenance than the old
punch-card systems. The County has experienced frequent component fail-
ures. Roughly 80–100 touch screens have required replacement. Batteries
have not lasted as long as manufacturers suggested, and about 200 needed to
be replaced within two years of purchase. Electronic harnesses and buttons
have also failed with some regularity. Replacement touch screens cost $1,500
apiece, and replacement batteries cost $200 apiece. Since the machines are
under warranty until the end of 2005, the County has not yet incurred any
costs for replacement. However, it has had to pay for labor. Mr. Kouba esti-
mates that when the warranty runs out, San Bernardino County may have to
pay as much as $100,000 a year for maintenance.
■ Ballot Costs. The county used to spend about $65,000 per election for punch-
card paper ballots. Although DREs do not use paper ballots, costs for pro-
gramming, laying out, and proofing the ballot that appears on the touch
screen are substantial. Mr. Kouba estimates they total about $450,000 per
election. Ballot-proofing and layout requires the work of four to five people
over a period of three weeks. The cost of preparing absentee ballots (San
Bernardino uses Optech ballots and OpScan machines for absentee voting) is
included in these estimates. Optech ballots are six times the size of old
punch-cards ones and take up much more space. In the case of a presiden-
tial election, two ballots are needed because of space constraints.
■ Preparation for Election. Twenty-five workers, working full time for three
weeks, are required to prepare and test the voting machines. Initial training
for poll workers and election staff was provided in the purchase contract.
Additional support and training from the vendor will have to be purchased
separately.
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■ Post-Election Costs. The County spends between three and four weeks after
each election on preventative maintenance to make sure all machines are in
good working order. This maintenance involves running diagnostic tests on
all machines and repairing any physical problems that arose during the elec-
tion, such as replacing legs, latches, screens, etc.
■ Conversion from DRE to DRE w/ VVPT. The County added printers and
VVPT in 2005. Mr. Kouba reported that he did not have any major prob-
lems with the VVPT in the last 2005 election, although there were increased
labor and training costs associated with loading and unloading the paper
rolls, and pollworkers experienced some paper jams.
■ Security (the Automatic Routine Audit). A manual recount of 1% of the total
vote is required by California law as of January 2006 for every election.
However, every contest must be included, so 2–3% of ballots or paper rolls
are actually audited. DRE results are compared against the paper trail and
Optech ballots are handcounted. The automatic routine audit was not insti-
tuted at the last election held in San Bernardino County.
■■■ CASE STUDY II: CONVERSION FROM PUNCH CARD TO PCOS68
Mendocino County, California is home to 50,713 in 98 precincts. Voting (two
elections in even years, one in odd years) occurs at 65–70 polling places across the
county. The County replaced its punch-card system with 70 Diebold AccuVote-
OS PCOS machines in 2003 with State Proposition 4169 and HAVA money.
■ New Storage Issues. With the purchase of the PCOS System, Mendocino
County had to find double the space formerly needed for elections in a
County-owned warehouse, including space that was earmarked for other
divisions. This space houses the PCOS scanners, voting booths, ballot boxes,
and paper ballots. The County does not pay to rent the warehouse space.
Before each election, each machine is tested and then charged overnight
while still in the warehouse. The warehouse did not have to be retrofitted to
accommodate these functions.
■ New Transportation Costs. The County has had to hire a moving company,
at a cost of $8,000–9,000 per election, to deliver booths and ballot boxes to
polling places. The necessary equipment used to be picked up by polling
place supervisors and driven to polling places, but the PCOS ballot boxes are
too big to continue this practice. Now supervisors pick up (and return) only
the Optical Scan unit. For polling places where electronic transmission of
results is impossible, the supervisors will typically drive the Optical Scan unit
into the County’s central office for the results to be uploaded.
■ Maintenance. During an early election, the feeding mechanism on some
PCOS units became periodically jammed when voters inserted their ballots.
When jamming occurred, the ballot had to be cleared out by a poll worker
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and reinserted by the voter. The problematic machines were replaced by
Diebold after the election at no extra cost. Paper audit rolls and print car-
tridges must be changed every election, in part because portions are con-
sumed by testing.
■ Ballot Cost. Ballot costs per election have increased considerably, from about
$5,000 prior to conversion, to at least $30,000 for the current. Over-ordering
has also become a concern where it was not before, because whereas punch-
card ballots were generic and extras could be retained for future elections, the
PCOS ballots currently used are election-specific.
■ Training. New duties, such as electronic transmission of results, have required
more technology-savvy poll workers. In addition, the county has had to hire
Election Day “troubleshooters” to travel between polling places and aid with
more difficult technology issues. With each election, fewer troubleshooters
have been necessary.
The county has had to rewrite instructions and training materials, in some
cases several times, requiring many hours of election staff time. No voter
education was necessary for the conversion to PCOS – it is easier for voters
than punch-cards because the layout is more intuitive.
■ Preparation for Election. The County requires two employees to test all the
machines in the warehouse for two days prior to Election Day.
■ Other Costs. The County spends about $200 per election on pens, which
were not needed for the punch-card system.
■ Unexpected Savings from Conversion. Since PCOS machines tabulate
results instantaneously as voters insert their ballots, the County no longer
requires personnel to tally results on election night as it did with a punch-card
system.
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BRENNAN CENTER FINDINGS
In interviews with the Brennan Center, election officials frequently cited cost as
the determinative factor when choosing among systems. All too often, however,
they did not have sufficient information to understand the full cost implications
of purchasing any particular system.
The most important conclusion of this report may be that the challenge of com-
paring the potential long term costs of particular voting systems is a complicated
task that will require detailed investigation and significant guesswork. There are
few universal rules. That challenge does not mean that a concerted effort to deter-
mine the likely cost of a voting system is pointless. To the contrary, the more
information a jurisdiction has, the more likely it will be able to get a clear picture
of both the initial and ongoing costs of choosing one voting system over another.
The Brennan Center has posted a “Cost Calculator” online.70 This Cost
Calculator can be used by jurisdictions to perform the kind of analysis for their
jurisdiction that we conducted for Amalgam County in this report. In addition to
using the Cost Calculator, we urge election officials and concerned citizens to
consider four important concepts detailed in this report when examining the
potential cost of a particular voting system:
■ PURCHASING IN LARGE VOLUME 
CAN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE TOTAL COSTS.
This report shows that vendors offer significant volume discounts, particularly for
the initial purchase of hardware. To the extent that counties and states can pool
their purchases, they are likely to save considerable money in the purchase of
their voting systems. Accordingly, we recommend that states solicit final bids from
vendors directly, rather than allowing counties to do so individually. From these
final bids, counties can make their own determinations as to which systems and
models are best for them.
■ THE INITIAL PRICE OF A VOTING SYSTEM 
WILL FREQUENTLY REPRESENT A SMALL SHARE 
OF THE TOTAL COST.
Initial costs of information technology systems like voting machines are general-
ly only a small portion of their total, life-span cost. The life-span costs of voting
systems will include the purchase and use of consumables like ballots, paper and
ink, as well as operating, maintenance and training costs.
As demonstrated in this report, voting systems that initially seem least expensive
will often become more expensive than other systems after a few years. Some
jurisdictions may decide that, given the constraints of current funding for voting
systems and the time value of money, they care most about a voting system’s ini-
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tial costs. At the very least, they should be aware that, depending upon facts spe-
cific to their locations, the costs of the Five Voting Systems are likely to change
substantially over time.
■ THOROUGH INVESTIGATION IS KEY 
TO UNDERSTANDING LIKELY TOTAL COSTS.
The total cost of purchasing a voting system will be different for every jurisdic-
tion. We have detailed seven key factors that jurisdictions should consider when
attempting to determine the likely, long term costs of voting systems. The Cost
Calculator should assist jurisdictions in making that determination.
However, the Cost Calculator cannot supply the answers to many questions that
jurisdictions will have to answer to get a complete picture of what a particular
voting system may cost them. Among other matters, when purchasing a new vot-
ing system, jurisdictions should attempt to determine how much they are likely
going to have to pay for ballots, how many ballots they will have to print for each
election, how many elections are likely to be held each year, whether they expect
significant population growth, how similar the new voting system is to the system
they currently use, whether they have trucks and space to accommodate different
machines, whether the state pays for transportation, what kind of security meas-
ures they are required to take by law, and whether they will have to make changes
to warehouse space and polling places to accommodate the new machines.
■ ADOPTING A NEW VOTING SYSTEM 
CARRIES MANY EXPENSES.
As illustrated in our case studies, a repeated lament of election officials was the
unexpected costs of adopting an entirely new voting system. These costs are often
separate and apart from the amounts charged by a vendor in the voting system
contract. They include training poll workers and employees to use, test and main-
tain the new systems, educating the public on how to use the machines, retro-
fitting warehouses and polling places to accommodate new machines, and find-
ing new ways of transporting equipment.
Jurisdictions that already use a PCOS- or DRE-based system, in particular,
should consider these costs when making determinations about purchasing new
machines.
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APPENDIX A
BRENNAN CENTER COST SURVEY
Any individuals and jurisdictions referred to in this report are printed with
express permission obtained outside of this survey.
The Brennan Center at NYU School of Law 
Voting Machine Cost Survey
The Brennan Center is currently drafting a voting machine cost report. Among
other things, the report is meant to assist election officials in making future vot-
ing machine purchases.
The Brennan Center has collected dozens of recently executed voting machine
contracts and is currently reviewing them as part of its analysis.
Of course, in addition to costs listed in voting machine contracts, there are often
additional costs associated with voting machine purchases. We are hopeful that
you can assist us in identifying these costs. Accordingly, we request that you
review the questions below and answer them to the best of your ability.
If you choose, your responses will remain anonymous. This means that neither you nor
your jurisdiction will be identified in the results.
The responses can be returned by fax to Lawrence Norden at 212-995-4550 or
by e-mail at Lawrence.Norden@nyu.edu. Thank you for your help with this very
important project.
1. Do you request that your responses remain anonymous?
❑ yes ❑ not necessary 
2. What type of machine(s) did you use in the last election (please indicate make,
model and type)? 
3. How many of each type of machine are used in your county in general 
elections?
4. When were these machines purchased?
5. How many registered voters are there in your county? 
6. How many precincts are there in your county? 
7. Are there any transportation costs associated with the movement of your vot-
ing machines on Election Day? If so, what were these costs? How much was
spent on transportation of voting machines on each of the last four (4) elec-
tions (please provide dates and amount spent)? 
8. Are there any storage costs associated with your voting machines? If so, how
much is spent per year on storing your voting machines? 
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9. Did you incur any costs for training in excess of what is provided for in your
voting machine contract? If so, how much has been spent in each of the last
five (5) years (if possible, please breakdown expenses by type of training – e.g.,
poll worker training, program training, etc.)? 
10. Did you incur any costs for programming in excess of what is provided for in
your voting machine contract? If so, how much has been spent in each of the
last five (5) years?
11. Did you incur any costs for maintenance in excess of what is provided for in
your voting machine contract? If so, how much has been spent in each of the
last five (5) years? 
12. If you use PCOS machines, what is the approximate cost of ballots, includ-
ing printing (cents per ballot)? 
13. Can you identify any other costs associated with your voting machines that
were not covered in your voting machine contract (e.g., electricity to recharge
machines, purchase of replacement parts)? If so, please list each of those
items and the amount of associated costs on a per year basis (if you use more
than one type of machine, please break down additional costs by type of
machine – e.g.., $300 per 5 years for memory card replacement for PCOS,
$500 per year for memory card replacement for DRE).
Battery replacement? __________________ Approximate cost per year? ______
Memory card replacement?______________ Approximate cost per year? ______
Other replacement? (please identify) ______ Approximate cost per year? ______
Electricity/Recharge cost? ______________
Other costs? (please identify) ____________
14. Do you have either (a) a depreciation formula for your machines, or (b) an
estimate of how long you expect your voting machines to last before they will
need to be replaced? If yes to either (a) or (b), please provide details.
15. The Brennan Center would like to use certain counties as case studies in its
report. The purpose would be to show future voting machine purchasers the
types of extra costs that might be associated with purchasing a particular vot-
ing system. The individuals and jurisdictions used as case studies will remain
anonymous in the Brennan Center Report. Would you object to our con-




Best time to follow up: ______________________________________________
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APPENDIX B
BRENNAN CENTER FOLLOW-UP SURVEY
1. What type of machine(s) did you use in the last election (please indicate make,
model and type)? When were these machines purchased?
How many registered voters are there in your county?
2. How many precincts are there in your county?
3. Are there any transportation costs associated with the movement of your vot-
ing machines on Election Day? If so, what were these costs? How much was
spent on transportation of voting machines on each of the last four (4) elec-
tions (please provide dates and amount spent)?
4. Are there any storage costs associated with your voting machines? If so, how
much is spent per year on storing your voting machines?
5. Did you incur any costs for training in excess of what is provided for in your
voting machine contract? If so, how much has been spent in each of the last
five (5) years? 
6. Did you incur any costs for programming in excess of what is provided for in
your voting machine contract? If so, how much has been spent in each of the
last five (5) years? 
7. Did you incur any costs for maintenance in excess of what is provided for in
your voting machine contract? If so, how much has been spent in each of the
last five (5) years?
8. If you use PCOS machines, what is the approximate cost of ballots (includ-
ing printing)?
9. Can you identify any other costs associated with your voting machines that
were not covered in your voting machine contract (e.g., electricity to recharge
machines, purchase of replacement parts)? If so, please list each of those
items and the amount of associated costs on a per year basis.
Battery replacement? __________________ Approximate cost per year? ______
Memory card replacement?______________ Approximate cost per year? ______
Other replacement? (please identify) ______ Approximate cost per year? ______
Electricity/Recharge cost? ______________
Other costs? (please identify) ____________
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10. Unexpected costs associated with machines?
11. If making the purchase over again, what are things you would want to know
about system that you didn’t?
12. (For PCOS) – what kind of costs are associated with paper?
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APPENDIX C
ASSUMPTIONS IN DETAIL
■ LIFE SPAN AND REPAIR
In estimating the cost of systems, we have assumed that the life span of each sys-
tem will be exactly the same. This is almost certainly untrue both among and
within systems (some vendors’ products are likely to last longer than others, even
within the same system). The Brennan Center did not obtain enough information
on each of the systems to comment on their likely life spans. However, both DRE
and PCOS machines have been used without major replacements in a number of
jurisdictions for more than ten years.71 For instance, every county in Oklahoma
has used a version of the PCOS system since 1992.72 And Macon County, North
Carolina has used a version of the DRE since 1986, without needing to replace
any major parts.73
The Brennan Center was not able to obtain enough information about repairs to
different voting systems to estimate actual, annual, out-of-pocket repair costs for
each system. However, most vendors offer up-front maintenance agreements for
their machines. We assumed that jurisdictions will enter into these maintenance
agreements. We further assumed that vendors and jurisdictions would renew
these maintenance agreements for the life of the machines. For the most part, the
maintenance agreements cover replacement of hardware (but no consumables
such as batteries and removable memory cards) to the extent necessary to ensure
that machines will work “substantially as described” in the voting machine con-
tracts.74
■ CONGLOMERATION OF MACHINE TYPE
Each vendor manufactures slightly different versions of DREs, DREs w/ VVPT
and PCOS, and in many cases a single vendor may manufacture more than one
version of the same type of machine. We have not distinguished between vendor,
and our cost estimates are based on the median price charged for hardware, soft-
ware, and consumable goods for each type of system.
Our discussion of the cost of DRE-based systems is limited to systems that use
“scrolling” DREs (each race appears on the DRE screen separately; after the
voter makes her selection for the first race, the second race will appear on the
screen), as opposed to “full-face” DREs (all candidates and races listed on a sin-
gle screen). All of the Contracts and Bids we reviewed listed prices for “scrolling”
DREs only.
The initial hardware costs for scrolling DREs can be less than half the cost of
full-face DREs.75 Moreover, full-face machines have been shown to produce high-
166 THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, ACCESSIBILITY,  USABILITY,  AND COST
er rates of residual voting.76 Given these facts, we believe very few jurisdictions
will purchase full-face machines.77 
■ INFLATION, TIME VALUE OF MONEY
In projecting costs over time, we have assumed there will be no increase in licens-
ing, maintenance fees or the purchase price for consumables or replacement
parts. While such costs are likely to increase over time, we cannot project by what
amount, or for which system the rate of increase might be greater.
Furthermore, we have computed total costs without considering the “time value”
of money. Jurisdictions may determine that they would prefer to spend less
money initially, even if it means spending more in total dollars over 20 years. Our
purpose is not to make this judgment for localities; it is only to point out the
potential short- and long-term costs of each voting system.
■ NUMBER OF BALLOTS PURCHASED
We have assumed that jurisdictions using PCOS machines will purchase ballots
equal to 100% of the number of registered voters; this assumption includes the
printing of both absentee and polling place ballots. We have assumed this is true
for all elections, regardless of whether the election is primary or general, presi-
dential or mid-term. In fact, laws on the number of ballots that must be printed
vary drastically from state to state.78 
■ GROWTH/CHANGES IN JURISDICTION
In estimating and projecting the overall cost of voting systems, we have not fac-
tored in the costs that may be incurred as a result of population or political
changes in the jurisdiction.
An increase in a jurisdiction’s population may make DRE-based systems rela-
tively more expensive over time, in a way that is not reflected in this analysis. For
instance, Clark County, Nevada, one of the fastest growing counties in the coun-
try, first purchased DREs in the early 1990s. Since that time, it has repeatedly had
to purchase additional machines to accommodate additional voters.79 PCOS
scanners can handle many more voters in a day than a single DRE machine. In
a jurisdiction that used a PCOS-based system and experienced rapid population
growth, it might not be necessary to buy any new machines.
On the other hand, a decision to create new precincts (perhaps because of a
growth in population, or other political considerations) is likely to increase the
number of PCOS scanners that jurisdictions will have to purchase. Our analysis
does not detail how this kind of political change would affect the cost of PCOS
based systems. It is significantly easier to put multiple precincts on a single DRE
machine than on a single PCOS scanner.
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■ OTHER COSTS
Our “Analysis of Total Cost” is very likely to underestimate the ongoing operat-
ing costs of all Five Voting Systems. There are literally hundreds of costs associ-
ated with operating, maintaining, and using a voting system. These costs include
everything from preparing public education materials on how to use voting
machines to purchasing the machines themselves. Our analysis includes what we
have concluded to be the biggest cost factors in purchasing, operating, maintain-
ing, and using the voting systems. These factors are likely to have the greatest
impact in determining the total cost of a voting system, and in making one sys-
tem more or less expensive than another.
168 THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, ACCESSIBILITY,  USABILITY,  AND COST
APPENDIX D
LIST OF COSTS FOR EACH VOTING MACHINE
INITIAL OPERATING
Hardware
PCOS Scanner ($4,500-6,000) Memory card ($75-250)
DRE DRE Unit ($2,100-3,700) Memory card ($60-150)
Supervisor Terminal ($2,200-2,800)
Precinct Control Unit ($600-2,500)
Precinct Printer ($600-800)1
Accessible DRE Accessible DRE unit ($2,800-$3,800) Headphones ($15)
DRE w/ VVPT Same as DRE, plus: Memory card ($60-150)
VVPT Printer ($02-1,000)
BMD BMD Unit ($5,000-5,400) Memory card ($90)
Headphones ($15)
Software
PCOS Election Management System (“EMS”) EMS license
(varies according (varies according 
to county size) to county size)
Firmware license 
($25-100 per precinct 
per year)
DRE EMS EMS license
Firmware license 
($20-100 per precinct 
per year)
Accessible DRE Same as DRE Same as DRE
DRE w/ VVPT Same as DRE Same as DRE
BMD Same as DRE, plus: Firmware license ($30 per 
AIMS software ($2,500 initial cost) polling place per year)
Consumables3
PCOS Pens (for ballots) ($0.50/ea) Ballots ($0.22-0.30)
Pens
Paper for tally and audit
trail ($1-5/roll, 1-3 rolls per
machine per election)
DRE Thermal paper for tally 
reports ($2-4/roll, 1 roll 
per machine per election)
Accessible DRE Same as DRE, plus:
Headset ear covers 
($0.15/set, 1 set per voter)
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INITIAL OPERATING
DRE w/ VVPT Printer paper ($1-5/roll, 
about 3 rolls per machine 
per election)
Printer ink ($6-30 per 
machine per election)
Thermal paper (same as 
DRE)
BMD Ink cartridge ($25-30 per
polling place per election)
Thermal paper ($2/roll, 
1 roll per machine 
per election)
Headset ear covers 
($0.15/set, 1 set per voter)
Cardboard secrecy 
sleeves ($2.50/ea, 1+ per 
simultaneous voter)
Other
PCOS Installation ($50-100/machine) Training
Training/testing ($90-200/hr) Election support
Election support ($90-250/hr) Storage
DRE Programming Programming




Accessible DRE Programming Maintenance agreement
($250-300/machine per election) payments ($85-230/
machine per year) 
DRE w/ VVPT Same as DRE Same as DRE
BMD Installation ($60-105 per machine, Maintenance agreement
if jurisdiction cannot install their own) payments ($145-280 per 
machine per year)
Archiving of ballots
1Implementations of ballot activation equipment vary by vendors. Many (e.g. Diebold, Accupoll,
Unilect, and Hart) require a Precinct Control Unit (“PCU”) (essentially a PC or laptops) at each precinct,
the cost of which usually includes either a “electronic ballot” activator, a printer (to print a unique code
a voter activates a DRE with), or both. Other vendors (e.g. Microvote and Sequoia) require only that a
card activator device be purchased for each precinct. For ES&S systems, the number of Supervisor
Terminals depends upon whether the county uses a poll worker- or voter-activated ballot system. For the
former, the Supervisor Terminal is required only to activate supervisor Personal Electronic Ballots
(“PEBs”) for poll workers. For a voter-activated implementation, a Supervisor Terminal is required for
every precinct, so that a poll worker can load a ballot onto a PEB for each voter.
2 Accupoll builds VVPT into every DRE machine.
3 Initial consumable items generally included with PCU, printer pack, or other mandatory item.





Type & Model Dimensions Weight Charging Time Required?
DRE
Hart InterCivic eSlate1 11”x17”x3” 28 lbs w/ non-rechargable No
booth battery lasts 18 hrs
Sequoia AVC Edge2 26”x17”x10” 38-40 lbs N/A N/A
ES&S i Votronic 3 16.1”x18.5” 14.35 libs charge overnight No
x2.65” before elections 
+ every 3 months 
when not in use
Diebold AccuVote-TS4 15”X19”x3” 29 lbs 3hrs Yes
Diebold AccuVote TSX5 15”x19”x3” 29 lbs 3hrs Yes
AVS WinVote6 14” x 16”X3” 23 lbs Runs on standard Yes
110-volt electricity, 
has a self-contained 
3 hr battery
Unilect Patriot7 17 x 15”x2.2” 5-8 lbs runs on electrical No
power, backup 
battery should be 




AccuPoll 8 24”x20”x13” 36 lbs info not available N/A
AvanteVote-Trakker 20”x20”x20” 18 lbs leave plugged in No
EVC-308SPR9 at all times
PCOS
Avante Optical Vote 18”x18”x12” 30-35 lbs keep plugged in No
Trakker10 at all times to 
maintain charge
ES&S Model 10011 5”x14”x16” 20.7 lbs Charge overnight No
before elections + 
once every 6 months
when not in use
Sequoia Opteck Insight12 17.5x19”x22.5” 25 lbs N/A N/A
Diebold AccuVote-OS13 14x16”x3” 15 lbs Overnight Yes
BMD
ES&S Automark14 17.6x26x20.8” 39 lbs N/A N/A
Populex15 17.5”x17.5” >15 lbs N/A N/A
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1 http://www.capc.umd.edu/rpts/md_evote_ContempVotingMach.pdf (dimensions); http://
www.hartic.com (weight); Telephone interview with Hart InterCivic employee (April 21, 2006) (charging




4 Telephone Interview with Diebold employee (April 20, 2006 ).
5 http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/accuvote_tsx.htm.
6 http://www.uhavavote.org/vendorfair/survey_results/AVS.doc.
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APPENDIX F
EXPLANATION OF THE COST CALCULATOR
■ HOW TO USE IT 
The Cost Calculator can serve several purposes for election officials and con-
cerned citizens.
First, by permitting users to tailor their input to match the actual conditions of
their jurisdictions, the calculator allows users to understand what initial and long
term costs associated with a particular system might be. They can use the calcu-
lator to compare the potential costs for each system. As noted above, many of
these costs are not necessarily spelled out by bids or contracts that jurisdictions
negotiate or receive.
For instance, in addition to initial hardware and software costs, purchasers are
likely going to have ongoing costs for software licensing fees and maintenance, as
well as for consumables like pens, printer ribbons, paper, and ballots. The calcu-
lator will approximate these costs over a period of time (fixed by the user).
Second, the Cost Calculator also allows users to understand how certain decisions
could lead to a change in contract prices. For example, a jurisdiction’s decision to
program its own machines will (not surprisingly) lead to a smaller total charge
from most vendors because the jurisdictions will avoid programming charges
from the vendors. However, we have found that jurisdictions that do their own
programming are also likely to be charged slightly more for software and software
maintenance. Thus, the savings for doing their own programming might not be
as large as some jurisdictions would expect.
Third, the Cost Calculator allows officials to understand both the potential initial
and ongoing costs of purchasing a particular system. Using this information, they
should get a handle on whether their HAVA and other funding will allow them
to purchase the number of machines necessary to accommodate their jurisdic-
tion’s size, and what long term costs they are taking on by purchasing one system
over another.
Finally, even where a jurisdiction has determined which voting system it would
like to purchase, the Cost Calculator should tell it whether it has received a fair
bid from vendors (at least compared to deals struck by states and counties
between 2002 and 2005). The Cost Calculator should also give members of the
public greater confidence that their election officials negotiated the best deal pos-
sible for their county or state.
■ CALCULATOR LIMITS 
Most significantly, the Cost Calculator generates its estimates based on the medi-
an prices charged in a limited set of contracts. The Cost Calculator output is
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based upon contract and bid prices from between 2002 and the present. This
information is likely to change in a short amount of time. Costs of new technol-
ogy (which particularly includes BMDs, DREs, and DREs w/VVPT) are most
likely to fluctuate in the short term.
Moreover, while the Cost Calculator attempts to assist jurisdictions in determin-
ing total costs of purchasing a voting system over a fixed period of time, it does
not allow users to determine how a change in population might affect costs over
the long term. For instance, Clark County, Nevada, one of the fastest growing
counties in the country, first purchased DREs in the early 1990s. Since that time,
they have repeatedly had to purchase additional machines to accommodate addi-
tional voters.xi The calculator would not allow Clark County to determine to
what extent growing population would affect its long term costs under each vot-
ing system.
There are other reasons the estimates given by the Cost Calculator are necessar-
ily limited in scope. The data from the contracts collected by the Brennan Center
are most consistent as they relate to initial hardware purchases and hardware
maintenance agreements, because nearly every contract or estimate included
these items in a well-defined form. For these costs, the Cost Calculator does not
include any extras, backups, or alternative systems (i.e. ballot-scanning systems to
count provisional or absentee ballots or to serve as fail safes for a DRE-based
implementation) that many counties choose to purchase. Other costs were more
difficult to model, and have been addressed in a variety of ways.
Software costs were one such area. Some vendors, such as Diebold and Accuvote,
provided in their estimates graduated cost schedules for their election manage-
ment system (“EMS”) software, so that it is a trivial matter to calculate the soft-
ware costs given the number of precincts in a county. Others, however, appear to
negotiate EMS costs on a contract-by-contract basis according to no discernible
system. Still others (such as Microvote) seem to charge a relatively fixed cost for
their software, regardless of the size of the county. Every vendor charges a pre-
mium to counties who wish to program the hardware on their own, as opposed
to purchasing programming services from the vendor. The EMS calculator tool
on the input form represented a best guess averaging data from four vendors’
(ES&S, Diebold, Microvote and Accupoll) contracts. However, the user may also
input a different cost than the one calculated. The Cost Calculator is likely to
underestimate EMS costs for very large jurisdictions, and overestimate EMS costs
for small purchases made by very small jurisdictions.
Training, installation, support, and voter awareness services are also difficult to
calculate based upon available data. A county’s need for these services is largely
a function of not only the size of the county, but on its existing infrastructure, the
savvy of its employees, poll workers and voters, and other factors. Several of the
contracts listed hourly or daily rates for these services, but the totality of the data
did not yield a formula for determining these needs according to a county’s size.
The Cost Calculator is incapable of evaluating these variables.
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Finally, neither the Cost Calculator nor this report addresses the cost of replac-
ing various systems, or how long each system can be expected to last. Some data
that may help voting machine purchasers assess these factors may be found in this
report.
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